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The present issue of the Working Papers 
published by the Department of Sociology of the 
Institute for Eastern European Studies at the Freie 
Universität Berlin contains preliminary results of 
the international research project Comparing Out-
Migration from Armenia and Georgia (ArGeMi), 
funded by Volkswagen-Stiftung for the 2008-2010 
period. Two introductory chapters provide an 
overview on the topic of international migration 
and on the aims of the research project. Three 
reports explore causes, processes and effects 
of out-migration from Armenia and Georgia to 
Moscow which is the most relevant destination 
of migrants from the South Caucasus. The issue 
also contains a comprehensive bibliography on 
out-migration from Armenia and Georgia and 
immigration to Russia.
The guiding idea of the descriptions 
and explanations is the necessity to analyze 
international migration from the perspective of 
both the countries of origin and the countries of 
immigration. This balanced approach is further 
elaborated by taking into account the variety of 
macro-, meso-, and micro-social determinants 
of international migration and its consequences. 
This two-tired explanatory model offers fresh 
insights into the interplay of economic, political 
and cultural factors and effects of migration. In 
addition, it makes it possible to systematically 
study acting individuals together with economic 
organizations, political institutions and other 
collective actors involved in the international 
migration. Following this complexity of the 
guiding conceptual approach, the reports discuss 
the historical background and the present day 
conditions of migration, provide statistical 
information from national and international 
sources, review legal regulations and results of 
scientiﬁc studies.
The bibliography at the end of this publication 
includes literature from periodicals (both printed 
and online editions), monographs, results 
of representative surveys and case studies. 
The bibliography will be updated and can be 
downloaded from website of the project
http://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/soziologie/
forschung/ArGeMi/Links_Bibliography.html
The papers included in the present publication 
are products of an international cooperation 
involving Prof. Dr. G. Poghosyan from the Institute 
of Philosophy, Sociology and Law of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, 
Yerevan; Dr. I. Badurashvili from the Georgian 
Centre of Population Research, Tbilisi; Prof. Dr. 
G. I. Osadčaya and Prof. Dr. T. N. Yudina from the 
Russian State Social University, Moscow; Prof. 
N. Genov (Head of Project), Dr. T. Savvidis and 
Dr. M. Bojadžijev from the Institute for Eastern 
European Studies of the Free University Berlin. 
Paul Becker and Kristin Mehnert provide technical 
assistance to the Project. Special thanks of the 
research team go to Volkswagen-Stiftung and to 
the Freie Universität Berlin for the ﬁnancial and
organizational support to the ArGeMi research 
project. 
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The statement “labour is not a commodity” was 
a cornerstone in the Eastern European ideology, 
politics and social sciences before 1989. The 
background was the interpretation of labour as 
commodity under capitalism. This interpretation 
was introduced by Marx in his early writings (cf. 
Marx 1847). Under the conditions of socialism the 
situation was supposed to be radically different. 
Labour was deﬁned as free of commodiﬁcation
since the means of production were widely 
socialized (state owned). Economy was thus 
dominated by plan and not by market. There was 
ofﬁcially no labour market and labour had no
market price. 
At ﬁrstglance,thestatementandtheexplanations
were correct. Wages and salaries were in fact 
determined by administrative decisions and not 
by the market equilibrium of demand and supply 
of labour. However, a closer look at the realities in 
the state socialist societies reveals a controversial 
situation. Millions of peasants moved voluntarily 
from the rural areas to the emerging industrial 
agglomerations because of one major reason: the 
remuneration of industrial work was higher than 
the work in the agricultural cooperatives. Thus, 
peasants moved to towns because they could 
receive a better price by selling their labour force 
in the industrial enterprises. 
After the ﬁrst phase of industrialization
was over, the deﬁcits in the supply of labour
force became chronic in most eastern European 
societies. Directors of industrial enterprises tried 
to cope with the deﬁciencies of the socialist
labour organization and the lack of motivation 
for work. They tended to overstaff their factories 
by offering beneﬁts to attract workers from other
factories. Salaries and wages were generally kept 
low by administrative means but there was some 
space for bargaining concerning remuneration and 
other beneﬁts. The workers did their best to sell
their labour force under better terms of trade like 
payments, lower pension age, facilities for child 
care, etc. and massively ﬂuctuated from factory to
factory.1 There was an administratively regulated 
international labour market in the former socialist 
societies as well. Vietnamese, Cuban and Angolan 
workers voluntarily went to work in Eastern 
Europe for better pay. Thus, the reality was 
inherently controversial under state socialism. 
It did not function according to ideological and 
political assumptions. To the contrary, the state 
socialist societies were increasingly moving away 
from the imaginary situation in which the labour 
had to be free of commodiﬁcation. It became clear
for everybody that the ideological slogan “from 
each according to his abilities, to each according 
to his needs” could not be practically materialized. 
The attempt to develop a convincing alternative 
to the efﬁciency of motivation and allocation of
labour force under market conditions could not 
survive for long. 
The rigid administrative regulations of the 
eastern European labour markets disappeared 
together with the rapid political changes after 
1989. The population in the region reacted quickly. 
Only in the course of days thousands and later 
millions of Eastern Europeans joined the millions 
of international migrants offering their labour in 
the markets all over the world. No protectionist 
barriers in Western Europe and North America 
could stop them. When struggling with difﬁculties
in their adaptation to the economy, politics and 
culture in the host countries, eastern European 
migrants practically experienced and continue to 
experience the fact that the labour market is the 
least globalized one as compared to the markets of 
goods, services and the ﬁnancial markets.
The conditions for labour migration 
substantially improved after the accession of 
ten Eastern European countries to the European 
Union. The larger part of the former “second 
world” remains, however, outside of the common 
European labour market. It is actually not fully 
open to the newcomers, too. Still, there are not 
too many other destinations in the world, in which 
the Eastern European labour migrants could try 
to make their dreams come true. On the global 
scale there are only few impressive examples of 
societies which substantially proﬁted from the
international migration of labour:2
LABOUR FOR SALE IN THE GLOBAL MARKET
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Table 1: 
Major destinations of international migration  
(in percentage of migrants in the country’s population, 2005)
Country Millions immigrants In percentage of the population
United Arab Emirates 3.2 71.4
Israel 2.7 39.6
Saudi Arabia 6.3 25.9
Australia 4.1 20.3
Canada 6.1 18.9
USA 38.4 12.9
Germany 10.1 12.3
Russian Federation 12.1 8.4
Twenty years after the start of the East 
European transformations the effects of the 
out-migration from the region are spectacular. 
The lifting of administrative restrictions for 
international movement of labour resulted in a 
net loss of one-third of the population in Armenia, 
Georgia and Moldova. Millions of migrants 
left Poland, Romania and Ukraine for some 
time or forever. Some 80% of them or more are 
assumed to have joined international migration 
in search for employment. The economically 
motivated out-migration from Eastern European 
countries still continues and will continue in the 
foreseeable future. The long lasting effect is the 
net loss of population. Some new member states 
of the European Union are particularly affected by 
emigration:3 
Table 2:
Net migration projections for the Eastern European members of the EU  
(in thousands)
Country 2006 to 2010 2011 to 2015 2016 to 2020
Bulgaria  -58.3 -77.1 -83.1
Czech Republic 16.9 -10.2  22.0
Estonia -9.9 -13.5 -7.2
Hungary 69.3 33.1 52.2
Latvia -12.6  -22.1  -11.7
Lithuania -29.5  -35.1  -18.7
Poland -158.7 -277.3 -153.7
Romania -68.4 -168.6 -226.5
Slovakia -11.9 -13.7 -2.8
Slovenia  30.1  18.7 22.8
Thus East Europeans became involved in social 
processes which challenge social theory and social 
policies all over the world. For social sciences, the 
major issue is rooted in the complexity of the out-
migration and immigration processes which “create 
whole new ways of linking labour-exporting 
and labour-importing countries” (Sassen 2007, 
141). These links and processes are determined 
by multiple interconnected factors and ﬂuctuate
substantially in the course of time. It is difﬁcult
to analytically specify the lines of determination 
and their effects. Only tentatively, some elements 
of international migration could be identiﬁed
in relative isolation and related to theoretical 
explanatory models. An all-encompassing 
explanatory scheme concerning the phenomenon 
in general or concerning international labour 
migration in particular does not exist so far. This 
unsatisfactory situation will probably continue 
in the foreseeable future despite the fact that the 
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classical “push-and-pull” conceptual scheme has 
been successfully used for long. However, if the 
analysis and the search for explanations would go 
deeply enough, it turns out that there is a large 
variety of push and pull factors interacting at 
various structural levels and with largely varying 
intensity. There are other more or less elaborated 
conceptual schemes which could be used for 
explaining this variety of the speciﬁc push and pull
processes. Some of these explanatory schemes 
concerning emigration/ immigration of labour 
could be brieﬂy and selectively summarized as
follows: 
Macro-social dimensions of the international 
migration of labour:
- Of economic nature 
- International cleavages between national 
labour markets 
- Segmented national labour markets
- Of political nature
- Open policies or isolationism at national 
level
- Supranational policies 
- Of cultural nature
- Compatibility of value-normative systems
- Compatibility of communication means 
(language)
 ↕
Meso-social dimensions and conceptual 
schemes:
- Of economic nature
- Economic actors facilitating or hindering 
international migration 
- Of political nature
- Political and civil actors facilitating or 
hindering international    
migration
- Of cultural nature
- Cultural actors facilitating or hindering 
the adaptation of migrants
 ↕
Micro-social dimensions and conceptual 
schemes:
- Of economic nature
- Rational choice calculation of gains and 
losses of migration
- Of political nature
- Balancing personal interests and social 
responsibilities
- Of cultural nature
- Dynamics of socializations
Thus, the efforts to develop and apply 
explanatory models are facing a large variety of 
individuals’ orientations, decisions and actions 
determined by multiple contingencies. One may 
focus on the concept of cultural preferences or 
on the rational choice among alternatives in the 
attempt to explain the relative importance of push 
and pull factors inﬂuencing personal decisions to
leave the home country and to choose a country 
of destination. This might be done in the search 
for jobs or better pay, for economic and political 
security, for better professional development and 
realization, for a better future for the children etc. 
As seen from a macro-social point of view, one 
may focus on the segmentation of national labour 
markets or on the centre-periphery relationships in 
economic, political and cultural terms. In addition, 
serious theoretical and empirical research is 
possible and needed in order to precisely establish 
and explain the implications of emigration for the 
societies of origin or for the host societies. Labour 
emigration diminishes economic and political 
tensions and conﬂicts due to mass unemployment
in the societies of origin of migrants but usually 
deprives these societies of their most active labour 
force. 
Taking another vantage point, one has to 
precisely calculate the relevance of remittances 
from labour migrants for the mere survival of 
their families left in the countries of origin as well 
as for the stabilization and development of their 
national economies. As seen from still another 
angle, one has to include in the explanatory model 
the probability of return of labour migrants to their 
countries of origin together with the accumulated 
capital, work experience, cultural enrichment etc. 
A special research ﬁeld having policy relevance
concerns the social-structural situation and 
behavioural patterns of labour migrants in the host 
country. The task to reach precise description and 
explanation of the immigration processes is in itself 
multidimensional enough. The labour markets in 
the host countries might have large niches for 
newcomers or might be saturated with all types 
of labour. In addition, the population of the host 
country might be basically tolerant to newcomers. 
But it is also possible that deeply rooted attitudes 
of hostility towards foreigners in general and 
labour migrants in particular are widespread. The 
latter attitudes might be strong even in the case 
that all rational arguments support the thesis that 
International Migration. Local Conditions and Effects 11
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Figure 1: 
Factors, processes and effects of international labour migration4 
immigrants take jobs which the locals would not 
take, that the immigrants substantially contribute 
to the GDP growth and do not misuse the social 
security system at all. 
This large variety of approaches, interpretations, 
cognitive results and policy orientations is 
possible and necessary since the very process 
of international migration is rather complex and 
complicated in motivations, actions and effects at 
various structural levels of society: 
The complexity and the dynamics of these 
processes are exempliﬁed below with the cases
of mass labour out-migration from Poland and 
with the immigration of labour into the Russian 
Federation. 
1: Labour Out-migration from Eastern Europe: The Polish Case
There is one striking problem in the research on 
labour out-migration from the Eastern European 
societies. The phenomenon of out-migration is 
very well known for scientists, politicians and the 
general public in the region. One may identify 
causes and effects of out-migration in all walks 
of social life there. However, it is extremely 
difﬁcult to analyze the phenomenon in precise
terms. According to the Polish Central Statistical 
Ofﬁce, 35,480 persons emigrated from Poland in 
2007. The major destinations for emigration were 
Germany and the United Kingdom. Nearly one 
third of the registered emigrants (13,771 persons) 
moved their permanent residence to Germany and 
9,156 to the United Kingdom.5 This is well proved 
information but the numbers do not correspond 
Tessa Savvidis (Hg.)12
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at all to the real level of out-migration or labour 
migration from Poland to Germany or to the 
United Kingdom. The reason is rather simple since 
only declared emigration is registered. Millions 
of Polish citizens have left Poland after 1989 
for years without registering their emigration. 
Many of them still have a registered residence in 
Poland where they return from time to time. In 
practical terms they are emigrants and many of 
them have no intention to return to Poland indeed. 
However, in statistical terms they are not counted 
as emigrants by the Polish statistical ofﬁce.
The registration of travels from Poland to other 
countries would not bring the researcher closer to 
the real numbers of out-migration, immigration 
and emigration in the Polish case. Many Poles 
travel many times per year abroad without the 
intention to join the Polish labour migrants abroad. 
This holds true for people practicing cross-border 
trade or for business people. The information 
about labour permissions for Poles in other 
countries is also misleading. It is well known that 
Polish labour migrants often start working in the 
shadow economy in the host countries and then 
try to legalize their jobs. However, some of them 
remain working in the shadow economy for long 
and remain statistically unregistered as residents 
of the host country. Thus, statistical information 
about out-migration from Poland is basically 
unreliable. Even in best cases it is the product of 
estimations based on available partial statistical 
data. This is the way in which the following data 
focusing on ’temporary migrants from Poland’ 
were collected by the Polish Central Statistical 
Ofﬁce and should be interpreted (cf. Kaczmarczyk
& Okólski 2008, 603):
Table 3: 
The stock of temporary migrants from Poland, by major destination countries  
(in thousands)
Destination May 2002 January 2005 January 2007  January 2008
Total 786 1000 1950 2270
European Union 451  750 1550 1860
Austria 11 15 34 39
Belgium 14 13 28 31
France 21 30 49 55
Germany 294 385 450 490
Ireland 2  15 120 200
Italy  39 59 85 87
Netherlands  10 23 55 98
Spain  14 26 44 80
Sweden  6 11 25 27
United Kingdom  24  150 580  690
This large-scale out-migration of the Polish 
population in the recent years is a historically 
unique phenomenon. It has no precedence in the 
long history of out-migration from Poland which 
is one of the best-known emigration countries in 
Europe and even world-wide. How do we explain 
the process? More precisely, how do we apply the 
typologies introduced above for the purposes of 
multidimensional explanations? 
The macro-social dimensions of the 
explanatory model should cover the substantial 
cleavages of incomes in Poland and in the EU 
core countries presented in Table 1. The salaries 
and wages in Poland are still at the level of three 
to four times lower than the average remuneration 
in comparable branches in the EU-15. The major 
determining factor of these cleavages is the low 
productivity of labour in the Polish industry and 
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particularly in Polish agriculture which is still 
marked by elements of a subsistence-type economy. 
Thus, mass labour out-migration is an escape 
from the low productivity/ low income national 
economy. The open question concerns the extent 
to which the out-migration lowers the tensions 
on the labour market and contributes to the faster 
rationalization of labour relations. In broader terms, 
the question concerns the facilitating or hindering 
impacts of out-migration on the modernization of 
Polish economy. Another explanatory line in this 
context concerns the predictable movement of 
labour force from the low productive periphery to 
the higher productivity and higher incomes in the 
economic centre of the supranational integration 
scheme of the European Union. This ﬂow of
labour is possible and economically necessary 
due to the segmentation of the labour markets 
both in the countries belonging to the centre of 
the supranational European integration and in the 
framework of the supranational integration itself. 
Polish migrants use to ﬁll in niches in the lower
segment of occupations taking jobs which are 
unattractive for the locals in the economic centre 
of the European Union. 
Major explanatory models for the mass out-
migration from Poland are of macro-political 
nature. Although Poland was a typical land of 
emigration already during the 1980s, there were 
substantial political barriers hindering mass 
emigration from the country at that time. After the 
political changes the out-migration from Poland 
to the European Union countries reached a peak 
in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s and then declined
due to political restrictions on the part of the then 
member states of the Union. The political decision 
for the membership of Poland in the Union in 2004 
opened the access for Polish labour force to the 
labour markets of only three EU-15 member states 
at the beginning – Ireland, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. The effects of these political decisions 
were truly spectacular. From May 2004 until 
January 2008, the number of Polish immigrants 
(conditionally called ’temporary migrants’) 
increased by 4.5 times in Sweden, by 29 times in 
the United Kingdom, and by 100 times in Ireland. 
Particularly the latter case is a sound conﬁrmation
of the mingling of economic and political variables 
inﬂuencing migration processes. Exactly the same
holds true in the reverse sense concerning the 
restrictive labour market policies of Germany. It 
will take time to make a precise judgment about 
the effects of this policy. In preliminary terms, 
it is questioned by German authors (cf. Becker 
2007, 2). Seen from the point of view of the 
political impact of the mass out-ﬂow of labour
force from Poland on the Polish domestic politics, 
the stabilizing impact seems to predominate. It 
has two sides. The ﬁrst concerns the decreasing
pressure on the Polish labour market due to out-
migration of labour force and the ensuing decline 
of unemployment. The second side concerns the 
stabilization of attitudes supporting the European 
integration of the country. 
There are some isolated efforts to explain the 
unique rise of Polish out-migration towards Ireland 
by referring to the value-normative proximity of 
both societies. Certainly, Poland and Ireland have 
strong Catholic traditions in common. However, 
observers also noticed the large increase of 
Polish labour migrants to the protestant British 
and Swedish societies. The explanation should 
probably take the religious element into account, 
but the political decisions to open the labour 
markets of the three countries to Polish migrants 
was not particularly inﬂuenced by denominational
considerations. As seen from another point of view, 
the slow increase of the number of Polish migrants 
to Germany is mostly due to the restrictive politics 
of the German government. One should take one 
more cultural variable into account, however. 
A major cultural change also inﬂuenced the
replacement of Germany as a major destination 
for Polish labour migrants by Great Britain. The 
study of English in Polish schools and universities 
is in a long-term rise mostly at the expense of the 
studies of German language. 
At the meso-social level one may search for 
explanation of the rapid increase of the number of 
Polish migrants to the EU countries in the explosive 
rise of the number and in the range of activities of 
economic actors facilitating and supporting out-
migration from Poland. Numerous agencies in 
Poland and in the host countries serve the search 
for jobs for the would-be labour migrants from 
Poland. Travel agencies serve their transportation 
to the host country of labour migration and back 
to Poland. Low fare ﬂight companies like Ryanair
or EasyJet make convenient ﬂight transportation
economically affordable for many. Indeed, the 
serving of labour migrants heading from Poland 
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to the United Kingdom and Ireland became a truly 
booming industry after May 2004. In the major 
host countries of Polish labour migrants there are 
already well established banking and other services 
offered in Polish. Shopping, medical and dental 
services, educational facilities etc. are largely 
offered in Ireland and in the United Kingdom by 
Polish migrants. They have developed networks 
for services tailored according to the habits and 
incomes of their migrant compatriots. 
The EU enlargement to Eastern Europe in 
general and the accession of Poland to the EU 
in particular was and remains an important issue 
on the political agenda both in Poland and in 
the countries of the former EU-15. Most local 
political actors in the countries of the ‘old’ EU try 
to support a positive attitude in their population 
to the migrants from Poland. Part of the social 
policies in the ‘old’ EU contains special attention 
to the social and educational integration of the 
labour migrants from the new EU member states. 
Local governments have the task to implement 
these policies in organizational details. Since 
the adaptation of migrants is already seen as a 
social and not just personal problem, non-proﬁt
organizations, philanthropic foundations, church 
facilities and various clubs support the adaptation 
of Polish migrants to the economy, politics and 
culture of the host countries in Western Europe. 
An increasing number of cultural and social 
associations of migrants of Polish origin facilitate 
their networking and particularly the adaptation 
of the newcomers from Poland. 
The explanatory model of the ’homo 
oeconomicus’ is certainly of particular relevance 
in approaching the micro-social dimensions of 
the out-migration of labour from Poland. Due to 
the long tradition of emigration or due to ﬁrst-
hand information from friends and relatives 
working abroad, people in Poland are on average 
well aware of the gains and losses of potential 
labour migration or emigration. The vagaries of 
migration notwithstanding, potential migrants 
try to decide for or against out-migration on the 
basis of rational choice principles. Currently 
this is more and more possible due to improving 
public information systems. Economic actors and 
informal networks in Poland and in the countries of 
destination support the rational decision in favour 
of out-migration or in favour of the decision to stay 
in Poland. Rational decisions are facilitated by the 
very fact that in most cases the motivation for out-
migration or emigration is most often exclusively 
of economic nature. Highly emotional religious, 
political or other factors only exceptionally guide 
the decisions to emigrate or not.
This is not supposed to mean that the decisions 
to emigrate or to stay at home have become easily 
explainable. According to a national representative 
public opinion poll conducted in March 2007, 
by the Centre for Research on Public Opinion 
located in Warsaw, only 10% of the working-age 
Poles nation-wide have worked abroad during 
the ten years before the poll despite the strong 
Polish migration tradition, the open borders in the 
European Union or the unsatisﬁed material needs
of millions of Polish households.6 Obviously, the 
decision in favour of out-migration is not easy since 
it includes a difﬁcult balancing between personal
interests and social responsibilities, mostly in 
terms of responsibility for the family. At the ﬁrst
glance, the best way to meet the responsibility 
towards the family might be the improvement of its 
material situation by incomes from work abroad. 
However, well known stories of broken families, 
abandoned children and neglected parents make 
the decision more complex and complicated. 
The decision is so complex and complicated 
due to the fact that the adaptation to a new 
environment of life and work requires intensive 
learning. The out-migration is a new stage in 
the socialization of the migrant. The transition 
from one (at home) to another (abroad) phase 
of socialization might be full of uncertainties, 
tensions and various value-normative conﬂicts.
This is not just a common wisdom but also a 
challenging everyday reality to migrants. This 
holds particularly true for Polish migrants who 
voluntarily choose or are forced by circumstances 
to work in the shadow economy. The difﬁcult
adaptation to the new social environment is often 
the background of the motivation to decide in 
favour of criminal activities of various kinds or to 
return home. The latter decision seems easy if one 
would not think about the reactions in the local 
Polish environment of the returnee. He or she is 
still typically regarded as a case of failure. In the 
Polish mass consciousness the winner is still the 
person who managed to successfully establish 
himself or herself abroad. 
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It is today much less a matter of state regulations 
but mostly a matter of personal decision to 
migrate, to stay in the host country or to return 
back to Poland. Since there are already labour 
deﬁcits in some occupations in the country, the
Polish state announced the Programme ‘Powrót’ 
(‘Return’). It foresees a series of ﬁnancial and
organizational measures for the support of Polish 
migrants who would decide to return to Poland 
after having spent at least one year abroad. The 
measures supporting the repatriation of migrants 
are very much needed since the Polish society 
changes quickly and the re-socialization of 
returnees might be quite difﬁcult in case of longer
absence. Since the current ﬁnancial and economic
crisis will most probably press thousands of Polish 
migrants to return back to Poland, the programme 
is very timely. 
All in all, it is extremely difﬁcult to draw a clear-
cut conclusion about functional and dysfunctional 
effects of the Polish out-migration under the 
conditions of re-commodiﬁcation of labour in the
country and in Eastern Europe in broader terms. 
One positive function of out-migration from 
Poland is undoubtedly the decrease of the conﬂict
potentials due to the high level of unemployment. 
This effect might be taken for granted since 
unemployment in Poland has reached two peaks in 
1993 with 16%, and in 2003 with 19%. Provided 
there were not the channels for mass out-migration, 
the unemployment would have been even higher 
and the social situation in the country could have 
been explosive. The effects of out-migration on the 
productivity are not so easy to calculate but most 
probably the result is also positive. The relevance 
of remittances for the survival or well-being of the 
families of labour migrants might also be taken for 
granted. One may assume that due to the world-
wide ﬁnancial and economic crisis a large number
of Polish labour migrants will return to Poland 
together with their savings and accumulated 
human capital (experience in life and work) and 
social capital (established connections in the host 
countries). This return could be supportive for the 
modernization of the Polish economy and society 
further on. 
Analyzing causes and effects of out-
migration from Poland one should notice that the 
composition of labour migrants from the country 
has substantially changed in the course of the 
years after 1989. Contrary to the situation during 
the 1990s, an increasing proportion of labour 
migrants recently consists of well educated young 
people. This is exactly the human capital the 
Polish society badly needs itself. In some areas 
like health care the emigration of medical doctors 
and nurses has already brought about substantial 
deﬁcits in the Polish health care system. The
deﬁcits are not easy to overcome (cf. Krajewski-
Siuda & Romaniuk 2007). The same holds true for 
some specialized craft services, IT specialists and 
other highly qualiﬁed personnel. Both the most
advanced economies and the Polish economy itself 
will urgently need them. The best solution would 
be to close the cleavages of remuneration of these 
specialists in Poland and in the most developed 
economies. The process is advancing but will 
take time. In the meantime one may expect that 
the developed economies will be better served 
by Polish specialists than the Polish economy. 
As to remittances, they have been so far used for 
an increase of the level of wellbeing of migrants 
and their families, for acquisition of housing or 
improvement of the quality of housing. Only 
exceptionally remittances and the accumulated 
capital of returnees have been used for substantial 
productive investments. 
Given the available information, some long-
term effects of the out-migration from Poland 
to Western Europe are foreseeable. Polish 
society together with all other Eastern European 
societies is on the losing side with regard to the 
demographic development. On the contrary, the 
Western European societies are the winners in 
the competition for human capital although to a 
different extent from country to country: 
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Table 4:
Population projection of selected western and eastern European countries  
(2008-2055) 7
                Population (millions)                                 Percentage change 
Country 2008 With  
migration  
2055
Without 
migration 
2055
With  
migration 
2055
Without 
migration  
2055
Western Europe
France 61.9 71.4 65.2 15.5 5.3
United 
Kingdom
61.3 75.6 61.4 23.5 0.3
Sweden 9.2 10.8 9.0 17.4 -2.3
Netherlands 16.4 16.7 15.5 2.0 -5.5
Spain 45.3 52.7 38.6 16.4 -14.8
Italy 59.5 60.4 46.2 1.5 -22.4
Germany 82.2 72.6 61.1 -11.6 -25.7
Eastern Europe
Poland 38.1 32.2 31.6 -15.4 -17.1
Romania 21.4 17.6 17.2 -17.9 -19.9
Czech Republic 10.3 9.7 8.2 -6.0 -20.4
Slovenia 2.0 1.8 1.6 -9.5 -22.0
Hungary 10.0 8.9 7.8 -11.4 -22.5
Latvia 2.3 1.7 1.7 -23.0 -23.4
Bulgaria 7.6 5.7 5.6 -25.3 -27.0
The above projections for demographic 
development in the western and the eastern 
part of the EU-27 substantiate the point that the 
decision for EU-enlargement to the East was a 
well calculated decision of the EU-15 in the long 
run. Many factors can inﬂuence the demographic
processes in the meantime, however.
2: Immigration to Eastern Europe: The Case of the Russian Federation 
The Eastern European countries introduced 
in Table 4 will gain few immigrants in the 
foreseeable future but will loose substantial 
parts of their population due to emigration in the 
long run, mostly to Western Europe. The change 
of the population of the Russian Federation is 
marked by quite different patterns due to two 
contradictory processes. The ﬁrst one marks the
losses of population. Russia lost a well educated 
segment of its population due to mass emigration 
to Germany, Israel and the United States during 
the 1990s (cf. Mansoor & Quillin 2007, 47). 
However, more relevant in the longer perspective 
is the fact that the population of the Federation is 
declining fast due to rather negative demographic 
processes. The country annually loses some 
700,000 of its population because of a low birth 
rate (11.0 per 1,000 in 2008), high mortality rate 
(16.0 per 1,000 in 2008) and low level of life 
expectancy (59.1 years for men and 73.1 years 
for women in 2008). As seen from the opposite 
point of view, the Federation is the second largest 
receiver of immigrants world-wide after the 
United States (see Table 1). However, as large as 
it actually is, the inﬂow of mostly ethnic Russians
from the republics of the former Soviet Union 
together with all other forms of immigration 
cannot replace the natural loss of population of the 
Russian Federation. It numbered 148 millions at 
the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
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has reached some less than 142 millions in 2008. 
The pessimistic projections tend to estimate the 
population of the Federation at about 100 millions 
in 2050. Both controversial trends of population 
development are presented in Figure 2:8
After the tide of ethnic Russians moving to the 
Russian Federation in the wake of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union was over, the massive labour 
migration from the ‘near abroad’ (from the 
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
states, CIS) became the major source of additional 
labour for serving the needs of the Russian 
economy. 
In macro-social terms, the economic, political 
and cultural reasons for the attractiveness of the 
Russian labour market for citizens of the former 
Soviet republics were and remain strong. During 
the last decade the Russian Federation used to 
have a much higher GDP per capita as compared 
to these countries. The economy of the country 
was booming due to the high revenues from the 
export of crude oil and natural gas. The cleavage 
between the level of salaries and wages in Russia 
and in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia 
became very deep. The economic cleavage turned 
into a powerful pull factor attracting millions of 
migrant workers from these parts of the former 
Soviet Union to Russia. The particularly strong 
growth of the construction sector had to be met 
mostly by migrant labour since the citizens of 
Russia use to avoid jobs in construction. The same 
holds true for jobs in the communal services. As 
seen from the supply-side of migrant labour, due 
to the decline of the national economies in Central 
Asia and in the South Caucasus as well as due 
to political turbulences there, the remittances of 
labour migrants in the Russian Federation became 
crucial for the survival of the families of the 
migrants and even for the survival of the national 
economies in both regions. This is obvious 
particularly in the cases of Moldova, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan:9
1991
Net migration in thousand Population in millions
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Figure 2: 
Net migration and population growth in the Russian Federation 1991-2008
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The macro-social political conditions for 
the movement of labour force from the ‘near 
abroad’ to the Russian Federation were and 
basically remain favourable. There are no visa 
regimes and practically no boundaries between 
the member-states of the CIS.10 In some cases 
such as Tajikistan the migration of labour force to 
the Russian Federation is specially facilitated by 
bilateral agreements at state level. After seventy 
years of co-existence under the umbrella of the 
Soviet Union there are many value-normative 
common grounds for mutual understanding and 
cooperation at the work place between citizens 
of the Russian Federation and labour migrants 
from the CIS states. Most of them still have a 
good command of Russian. In addition, from 
the beginning of 2007, the Russian state started 
a special programme aiming at the attraction of 
immigrants because of the burning demographic 
problems of the country. The target for 2007 was 
6.5 millions registered immigrants with permission 
to live and work in Russia. A special six year 
programme started in the same year focusing on 
the support for Russians from the ‘near abroad’ 
who would like to move to Russia. 
At the meso-social level of relations and 
processes the migration of labour force from the 
CIS countries to the Russian Federation is largely 
supported by a variety of intermediary economic 
actors like labour agencies, transportation ﬁrms,
ﬁrms for legal services etc. There are well
established civic and cultural organizations of the 
migrants’ ethnic groups in the Russian cities. Some 
of these organizations have their roots already in 
Soviet times. Together with newly established 
ethnic organizations they use to actively support 
the adaptation of the new coming labour migrants 
to the local conditions in Russia. 
A variety of micro-social factors also facilitate 
decisions to migrate from the South Caucasus or 
Central Asia especially to the Russian Federation 
Figure 3: 
Comparison of the GDP level per capita in PPP terms in selected post-Soviet republics 
with the GDP of Russia and ratio of the remittances from Russia to their national GDPs 
(2007, in precentage)
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in search of employment. The rational calculation 
of gains and losses takes into account the visa 
regimes to all other desirable destinations, the 
abundant information about living and working 
conditions in the Russian Federation, the easy 
contact with networks of compatriots there and 
even old business or human connections with 
citizens of Russia as remnants from Soviet times. 
The socialization with the Russian conditions of 
life and work is in most cases not a new experience 
for the labour migrants who still remember 
schooling in Russian language and culture. 
Thus, one may draw the conclusion that there 
should be no burning economic, political and 
cultural issues confronting the labour migrants 
from the CIS countries to the Russian Federation. 
The legal regulations of their stay are well 
developed both in terms of the international treaties 
ratiﬁed by the Federation and the Russian laws. A
special package of laws has made the residential 
registration of foreigners, the legalization of their 
employment and their stay in Russia easier since 
January 2007. However, representatives of the 
international organization Human Rights Watch 
recently documented grave perpetrations of laws 
and regulations concerning the human rights of 
foreign workers employed in the construction 
industry in Russia. The issues are socially relevant 
since half of the labour migrants in the Russian 
Federation have their jobs in particular in the 
construction sector. 
The perpetrations against legally guaranteed 
human rights start from the very attraction of labour 
force for the construction sites in the Russian 
federation. Both Russian and local agencies in 
the CIS states advertise conditions which are 
not observed on the spot. Transportation ﬁrms
and other intermediaries use to cheat the labour 
migrants on their way to the construction sites in 
Russia. Contrary to the clear legal regulations, 
labour contracts are still rarely concluded between 
the construction ﬁrms and the migrant workers.
Moreover, the concluded contracts rarely include 
precise deﬁnitions of the conditions of labour.
The lack of clarity is intentional for the purposes 
of tax evasion or evasion of liabilities for the 
construction ﬁrms in case of work accidents. The
working conditions are very often indecent in 
terms of long working days, dangerous working 
environments and low salaries. In addition, the 
payment of salaries and wages is being typically 
delayed, not made to the full extent or in some 
cases they are even not paid at all. The treatment 
of labour migrants by their supervisors is reported 
to be notoriously uncivilized in many documented 
cases. The state institutions supposed to protect 
the rights of migrants typically act slowly if they 
act at all. Moreover, representatives of the local 
administration, legal institutions and the police 
are recorded to have abused the unclear or illegal 
situation of labour migrants by various forms of 
extortion. The options for effective complaints 
or resistance of the exploited, abused or even 
tortured migrant construction workers are rather 
limited (cf. Buchanan 2009).
It would be naïve to assume that illegal 
employment of labour migrants, their cheating 
and exploiting belong to the speciﬁcities of the
conditions in the Russian Federation alone. All 
events described above do happen with migrants 
everyday in Western Europe and North America 
as well. The commodiﬁcation of the labour force
of migrants obeys everywhere the market rules of 
pursuing maximum proﬁt and not necessarily of
maximum humanism. However, the institutional 
conditions in the Russian Federation still allow 
extremes of wild capitalism. This does not apply 
to the treatment of migrant workers alone. In many 
particular cases both workers of ethnic Russian 
origin and labour migrants are treated badly in 
the same way. But the workers of foreign ethnic 
origin are particularly vulnerable since they are 
also subject of xenophobic attitudes and actions. 
They are well rooted in the Russian cultural and 
political tradition but used to be ideologically and 
politically suppressed in Soviet times. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and particularly after 
the wars waged in the Caucasus these traditional 
xenophobic attitudes powerfully reappeared. 
Representative public opinion polls provide 
sobering information about that:11
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Table 5: 
How do you relate to the fact that one may meet more and more often workers from 
Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldova and other countries from the ’Near Abroad’ on the 
construction sites in Russia? (N=1600, in percentage)
Relation 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Deﬁnitely in a positive way  10  11  10 8 6 7 6 6 6 6
Mostly in a positive way  15  18  17  20  16  15  15  16  14  12
In a neutral way  34  33  32  39  44  42  39  42  45  49
Mostly in a negative way  19  24  23  22  22  20  25  24  21  25
Deﬁnitely in a negative way  14  10  15 8 9  12  13  11  12 6
Difﬁcult to say 8 4 3 3 3 4 2 1 2 2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
The global economy cannot function efﬁciently
without the commodiﬁcation of labour or without
a trans-border mobility of labour. In the European 
Union most conditions for the legal and institutional 
integration of the migrant labour are already well 
developed. Nevertheless, migrants’ work in the 
shadow economy and various forms of the abuse 
of migrant labour force are permanently on the 
agenda for political discussions and legal actions 
in the Union. The institutional framework of the 
Russian Federation is still far from this pattern 
of a social market economy. The free market 
economy as understood and practiced in Russia 
is particularly detrimental for the migrant labour 
which is in most cases not properly legalized, 
badly organized and vulnerable in every respect 
of human rights. One may only hope that the 
growing understanding of the contribution of the 
migrants to the wellbeing of Russian society will 
strengthen the economic, legal and moral respect 
to this segment of the Russian labour market. This 
critical attitude towards the present day situation 
on the labour market in Russia is not based on 
the assumption, however, that the problems of 
migrant labour are exceptional in the Russian 
Federation. Global labour markets indeed should 
go through a process of civilizational upgrading. 
The current global ﬁnancial crisis does not make
the task any easier. To the contrary, the crisis has 
effects hindering the very much needed process 
of civilizational upgrading in the treatment of 
migrant labour worldwide. 
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The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) in 1990 hurled the former 
Soviet republics into a social-economic situation 
they were not prepared for. The new geostrategic 
situation required the simultaneous implementation 
of profound political and economic reforms 
in the affected societies, their integration into 
international politics and the global economy. 
Combined with new individual and collective 
liberties, such as the freedom of movement, the 
post-socialist conditions triggered large-scale 
emigration. 
COMPARING OUT-MIGRATION  
FROM ARMENIA AND GEORGIA TO MOSCOW:
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF RESEARCH
Tessa Savvidis
1: Introduction
Figure 1: 
The South Caucasus
Massive emigration as a form of individual 
crisis management became particularly relevant in 
the South Caucasus, where the combined effects of 
natural disasters (the earthquake in North Armenia 
at the end of 1988), civil wars and political 
crises, unresolved ethnic and territorial conﬂicts,
expulsion and ﬂight of ethnic minorities, economic
embargos together with notorious mismanagement 
brought about social degradation and polarisation, 
impoverishment and overall insecurity. Experts 
from the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) describe the regional challenges 
of migration in the South Caucasus as follows: 
“Displacement issues in the context of unresolved 
conﬂicts continue to dominate national migration
agendas. This, combined with an incomplete 
transition to market economies, leads to high out-
bound migration. High unemployment especially 
affects educated young people and causes many 
to pin their hopes on jobs in Turkey, Russia and 
Western Europe. Migrant community networks, 
already established abroad, enhance economic 
pull factors. While some migration is regular, 
most people risk irregular migration and even 
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trafﬁcking.”12 Victims of trafﬁcking fromArmenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh are predominantly 
women and children from socially vulnerable 
groups – Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 
refugees and urban poor. According to the IOM, 
which published its ﬁrst study on trafﬁcking from
Armenia in September 2001, there were annually 
about 700 women and girls, who were promised 
labour abroad but found themselves trapped in 
prostitution. 61.4% of these were transferred to 
neighbouring Turkey, followed by 29.5% to Dubai 
(cf. IOM 2001).13
Figure 2
The mass exodus from the South Caucasian 
republics started already in 1988/89. Since then, 
roughly one million of emigrants14 from both 
Armenia15 and Georgia have left their homeland 
seeking socially, politically and economically 
more stable conditions abroad. For practical 
reasons such as passport and visa regulations, 
language skills or familiarity with the way of 
life, the Russian Federation used to be the main 
destination for migrants in the 1990s and remained 
in that position, as a more recent household 
survey by the OSCE proves: 97.6% of all labour 
migrants (87,600-143,600 persons) from Armenia 
have visited Russia at least once during the 
period between 2002 and 2005 (cf. Minasyan & 
Hancilova 2006, 27).
As a result of the massive emigration during 
the ﬁrst post-Soviet decade and according to
the calculations of Armenian demographers, the 
average annual net migration outﬂow exceeded
the average annual net natural population growth 
by more than three times (cf. Mirzakhanyan 2004, 
2). Although net migration rates in Armenia and 
Georgia were reduced over a period of 17 years 
(1990 and 2007) by 40-50%, in international 
comparison the rates remain quite high. In 2008, 
Armenia is expected to experience a net migration 
rate of minus 4.95 per 1,000 of the population16 
(2000: -9.0/1,000) and Georgia minus 4.3617 (1990: 
-9.2/1,000; 2,000: –5.7/1,00018), assumedly due to 
the economic growth in both countries. One may 
ask, however, if there is really an immediate and 
direct causal link between economic and social 
development. Impressive as the economic growth 
rates may seem, the growth itself remains relative. 
Not earlier than 2005, Armenia could for the ﬁrst
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time slightly surmount the gross national product 
of the late Soviet period. It is one of the aims of 
the ArGeMi Project to explore the inter-relation 
between economic and social development, 
keeping in mind the above mentioned relativity 
of the current economic growth and the general 
discrepancy between economic and social 
development. 
The post-Soviet exodus from Armenia and 
Georgia was the largest massive emigration in the 
long and rich emigration history of both countries. 
The exodus is being perceived as a painful 
experience and the most challenging economic, 
political and cultural phenomenon. The political 
and scientiﬁc debates on this complex issue are
highly controversial. Particularly relevant is the 
question whether the emigration is caused by the 
system transformation, by geopolitical factors or 
whether it is an independent process loosely linked 
with the opening of previously closed societies. 
As a working hypothesis we hold that the South 
Caucasian out-migration has most notabbly to 
do with the opening of societies in the South 
Caucasus to global processes. In more speciﬁc
terms, this means opening to global markets for 
goods, services, investments, ﬁnancial exchange
and labour. 
There is no widely shared view about the 
effects of migration on the countries of origin. 
International bodies generally avoid any criticism 
of migration as such and instead focus on aspects 
of mismanagement of this increasingly relevant 
global phenomenon. Quite typical for this position 
was the statement of the former United Nations 
Secretary General Koﬁ Annan in his address to
the UN General Assembly. Opening the ‘High-
Level Dialogue on International Migration and 
Development’ (September 14-15, 2006), Annan 
described international migration as a phenomenon 
“to be with us for as long as human societies 
continue to develop. Migration should not be 
stopped, but it should be better managed” (Annan, 
cited in: Gutcheneire & Pecoud 2006, 16). In its 
communication of May 16, 2007 to the European 
Parliament and others, the Commission of the 
European Communities attempted to summarize 
labour migration experiences of sending countries 
by introducing the term of ‘net beneﬁts’:
“Neighbouring countries [of the European Union; 
TS] are experiencing the effects of both brain gain 
and brain drain, and the net beneﬁts help mitigate
pressures in terms of high unemployment and low 
income that often result from the difﬁculties of
political and economic transition.” (Commission 
of the European Communities: 2007, 4)
Undoubtedly, a more speciﬁc, differentiated
approach to international migration is needed. 
For instance, massive out-migration helped 
to moderate the rise of unemployment in the 
most critical period of the transformation of the 
Armenian and Georgian societies. Remittances 
of the migrants enabled a substantial part of the 
households to survive during the critical years 
of large-scale impoverishment. However, it is a 
widely shared opinion that the migrants belonged 
to the best-educated and most entrepreneurial 
parts of the population thus causing a heavy 
loss of national human capital. For example, 
between 2002 and 2005, 39.4% of Armenian 
labour migrants had higher or secondary special 
education in engineering (15.1%), construction 
(11.2%), social sciences (8.8%), natural sciences 
(2.4%) and agronomy (1.8%). (cf. Minasyan & 
Hancilova 2006, 35)
Therefore, the causes, reasons, effects and 
prospects of mass migration from Armenia 
and Georgia urgently invite for well-focused 
systematic studies. It would be particularly 
relevant in scientiﬁc and practical terms to
determine the speciﬁc national and regional
features of this process, while understanding it at 
the same time as part and parcel of broader trends. 
Taking into account the above cited polls and 
studies about migration from the South Caucasus, 
the ArGeMi Project focuses on comparing out-
migration experience and prospects in two South 
Caucasian societies – Armenia and Georgia 
– on a cross-national basis. Additionally, we 
are studying the experience of immigrants from 
these two societies in one receiving society – in 
the Russian Federation (Moscow). In the given 
context, Moscow exempliﬁes typical patterns of
success and failure in the integration of migrants 
from Armenia and Georgia. The similarity of 
the two societies of origin, as well as that of the 
host society is determined by the fact that all 
of them went through intensive post-socialist 
transformations. 
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Hereafter, we shall interpret migration as a social 
and spatial move from one country to another for a 
short, medium19 or long-term20 or even permanent 
residence. Migration is a typical strategy and 
practice of managing risk situations, faced by 
individuals and groups in the country of origin 
(push factors). Risks are particularly intensive 
in the case of an overall transformation of the 
society. Thus, one could expect an increase of out-
migration as an effort to escape from intensiﬁed
local risks in the context of opening of the borders 
as part and parcel of societal transformation as it 
happened in the post-socialist societies after 1990 
(cf. Genov 1999). This escape became possible 
because the countries under scrutiny joined the 
global process of international migration after 
the restrictions on international travel were 
dropped down in the course of the third wave 
of democratisation. Thus, it became a realistic 
endeavour to rationally calculate gains and 
losses of legal out-migration. Since the economic 
arguments in favour of emigration from poor to 
rich societies (pull-factors) were too strong, the 
mass exodus from Armenia and Georgia during 
the 1990s has a clear explanation in terms of 
rational choice calculations. 
2: Conceptual Background 
Roots and Routes of Migration
The established economic, political and cultural 
links and transportation routes determine the 
destination of out-migration. Contrary to the 
widespread belief, the majority of migrants do 
not come from the most disadvantaged groups 
or regions in the transformation process. Studies 
prove that relatively better to do groups and 
developed regions account for the bulk of the 
migrants (cf. Schürkens 2005). A promising task 
is to prove whether there are regional, local or 
periodic exceptions to this rule in Armenia and 
Georgia.
Researchers who have their theoretical 
roots in modernization theory often believe that 
economic improvements automatically reduce 
the potentials for emigration. Given the ﬁgures
of migration potentials in Armenia and Georgia 
in 2007, we assume that this correlation generally 
exists but its effects do not come immediately 
and automatically. The failing poverty reduction 
management and the failure to fairly distribute 
the beneﬁts of economic growth are decisive
determinants for a continued mass out-migration 
despite economic growth. Consequently, we 
assume that there is an important lag between the 
trends of economic stabilization and improvement 
and migration ﬂows. In practical terms, we have
to test whether and why migration from Armenia 
and Georgia will persist even though economic 
growth in these societies is already quite visible. 
We also have to take into account the already 
mentioned difference between economic and 
social development.
How can international migration be managed 
in order to avoid or at least reduce its negative 
impacts? Which are the key aspects for migration 
management? The ArGeMi project includes 
research on the three areas (‘three R’s’) of 
development impact of international migration, as 
identiﬁed by Papademetriou and Martin (1991), 
– recruitment, remittances and return – and the 
additional categorization (‘six R’s’) by Lowell 
and Findlay (2002) for possible policy responses: 
• Return;
• Restriction of international mobility to own 
nationals and foreign workers; 
• Recruitment of international migrants; 
• Reparation for loss of human capital 
(compensation); 
• Re-sourcing expatriates (Diaspora options); 
• Retention: through educational sector policies 
and through economic development. 
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Migrant remittances provide a good example for 
the ambivalent nature of migration related issues. 
It is often assumed that migrant remittances 
form a substantial support to economically less 
developed societies.21 In fact, the volume of 
remittances may match or even exceed the volume 
of foreign direct investments in the countries 
under scrutiny. According to international expert 
estimations, in 1995-96 Armenia annually used 
to receive remittances of about 450 million USD. 
The amount was surpassing the national budget of 
the country. The percentage of monetary transfers 
by out-migrants made up approx. 60 to 65% of the 
sum (cf. Poghosyan 2003, 118 et seq.). Between 
2002 and 2005, the amount of remittances, sent 
by labour migrants to their families in Armenia, 
decreased to an estimated annual amount of 100 
million USD (cf. Minasyan & Hancilova 2006, 
44) due to the smaller number of migrants. In 
a World Bank study Armenia, together with 
Moldova, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is 
still counted among the four of the world’s largest 
recipients of remittances as a proportion of GDP 
(cf. Mansoor & Quillin 2007, 57). Remittances 
really improve the balance of international 
payments of the state, the economic situation 
of households and spur domestic consumption. 
Remittances also constitute an important source 
of foreign exchange, enabling vital imports, pay 
off external debts and the improvement of the 
country’s creditworthiness. 
However, there are different interpretations of 
the impact of migrants’ remittances on the countries 
of origin. From the 1960s until the early 1990s 
the generally pessimistic view predominated. It 
stressed the point that remittances do not promote 
growth but exacerbate the dependency of societies 
sending migrants by raising material expectations 
without providing a variety of means for satisfying 
them. Some authors used to stress the point that 
remittances “do nothing to convert stagnation to 
development” (Jacobs 1984) and “serve more 
as symbols of a ‘squandered opportunity for 
development’” (Martin 1991). Meanwhile, the 
impressive growth due to remittances and the 
contribution of migrants’ remittances as a source 
of development ﬁnance are widely recognized
(cf. Alshabibi 2005, 1 et seqq.; UN 2006, 13; 
Baruah & Cholewinski 2006, 74). But still there 
remain many aspects, which demand a thorough 
considering.
The IOM author Bimal Gosh (2006, 95) 
certainly has good reason to insist on the point that 
remittances often have a positive development 
effect at household level. They may even help 
to develop small enterprises or to promote 
entrepreneurial skills if credit constraints are 
eased and risk insurances for rural households 
are provided. Remittances can contribute to the 
development of villages and local communities 
as they help to establish social facilities such as 
schools, hospitals, community centres, feeder 
roads and infrastructure projects by promoting 
micro-enterprises. Some caution is needed, 
however. Although remittances “can be a valuable 
source of foreign exchange and an important 
addition to gross national product, their overall 
development impact at macro-level has so far been 
less impressive. (…). There is hardly any causal 
relationship between inﬂows of remittances and
economic performance, although they may well 
be correlated” (ibid, 97). Roberts and Banaian 
have studied for USAID the impact of remittances 
on development in the South Caucasus in 2004. In 
Armenia the Diaspora and migrants beneﬁt from
the effective international Anelik money transfer 
system, established in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and Baltic States in 
1996. 
However, on a national level a high amount 
of remittances can have a decisive impact on the 
ﬂoating of currency, as the example of Armenia
shows. According to the Armenian Central Bank, in 
2007 the country’s currency (Dram) gained worth 
of 21.62%, as compared both to the US dollar and 
the EU’s Euro; during 2004-2007, the growth rate 
was even close to 60%. The Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund explain this with 
the high amount of remittances by the Armenian 
Diaspora, including migrants (an alternative or 
rather additional explanation would be currency 
speculations). The main losers of the Dram’s high 
revaluation are again those parts of Armenia’s 
population that depend on remittances and who 
are usually seen as the exploiters of remittances. 
Furthermore, the high revaluation negatively 
affects all exporters of goods in Armenia, whose 
trade balance deﬁcit climbed up to 73% in 2007,
Remittances
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followed by a prize increase of consumer goods 
and natural energy.22 The example clearly indicates 
that an unambiguous answer to the question 
‘curse or blessing’ is impossible. Any analytically 
based answer will have to take into consideration 
the various levels of national economies and the 
interaction of different variables.
In the receiving states, remittances of 
immigrants can become the object of xenophobic 
speculation and subsequently a pretext for inter-
ethnic hate of immigrant communities, as it is the 
case with (South-) Caucasian immigrants in the 
Russian Federation. Under the slogan ‚For Law 
and Order! For Russia’s Glory!’ the extremist 
Movement against Illegal Immigration (in 
Russian: Dviženie Protiv Nelegal’noj Immigracii 
– DPNI) agitates on its website against foreign 
immigrants: „The vanguard of the foreign invasion 
consists of descendents from Caucasian states, 
from Central and Southeast Asia. Every month 
millions of the migrant Diaspora send enormous 
amounts of money (more than 50 billions USD) 
to their homelands. The bulk of this money was 
obtained by speculation, drug trade and in other 
criminal ways. Since their families count ﬁve to
ten children, in twenty years they will become 
the entitled overlords of the Russian land, and 
our few children will turn into slaves in their own 
homeland.”23 We shall study such xenophobic 
effects both by migrant and expert interviews.
Conditions for Return Migration
We strongly question the widespread assumption 
of a possible mass return of emigrants24 to the two 
scrutinized countries of origin. We assume that this 
type of return is and will most probably remain a 
rare phenomenon under normal conditions. The 
reason for our opinion is simple. The hesitation 
to return is caused by risks facing the returnees in 
an environment, which has considerably changed 
since their emigration. Examples of successful 
returnees investing their ﬁnancial, political
and cultural capital in their country of origin 
are usually the result of state efforts to attract 
returnees or certain groups of them. However, this 
applies to relatively small groups of scientists and 
administrators only. A differentiated deﬁnition of
migration motifs and forms will help to establish 
precise knowledge about the groups from which 
returnees can be expected and under which 
conditions they would revert to their country of 
origin. 
There is, however, the phenomenon of 
involuntary ‘returnees’, who are deported back to 
their country of origin.25 In the ﬁeld studies we
pay particular attention deportees who fall victim 
to the deterioration of Georgia’s foreign relations 
with Russia since October 2006. The case of 
the Georgian deportees exempliﬁes the general
vulnerability of migrant and Diaspora communities 
and their dependency on international relations. 
Ethnic Composition and Ethnic Stratiﬁcation
We assume that out-migration often changes 
the ethnic composition and ethnic stratiﬁcation
in both the societies of origin and in the host 
societies. However, the changes are down-played 
or ignored in the countries of origin and frequently 
exaggerated in the public and political discourse 
of the receiving societies. In the societies of 
origin out-migration may be combined with a 
tendency towards mono-ethnization. As seen 
from a socio-structural point of view, immigrants 
usually end up in positions on the low level of the 
stratiﬁcation ladder of the receiving societies, thus
building ethnic enclaves there. We try to ascertain, 
whether ‘ethnic emigration’ is a closed chapter of 
post-socialist migration history of the ﬁrst half of
the 1990s, or whether there is a regional revival 
of ‘ethnic emigration’ still to be expected with 
regards to current developments. 
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It is widely assumed in contemporary migration 
theory and research that better educated individuals 
and groups are more inclined to migrate and have 
better chances to be well integrated in the host 
societies. We will try to verify this assumption 
on out-migration from the two societies under 
scrutiny. The major issue is usually presented as 
‘brain drain’ from societies of origin of the migrants 
(cf. Friedman & Shalini 2004) and ‘brain gain’ on 
the part of host societies. The background of both 
assumptions mostly concerns the investments 
into the development and improvement of skills 
of nationals through education and training in 
the country of origin. The investments give their 
returns abroad by the work of temporary migrants 
or permanent emigrants. The opposite version of 
the issue concerns the use of education and skills 
acquired abroad by returnees to their country of 
origin (cf. International Agenda for Migration-
Management 2004, 38). Data from censuses prove 
the fact that the percentage of highly skilled26 
international migrants has signiﬁcantly increased
since 1990. It was estimated that the number of 
foreign-born persons having tertiary education 
and living in the OECD countries increased from 
twelve to twenty millions between 1990 and 2000. 
The increase of eight million represents 46% 
of the total growth in migrants aged 25 or older 
between 1990 and 2000 in the OECD countries 
(cf. Docquier & Marfouk 2006). 
It is not fully clariﬁed, whether the ﬂows of
highly skilled migrants are always detrimental 
to their country of origin. There are two main 
‘schools’ of thought on the issue. In the 1960s the 
arguments usually considered the aftermath of 
skilled migration by analysing its impacts on the 
remaining population. This is a zero-sum analysis 
that seeks to demonstrate that “by reducing the 
number of educated remaining in the country, the 
brain drain unambiguously reduces the average 
level of education and generates a loss for those 
left behind” (Docquier, Lohest & Marfouk 2005, 
3). Skilled out-migration is argued to have knock-
on effects such as wage deﬂation for unskilled
workers, and lower levels of attractiveness for 
foreign direct investments (Page & Plaza 2005). 
This approach corresponds with the endogenous 
growth model. According to it a person’s 
knowledge provides a direct beneﬁt in terms of
available skills and has also positive effects on 
the productivity of the other. If those with skills 
and knowledge leave, the indirect beneﬁt to the
economy at large is eliminated. ‘Chronic and 
sustained human ﬂight’ are one of the social
indicators of the ‘Failed States Index’, as deﬁned
by the US based think-tank Fund for Peace. This 
includes: 
• “‘Brain drain’ of professionals, intellectuals 
and political dissidents fearing persecution or 
repression;
• Voluntary emigration of ‘the middle class’, 
particularly economically productive segments 
of the population, such as entrepreneurs, 
business people, artisans and traders, due to 
economic deterioration;
• Growth of exile communities“.27
Another strand of arguments rejects the very 
notion of entirely detrimental consequences of 
skilled migration for less developed countries. 
Instead, the emphasis is on the positive impact of 
skilled migration on the general population prior 
to the actual emigration. The conclusion is that 
„in the long run, the global impact of the brain 
drain balances its ex ante beneﬁcial and the ex
post detrimental effects.” (Docquier, Lohest & 
Marfouk 2005, 3) This new approach analyzes 
various ways in which outward migration of 
skilled workers may have positive repercussions 
(cf. Farrant & MacDonald 2006, 9). Since only 
few empirical studies have been conducted to 
consequently test both theoretical models (ibid. 
10)28, our research will be of particular importance 
for the analysis of this controversial issue. The 
scope of real post-socialist ‘brain-drain’ from the 
South-Caucasus is rather obscured since many 
South Caucasian scholars work on contract bases 
abroad, but remain registered as staff members 
in domestic scientiﬁc institutions, with annual
prolongations of their “long-term business tours” 
(Poghosyan 2003, 120 et seq.). 
The question of ‘brain gain’ will be studied 
both from the point of view of the sending and the 
receiving side. Some 400 structured interviews 
with migrants from Armenia and Georgia in 
Moscow will focus on a broad selection of 
immigrants, who came for different reasons 
Brain Drain
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(work, educational reasons, or professional 
training) and in different ways after 1990. We 
assume that some of them are well integrated into 
Russian society while many others still work in 
the shadow economy and in occupations with 
lower requirements than their level of education. 
Most naturally, the experiences, expectations and 
social-economic conditions of these groups differ 
considerably. The extent to which one or another 
development predominates has not been studied 
so far with a view to the immigrants from Armenia 
and Georgia in Moscow neither as speciﬁc cases
nor on a comparative basis. 
Feminisation of Migration
Globalisation is marked by the rapid increase 
of international migration in general and by a 
growing share of women in migration in particular. 
“The more signiﬁcant inﬂuence of globalisation
on migration can be seen in relation to the 
origin, composition and the respective proﬁles
of migrants. It is in regard to these changes that 
the phrase the ‘feminisation of migration’ refers 
to. (…) The most notable change concerns 
women participating in both formal and informal 
labour migration. (…) This increase in female 
participation in trans-national labour migration 
can be most readily seen among low-wage earners 
(…).” (Engle 2004, 21) The Georgian analyst 
Badurashvili suggests: “…when women cross 
international borders to take a job in the global 
market, they are making decisions, taking actions 
and redeﬁning their family and labour roles.
(…) Feminisation of trans-national migration 
has been prompted by rising global demand for 
labour in speciﬁc female-type domestic jobs and
occupations. Under the conditions of massive 
unemployment in Georgia being long time in an 
economic crisis this global demand for female-
speciﬁc job acts as a signiﬁcant incentive for
migration of Georgian women implying not less 
responsibility and obligations for their children 
than men” (Badurashvili 2005, 9).
The size and relevance of female migration 
from post-socialist societies is still an understudied 
issue connected to many open questions. The 
Georgian patterns of female migration making 
out nearly half of all out-migrants in 2003 differ 
considerably from the patterns in Armenia, where 
out-migration remains a predominantly male 
domain. Our hypothesis is that this remarkable 
difference between out-migration patterns in two 
otherwise similar neighbour societies originates in 
historical differences in the perception of migration. 
The OSCE ﬁnanced survey conducted from 2002
to 2005 revealed that the overwhelming majority 
of the Armenian society (78.1%) rejects migration 
of women abroad because of three major reasons: 
1) seeking jobs abroad contradicts the image of 
Armenian women (20.6% of respondents); 2) 
women should not leave the country (20.5%); 3) 
women should not work at all (13.8%). As many 
as 10.4% of the respondents assumed, that women, 
who go abroad engage in prostitution (Minasyan 
& Hancilova 2006, 52 et seq.). The notably low 
rate of 14.1% female migrants from Armenia 
registered in the survey seems to correspond with 
such a negative perception of female migration 
(cf. ibid. 31). 
3: Cognitive Aims of the Project
The ﬁnal product of the present research project
is expected to contain multi-facetted proﬁles
of out-migration from Armenia and Georgia, 
which enlarge and deepen the knowledge about 
the causes of the massive out-migration and its 
consequences both for the sending and receiving 
societies. In order to accomplish this task we plan 
to conduct qualitative and quantitative surveys 
in Armenia and Georgia before, during, after or 
between out-migration as well as in Moscow, 
which is the main destination for South Caucasian 
migrants. The multi-dimensional approach will be 
guided by the following ideas:
Firstly, we interpret the intensive migration 
from both societies as an unavoidable result of the 
opening of their previously non-market economies 
to global markets. The profound re-orientation 
requires the restructuring of fundamental 
economic and political relations together with the 
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corresponding change of value-normative systems. 
This type of societal transformation brings about 
intensive social risks and often provokes the 
effort of individuals and families (households) 
to manage the risks by means of trans-national 
migration and emigration. 
Secondly, the massive out-migration from 
both societies under study became possible in 
the context of the global commoditization of 
labour. Under these conditions the migration of 
individuals or families to countries offering jobs 
or better payment of labour became a real option. 
Thirdly, a special incentive for mass migration 
from countries which had a planned economy 
before the changes is the difﬁcult accumulation
of capital for starting economic activity under 
the precarious conditions of transformation of 
all dimensions of society. The liberalization of 
markets is followed by a rapid rise in the supply of 
goods and services. They are already available on 
the market but not affordable for large segments 
of the population. This discrepancy is another 
powerful incentive for out-migration. 
Fourthly, labour out-migration from the 
societies under scrutiny became also possible due 
to the development of segmented labour markets in 
the societies hosting migrants. They ﬁll in niches
in the labour markets which the native population 
in the host countries is no longer willing to occupy 
due to bad work conditions, low payments and 
limited prospects for occupational development. 
This is particularly the case in large urban 
conglomerations marked by a high concentration 
of an afﬂuent native population requiring a large
amount of low paid services. 
Fifthly, the need to ﬁll in exactly these positions
in the labour market, which are not attractive for 
the native population, brought about and maintains 
speciﬁc recruitment agents for attracting labour
force from low-income countries, including the 
former socialist countries. These recruitment and 
travel agencies often work at the edge of legality or, 
in the case of human trafﬁcking, beyond legality.
In the framework of this ﬁeld study, the methods to
explore half legal and illegal recruitment practices 
are limited. Nevertheless we hope to shed some 
light on the issue with the help of interviews with 
migrants and migration experts.
Sixthly, as seen from the vantage point of 
receiving societies, they are particularly interested 
in attracting the best and brightest specialists from 
developing and transition countries thus saving 
the resources already invested in their education 
and qualiﬁcation. For the countries of origin this
is a net loss of ‘brain drain’. We shall study and 
re-assess qualitative and quantitative aspects 
of highly qualiﬁed migration both from the
perspective of sending und host societies under 
scrutiny. 
Seventhly, at a certain moment mass migration 
develops its own dynamics because of the spread of 
networks facilitating it. It is widely believed, that 
this is particularly the case with societies having 
a well established traditional Diaspora. We shall 
comparatively study out-migration from Armenia 
and Georgia in the context of Diaspora building 
and answer the question whether and under which 
circumstances Diasporas, compatriot and expat 
networks facilitate or trigger migration. 
4: Societies Selected for Comparison and Related Studies 
Armenia and Georgia offer examples of well 
comparable societies. They are similar in their 
historic and cultural development as well as 
by the size of their populations (three and four 
millions respectively). The following paragraphs 
contain an outline of the available knowledge 
on migration from both countries as well as on 
aspects of immigration from the South Caucasus to 
Moscow. A comparative summary of Armenian and 
Georgian migration speciﬁcs is given in Table 4.
4.1 Armenia 
The Armenian society is nearly mono-ethnic 
and has a longstanding migration tradition. The 
worldwide Armenian Diaspora is estimated at 
about seven to nine millions, with the Russian 
Federation, the USA and France harbouring 
the largest communities. However, the massive 
emigration in the early 1990s has reached levels 
unknown in the turbulent history of the Armenian 
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society. In a 1993 survey of 1,200 residents of the 
Armenian cities of Yerevan, Gyumri, and Ashtarak, 
70% of the respondents indicated they would 
leave Armenia if given a chance, while 50% of 
the parents claimed they wish for their children to 
leave the country (Poghosyan 1994, 150 et seqq.). 
By the mid-1990s, ethnic Armenians had become 
the dominant migrant inﬂow from the Republic of
Armenia to the Russian Federation (cf. Riddle & 
Buckley 1998). 
The recent wave of out-migration of Armenians 
started after the earthquake of December 7, 1988. 
Following that disaster some 130,000 people left 
Armenia for other Soviet republics, of which 
about 70,000 left permanently. At the dawn of 
independence, in the winter of 1991-92 over 
700,000 Armenians emigrated mostly to the 
Russian Federation. Some settled in Europe and 
in the USA permanently as a rule. This large-scale 
out-migration radicaly questioned the political 
vision of making Armenia the homeland of all 
Armenians, at least of those in the former Soviet 
Union (cf. Karakashyan & Poghosyan 2003, 225 
et seqq.). 
The out-migration from Armenia continues. 
The Statistical Yearbook of Armenia (2004, 3 et 
seqq.) reports net migration ﬁgures for the years
1999 to 2003 of annually minus 10,000. However, 
in a summary statement, the ﬁgure of over one
million Armenians is mentioned who have left 
the country between 1992 and 1994 (cf. Balian 
1995, 55). A more recent study of out-migration 
from Armenia, co-funded by the OSCE’s Yerevan 
Ofﬁce and the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Ofﬁce estimated the number of people who have 
left Armenia between 2002 and 2005 in search 
of employment at approximately 147,000, or 
4.6% of the total population, and 7 to 9% of the 
economically active population. Some 85% of 
those job seekers are men aged between 21 and 
50 years with secondary or vocational education. 
Over the same period, some 95,000 Armenians 
who had left the country earlier in search of work 
returned, the study found.29 
According to the National Statistics Service of 
the Republic of Armenia (NSSRA), since 1991, 
the calculation of emigration in Armenia was 
based on the statistical coupons of those arriving 
and departing by air links. This approach does 
not reﬂect the real scope of migration, as only
10% of those departing were registered.30 The 
high percentage of unregistered out-migration led 
to politically motivated speculations. In 1996, a 
ﬁrst migration survey was conducted within the
framework of the ‘Technical Assistance to 
the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(TACIS)’ program, and aimed at exploring 
the motives of those departing from Armenia. 
Interviews with 900 passengers were conducted 
at all airports of the country. As a result it became 
obvious that the main reason for departure from 
Armenia was the deplorable social and economic 
situation. Afterwards, in the period between 
November 1, and December 19, 1996, a similar 
survey was conducted covering both arriving 
and departing air passengers, through separate 
questionnaires.
In 2001-2002, the NSSRA carried out its 
‘External Migration Survey’ within the framework 
of the Migration Survey Project Component, 
TACIS Programme of the Statistical Ofﬁce of
the European Union (Eurostat) and with the 
support of the IOM. The survey aimed at deriving 
information on the number of those arriving and 
departing, their sex and age composition, marital 
status, educational level, purposes, as well as 
geographical segmentation etc.
Some analysts use to point out to the assumedly 
positive effects of the long-term and large-scale 
out-migration from the country. It is considered 
helpful for avoiding social and political crises 
and even a civil war since the potential insurgents 
had an exit option. Of the more than 700,000 
Armenians who left the country in the early 1990s, 
the majority were men aged between 17 and 60 
who could otherwise be involved in insurgent 
activities. However, a nation-wide survey with in-
depth-interviews of 100 emigrants from Armenia 
revealed, that there are deeper reasons for the 
decision to migrate than just the poorly developed 
employment market, high unemployment rates and 
poor social conditions. The ethnologist Hranush 
Kharatyan explained at the launch of her book 
‘Emigration from Armenia’ (2003) that “many of 
those who leave the country are employed people, 
who have average living standards in Armenia and 
more or less normal perspectives for future. (…) 
Besides the lack of jobs, the reasons have deeper 
roots like lack of conﬁdence, problems with
getting used to new socioeconomic conditions, 
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legal injustice, helplessness, hopelessness and the 
feeling of being at a ‘dead-lock’.”31 
Other analysts (cf. Poghosyan 2003, 72) point at 
the devastating social and economic consequences 
of migration as the loss of human capital. The 
20th century has seen the Armenian intelligentsia 
repeatedly shattered and rebuilt. Within the ﬁrst
half of the 20th century, the country experienced 
the destruction of the Armenian Genocide 
between 1915 and 1923, the Stalinist purges 
of the 1930s and the Soviet Armenian civilian 
and military losses of World War II. The Soviet 
practice of sponsoring intellectual work – as long 
as it remained within Soviet ideological bounds 
– encouraged respect for intellectuals. Once the 
Soviet control loosened under the last General 
Secretary of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, 
Armenian intellectuals “were at the forefront of 
the effort to fundamentally rethink all aspects 
of Armenia’s situation, past and present”32. The 
politicising of the intelligentsia occurred during 
a period dominated by idealism. However, “the 
high hopes characterizing the period of 1988-
91 have long since evaporated along with state 
subsidies and support for intellectual work”33. 
With so many residents leaving, those who stayed 
in Armenia grew increasingly bitter towards the 
regime, and this was one source, according to 
Poghosyan (2003: 5-14), of Armenia’s political 
instability. The impact of out-migration on the 
economy, especially with the large number of 
skilled workers leaving, was signiﬁcant. The
political Instability and economic collapse are 
associated with civil war onsets. 
The Russian Federation used to be and continues 
to be the predominant choice of destination for 
migrants from the South Caucasus until recently. 
From 1991 until 1995, ﬁve percent of Armenia’s
population immigrated to the Russian Federation.34 
Estimations present the destination choice of out-
migrants from Armenia between 1990 and 2001 
as follows: 
Table 1: 
Choice of Destination of Out-Migrants from Armenia between 1990 and 2001
Russia 620,000
United States 100,000
Ukraine 80,000
Western Europe 20,000
Belarus 15,000
Source: Baghdasarian & Yunusov: 2005
Table 2:
 Destinations of Labour Migrants from Armenia  
between April and June 2002 and 2002-2005
Russia Georgia Ukraine USA Turkey Iran Belarus Others
2002 (April -June)
78
Percent  
of total
8 5 2 1 1 1 4
2002-2005 87.6 2.2 9.9 (EU states incl.)
Sources: 1) National Statistical Service of the Russian Federation: Survey of Arriving and Departing Passengers in April-
June 2002; 2) Minasyan & Hancilova 2005, 27-28 
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According to a representative nationwide 
OSCE survey of 1,503 households this situation 
did not change much in subsequent years: Between 
2002 and 2005, 90.1% sought work in other CIS 
states, including Ukraine (2.2%) and Kazakhstan 
(0.3%), and the remainder in the EU and the 
United States. The bulk of migrants, however, still 
names Russia as the main destination for labour 
migration. Some 87.6% have visited this country 
at least once during the period between 2002 and 
2005. The remainder of 9.9% (ca. 7,000 persons) 
migrates to EU countries with France on top and 
to the USA (ca. 5,000 persons) (cf. Minasyan & 
Hancilova 2006, 27 et seq.). Most of the migrants 
from Armenia to the EU and USA hold university 
degrees, while the majority of migrants to CIS 
countries have either no profession or are skilled 
workers (cf. ibid., p. 35). The picture is obscured 
by the methods applied in previous studies. For 
example, the exclusion of temporary short term 
migration or commuting migration randomly 
ignores the individual traders who conduct 
frequent short term travels in order to import 
and export goods and form a relevant cohort of 
migrants from Armenia. Since neighbouring Iran 
and Turkey are main destinations of this cohort, 
the overall destination choice of migrants would 
be less focused on Russia35 if current obstacles in 
the complicated Turkish-Armenian relations (no 
diplomatic relations, closed borders, visa regime) 
(cf. Derderian: 2006, 9) would be abolished. The 
sectors in which South-Caucasian migrants can 
work are more abundant in Turkey (household 
services, entertainment and sex industry, 
construction, textile, restoration and agriculture) 
than in Russia (construction, retail and trade 
in markets, sex industry) (cf. Yudina, cited in: 
Derderian 2006, 8).
As both the Russian and the Turkish examples 
reveal, work permits, visa regulations and 
administrative restrictions are key determinants 
in migration ﬂows. The increasing number of
working women in Turkey is due to the demand 
for domestic service. This demand is satisﬁed with
foreign labour, which Turkey legalized in 2003. 
The majority of Armenian and Georgian female 
out-migrants therefore go to Turkey instead of 
Russia, which has not such a high demand in 
domestic servants (cf. Derderian 2006, 7).
4.2 Georgia
The phenomenon of mass emigration from 
Georgia questions the national myth and self-
perception of a nation clinging to its homeland 
under all hardships. Revaz Gachechiladze 
(1997) presents the negative and positive sides 
of migration for Georgians as follows: “…it is 
hard not to see the danger in mass emigration, the 
fact notwithstanding that Georgians belong to the 
people who used to say: East or West, home Is 
best…But a big amount of families of Georgia 
survived on the money sent or brought by labour 
migrants in the period of economic crisis (…)” 
(cited in Badurashvili 2005, 3). Another scholar, 
Tamaz Gugushvili (1998), pointed out that labour 
migration “…has saved Georgia from starvation” 
(ibid.), but demanded also special attention of 
the Georgian government to the protection of 
human rights of Georgian citizens abroad (cf. 
Badurashvili 2005, 3). According to Guram 
Svanidze (1998) the intentions to emigrate was 
increasing in Georgia at the end of the nineties. 
The main reasons for emigration were tracked to 
unemployment and the low living standard in the 
country. Following the results of these studies, the 
main negative effects of large-scale out-migration 
from Georgia might be summarized as follows:
• Changes of the ethnic composition of Georgian 
society;
• Deterioration of families;
• Ageing of society due to out-migration of the 
young age cohorts; 
• Rural or regional depopulation with impacts 
on employment opportunities, public 
infrastructure, taxes, etc.;
• Dependent development (dependency on 
remittances and transfers). 
The choice of destination for out-migrants 
from Georgia seems to be more diversiﬁed than
the choice of migrants from Armenia, who face 
more restrictions than Georgians when migrating 
to Turkey, while Georgian migrants suffered from 
deportation and restrictions in Russia. Russia, the 
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EU, Turkey, Greece, Israel and the USA are main 
destinations for Georgian migrants, in particular for 
women, as Badurashvili (2004) found. In contrast 
to male Georgians, who go in the course of labour 
migration mainly to CIS territories (the share of 
men among former migrants to Russia exceeds 
70%). Georgian women are keen to migrate to 
other destinations (up to 60% of respondents). 
Georgians have not yet developed a self-image 
of a ‘Diaspora nation’ as Armenians did long 
ago. Another relevant distinction is the ethnic 
composition of Georgia and Armenia. While 
Armenia became a nearly mono-ethnic nation after 
the last emigration wave with 97.7% of the current 
population being ethnic Armenians, Georgia was 
and still is the ethnically and culturally most diverse 
of the three South Caucasian states, even if the 
breakaway regions of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia 
are not taken into consideration. According to 
the ofﬁcial 2002 population census, more than
16% (or more than 700,000) residents of Georgia 
were ethnic non-Georgians, with Azerbaijanis 
(284,761) on top and Armenians (248,929)36 
as the second largest ethnic groups. The largest 
cities with high ethnic diversity are Tbilisi (up to 
150,000 representatives of non-Georgian ethnic 
groups) and Batumi (up to 20,000). Two regions 
in the East of Georgia – Samtskhe-Javakheti 
(Armenian) and Kvemo-Kartli (Azeri) – have a 
non-Georgian ethnic majority. 
The study of the Georgian case can help to 
understand, whether, in which way or to what 
extent ethnic policies become a push factor for 
large-scale emigration. According to the Georgian 
analyst Zaal Anjaparidze (1998), respondents with 
a minority background in Georgia denied in a public 
poll of April 1993, that they felt overt oppression 
in Georgia, even in the ﬁrst years of the struggle
for national independence. Anxiety persisted. 
Urban Slavs (ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and 
Byelorussians) who settled in Georgia during 
Soviet times were the ﬁrst to emigrate. Most
representatives of these ethnic groups were either 
part of the military or were civilians working for 
the military. According to calculations conducted 
by various institutions in charge of migration 
and demographic problems, Slavs accounted for 
more than 60% of all emigrants in 1992. Most of 
them (88.5%) were city dwellers and moved to 
cities in the Russian Federation.37 For the period 
between July 1992 and 2005, the Russian Federal 
State Statistics Service recorded a total ﬁgure of
18,982 refugees and expulsed persons of Russian 
citizenship.38
The second largest group of emigrants were 
the Azeris, who lived primarily in rural areas. 
More than a quarter of the Azeris who left Georgia 
in 1992, emigrated to Russia while the remainder 
moved to Azerbaijan. The third largest group 
– the Armenians –predominantly lived in cities. 
According to ofﬁcial ﬁgures, 56.2% of the ethnic
Armenian emigrants immigrated to Russia, just 
under a quarter moved to Armenia, and the rest 
moved to other former Soviet republics. Many 
Armenians emigrated abroad – mostly to the 
United States. Updated information provided 
by Georgia’s Department of Statistics show that 
“4,980 people emigrated outside the former 
USSR in 1990, 3,876 in 1991, and 2,920 in 
1992. According to the Department of Visa and 
Population Registration of Georgia’s Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, 5,059 people emigrated in 1993, 
4,676 in 1994, 3,885 in 1995, and 2,527 in 1996, 
or a total of 27,913 registered emigrants. The 
most popular destinations were Israel, Greece, 
Germany, and the USA. The same countries seem 
to be the destination of choice for emigrants from 
the Russian Federation.” (Anjaparidze 1998) 
Thus, in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, out-
migration from Georgia was predominantly 
ethnic migration. Whereas some researchers try 
to prove that ethnic out-migration from Georgia 
was voluntary and occurred independently from 
the nationalist pressure in the society and by state 
authorities, other scholars admit ethnic repressions 
as a push factor: “Ethnic migration constituted the 
biggest ﬂow of emigrants from Georgia in that time
and was partly developed as a result of incorrect 
nationalities policy of the Georgian government at 
the beginning of the 1990s” (Badurashvili 2004, 
2). A return to Georgia by Russian, Armenian, 
Azeri and other emigrants from ethnic minorities 
seems unlikely. 
Meanwhile, another wave of ethnic emigration 
from Georgia may be under way, after Russia 
handed over its military base at Akhalkalaki 
and started to transfer the equipment to Gyumri 
(Armenia) since April, 2007. This once 15,000-
man-military complex was not only the most 
relevant employer (of 1,000 jobs), dating back to 
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1828, and the only provider of medical services in 
the otherwise poverty stricken Samtskhe-Javakheti 
province in the borderlands between Armenia, 
Georgia and Turkey. The base was also seen as 
a safeguard against Turkey by the near to mono-
ethnic Armenian population (96%) in the Javakheti 
region, who blame the Georgian government for 
intentionally neglecting the area.39 While the 3,000 
Russian and local Armenian servicemen of the 
base were scheduled to be transferred to Russian 
bases in Armenia and Russia after the termination 
of the withdrawal in autumn 2008, the security of 
the remaining more than 100,000 Armenians is 
feared to be at stake.40 With an ofﬁcial poverty rate
of 66% of the population (2008), the province of 
Samtskhe-Javakheti is the poorest region of post-
Soviet Georgia. Traditional seasonal migration 
of Javakhetians to Russia seems to be prompted 
now by permanent emigration. In Moscow, the 
inﬂux of Armenian migrants from Javakheti has
already been noticed (cf. Galkina 2006, 187). This 
second wave of ethnic migration or emigration 
puts a question mark over the previous perception 
of ethnic migrations from the South Caucasus 
allegedly limited to the early 1990s as well as a 
strict separation of ethnic and social determinants 
or push-factors.
Table 3:
 Change of Ethnic Composition in Georgia (1989-2002)
Main Ethnic Groups in Georgia according to the census of 1989 and 2002
(in brackets: the census of 2002)
Group Populationa Percentages of entire 
population and trendsb
Linguistic 
group
Ethnic-religious 
group
Main area of 
residence
Georgian 3,615,000
(3,661,173)
72.4 % (+)
(83.8%)
Georgian Georgian Orthodox, 
some Sunnite Muslim
Armenian 430,000
(2002: 248,929)
8.6 % (--)
(5.7%)
Armenian Armenian Apostolic South, bordering 
Armenia; Tbilisi
Azeri 358,000
(2002: 284,761)
7.2 % (+)
(6.5%)
Turkic Shiite Muslim South and west of 
Tbilisi
Ossetianc 165,000
(2002: 38,028)
3.3 % (--)
(0.9%)
Iranian Orthodox Christian, 
some Muslim
Central, South 
Ossetia
Russian 140,000
(2002: 67,671)
2.8 % (--)
(1.5%)
Slavic Russian Orthodox Urban centres, 
Abkhazia, coastal 
areas
Abkhazd 100,000
(2002: 3,527)
2.0 % (--)
(0.1%)
Caucasian Orthodox Christian, 
some Sunnite Muslim
Abkhazia
Greek 75,000
(2002: 15,166)
1.5 % (--)
(0.3%)
Greek Greek-Orthodox Abkhazia; South-
central, coastal 
areas
Kurd 33,000
(2002: 2,514)
0.7 % (+)
(0.0%)
Iranian Sunnite Muslim; 
Yezidi
Southwest
Ukrainian 23,000
(2002: 7,039)
0.5 % (--)
(0.2%)
Slavic Orthodox Christian Urban centres, 
Abkhazia, coastal 
areas
Other 50,000 1.0 % (--)
(0.3%)
Total 4,989,000 100%
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a Figures for all groups, except for Russians, are 
derived from the 1989 census results, modiﬁed by rates
of natural increase and out-migration. The ﬁgure for
Russians is a 1999 estimate by the Russian State Bureau 
of Statistics (Goskomstat), published in “Nezavisimaya 
gazeta”, on September 17, 2001. The total population 
ﬁgure is an estimate (as of July 2001) by the CIA, World 
Factbook, www.odci.gov/populations/factbook/index.
html. Due to massive out-migration in the 1990s, the 
above ﬁgures are likely to have a large margin of error.
b Future trends regarding population share are based on 
state policies of favouritism, patterns of natural increase, 
and expected migration ﬂows. + = relative increase; -- =
relative decrease; - = little change.
c The majority of Ossetians reside in South Ossetia, 
currently not under the control of the Georgian 
government.
d Almost all Abkhazians reside in the Abkhaz 
Autonomous Republic, currently not under the control 
of the Georgian government. The 2002 census does not 
include the break-away regions of Abkhazia or South 
Ossetia, but relates to Abkhaz people and Ossetians 
outside these regions.
Since 1996, the Department of State Statistics 
of Georgia is conducting a longitudinal household 
survey, which also covers the departure of 
household members to foreign destinations. A 
survey by the Georgian Centre of Population 
Research was conducted among randomly chosen 
360 households of three different strata where at 
least one member has left Georgia between 1997 
and 2002 with the purpose of labour activity 
abroad. In a second stage, this survey included 
interviews with 1,000 returnees, who had been 
abroad during the period between 1997 and 2002 
(cf. Badurashvili 2004, 6). An IOM ﬁnanced
survey (2002, 600 interviews) on labour migration 
revealed the considerate discrepancy between the 
qualiﬁcation and skills of Georgian migrants and
their occupation abroad. The skills required for 
working in Georgia and abroad vary signiﬁcantly.
Georgians are often not adequately qualiﬁed to
work in a particular ﬁeld abroad. It is expected
that this will lead to a further depreciation of their 
human capital in the long run. In contrast, many 
countries in the world are increasing their human 
capital through labour migration. Highly skilled 
workers often form associations abroad and upon 
their return to their county of origin are in the 
position to positively inﬂuence the economic and
social development within their home countries. 
Very few labour migrants from Georgia advance 
their qualiﬁcations abroad and as a rule, their
human capital depreciates.
The share of people employed in the domestic 
service sector (nurses, nannies) is signiﬁcant for
Greece (38%), Germany (34%) and the USA (32%). 
41% of the migrants to the Russian Federation 
work as auxiliary workers, but the share of those 
having succeeded to start their own business is 
also high (18%). 75% of the businessmen out of 
the total number of labour migrants from Georgia 
work in the Russian Federation.” (Gotsiridze et al. 
2003, 40 et seq.).
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Table 4: 
Country Migration Proﬁle (Preliminary results)
Migration aspects Armenia Georgia
Estimated net migration rate 
2007 
-5.34/1,000
(2000: -9.0/1,000; 2003: ca. 9,000; 
2004: 50,000) 
-4.45/1,000
(2000: -5.7/1,000)
Massive emigration/
migration
1991 to 1994: - 600,000
1991 to 2004: - more than 900,000 
– one million
1990 to 2003: 960,000 to 1.1 
million (20% of population)
Education level 2002 to 2005: 39.4% with higher or 
secondary special education 
2003: 44% with a university 
degree; 
Unemployment rate 2006: 7.7% (ofﬁcially registered)
32 to 35% (unofﬁcial estimation)
2004: 12.6% (est.)
Average duration of  
out-migration
2002 to 2005: 67.5%: 5 to 11 months; 
depending on destination
24 months
Percentage of female  
labour migrants 
14.1 % 2003: 49.3%
Ratio of ethnic majority 
among migrants
2005: 2/3 Armenians 2005: 2/5 Georgians, Ossetians, 
Azeris
Main destinations of labour 
migrants 
1990 to 2001 (est.): To Russia 620,000, 
to USA 100,000, to Ukraine 80,000, 
Western Europe 20,000, Belarus 15,000 
2002: To Russia 78%; 
Georgia 8%41
2005: To Turkey 40,000
2002 to 2005: To Russia 87,600-
143,000 (87.6%)42
USA (5,000 est.) and European Union: 
9.9% (in all: est. 7,000) 
1999: To Russia 61.9%; 12.7% 
Azerbaijan; 8.6% Ukraine; 
5% Greece; 4.4% Israel; 2.1% 
Armenia; 
2000: To Russia 50%; 
2004: Turkey registered 235,143 
arrivals of Georgian nationals
2006: Turkey registered daily 800 
to 1,200 entries
Visa regimes, introduced by Turkey Russia (in Dec 2000),
Belarus (2005)
Overall remittances 1995/96: 450 million USD
2007: 1.2 billion USD
2006: 1.627 billion 
Migrants share in 
remittances
1995/96: 60 to 65%
2007: 100 million USD
Remittances sent from 
Russia
2007: 600 to 650 million USD 210 million USD (annually)
Demographic consequences: 
gender ratio imbalance
2001 (Census): Female population 
53.13% (1,294,976)
Female population: 52.8%
Population growth rate 2007: -0.19% 2007 (est.): -0.329%
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After the collapse of the USSr and as its de iure 
and de facto heir, the Russian Federation found 
itself relatively unprepared in the midst of complex 
migration and demographic developments, which 
ever since determine any political and academic 
discourse on Russian migration policies: 
1) Refugees and ‘forced migrants’: The 
Russian Federation became the easily accessible 
refuge for ethnic Russians, Russophone and 
various other ethnic communities from previous 
Soviet republics targeted by ethnic violence 
and territorial conﬂicts (in particular, the South
Caucasus states). In contradiction to international 
refugee law, Russia deﬁned those immigrants
from the FSU as ‘forced migrants’ that obtained or 
could obtain Russian citizenship by virtue of their 
former Soviet citizenship, including IPDs. Only 
immigrants not eligible for Russian citizenship 
were given the status of ‘refugees’. The revised 
in 1997 refugee law adopted Western European 
standards in the intention to reduce the burden on 
the state for caring for refugees.
At the end of 2000, there were a total of 
667,000 registered refugees or forced migrants 
from other FSU states and only 9,710 refugees 
from non-FSU states in Russia. However, this 
number did not include those immigrants, who 
had meanwhile obtained Russian citizenship and 
subsequently lost their ‘forced migrant’ status. 
Most forced migrants arrived either from Central 
Asia or the Caucasus, including about 600,000 
persons displaced during the ﬁrst war in Chechnya
(1994-1996). About one-third, mostly Chechens, 
have since returned. As a result of the second 
Chechen war, which started on 26 August 1999, 
there are about 300,000 IDPs (and nearly half a 
million at the peak of the exodus in 2000), most 
in neighbouring Ingushetia. Several thousand 
refugees from Chechnya went into exile, as of 
2009 most residing in EU countries.
2) A magnet for foreign migrants: Russia has 
become a ‘migration magnet’ for both legal and 
undocumented immigrants, making the country 
the largest ‘receiver’ of foreign migrants next 
to the USA. According to ofﬁcial ﬁgures, about
180,000 migrants visit Russia every year. The 
majority of these immigrants originate from the 
NIS and are attracted by the signiﬁcant income
differences and the less competitive Russian 
labour market. In 2005, 95% of documented 
immigrants came from other CIS countries. They 
are mainly Russians or Russian speakers from 
adjacent Kazakhstan (29.30%), Ukraine (17.4%), 
Uzbekistan (17-2%) and Kyrgyzstan (8.8%) 
(Banjanovic 2007). On the other hand, signiﬁcant
changes in the 1997-2007 decade occurred with 
regards to the main ‘sending’ countries: While 
the inﬂux from Ukraine declined from 138,231
arrivals to 51,492 (with the lowest level of 51,492 
in 2004), the inﬂux from Central Asia increased
over the same period, with Uzbekistan in lead 
position (39,620 arrivals in 1997 against 52,802 
in 2007). Somehow exceptional is the high 
amount of arrivals from Armenia despite the fact 
that Armenia is no direct neighbour of Russia 
(19,123 in 1997 against 30,751 in 2007). Among 
all CIS states Armenia has the highest share of 
her workers abroad (perhaps 700,000 in a labour 
force of 1.2 million). In difference to Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan, the high ﬁgures of arrivals from
Armenia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan cannot be 
explained by the ethnic or ‘expat’ factor, for these 
countries did not send any large ethnic Russian 
or Russophone communities. Migrants from the 
‘far abroad’ in African and Asian states (China, 
Vietnam, Korea etc) also use Russia and the CIS 
in general as a transit corridor to Europe.
Estimates on general ﬁgures of undocumented
migrants vary considerably from 3.0 to 12 millions, 
not at least because of methodical and deﬁnitional
ﬂaws. Nevertheless, these disputable ﬁgures are at
the core of the public Russian discourse between 
social liberals and anti-migration conservatives 
or nationalists. Whereas the World Bank estimate 
is as high as 9 million undocumented migrants in 
Russia, leading Russian administrators present 
even higher ﬁgures: The Federal Migration
Service’s head, Konstantin Romodanovsky, told 
the State Duma in mid-March 2006: “Experts 
say about 10 million of [supposedly 20 million 
immigrants to Russia; TS] do so illegally”43. 
The Federal Migration Service estimates that 
the number of unregistered immigrants will 
4.3 Russian Federation
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increase to 30 million by 2010.44 According to K. 
Romodanovsky, Russia’s economic losses due to 
illegal immigration totals USD 7 billion annually: 
“It is a huge [amount of] damage to the country. 
Migrants evade taxes and duty payments,”45 he 
said, adding that the loss equalled the total budget 
spending on education and healthcare.
3) ‘Brain drain’ experience: Although Post-
Soviet emigration from Russia has been only 
1.1 million, or less than one percent of her 1989 
population, it included a signiﬁcant part of the
highly educated population. Ethnic Germans 
(1995-99: 45% of net migration), Russians 
(36%) and Jews (13%) made the main groups of 
emigrants, with Germany (57% of the emigrants), 
Israel (26%) and the United States (11%) as 
main destinations. Experts estimate that both the 
numbers of Jews and Germans in Russia declined 
for about 25%. Among the Jewish emigrants, 21 
% had a college education (against 13.3% of the 
general average).
4) Depopulation and aging society: The 
European North, Siberia and the Far East of the 
Russian Federation make up 70 percent of its 
state territory, while less than eight percent of the 
population live there. Under the market conditions, 
the previous level and type of development of the 
northern regions has proved to be unsustainable. 
The dramatically rising cost of living and the 
shrinking economy resulted in massive out-
migration from the northern regions to central 
Russia and the other FSU states. Between 1989 
and 2001, from the 16 regions that are deﬁned as
the ‘Far North’, over 12 percent of the population 
emigrated. From seven of these regions, over 20 
percent have left. Many more people wish to leave 
the North, but do not have the means to do so. 
Continued below-replacement fertility and 
high mortality combined with an aging population 
cause a general demographic crisis. Russia’s 
population shrinks by 700,000 people each year. 
Since 1992, the excess of deaths over births has 
been 7.7 million. Russia had a birth rate of 10.4 
per 1,000 people in 2006 and a higher death rate 
of 16.2 deaths per 1,000. Already by the beginning 
of 2002, the population had fallen by 4.3 million 
from its peak of 148.7 million in 1992 to 144.0 
million. 
Net immigration to Russia of 3.6 million has 
compensated for less than half of the natural 
decrease. According to a 2002 United Nations 
population projection, the population of Russia 
in 2050 will be 113 million according to the high 
scenario, 104 million in the medium, and 96 
million in the low. “Using these UN population 
projections as the basis for a feasibility study on 
replacement migration, researchers found that in 
order for Russia to maintain the same population 
size as in 1995, there would have to be a net 
migration of 24.9 million in the ﬁrst half of the
21st century. For the size of the working-age 
population to stay the same, there would have 
to be a net migration of 35.8 million.” (Heleniak 
2002) 
However, immigration of ethnic Non-
Russians is obviously not the ﬁrst choice for
Russia’s decision-makers, who have to meet 
their compatriots’ fear for a profound change 
of the country’s ethnic composition. For this 
reason, decision-makers rather try to increase 
the population by encouraging ﬁrst of all the
‘repatriation’ of expat communities. In his state-
of-the-nation address in May 2006, President 
Vladimir Putin vowed to make Russia’s population 
decline his highest priority and initiated changes 
in the migration policy, such as the attempt to 
attract compatriots from obroad. Subsequently, a 
six year government programme, started in June 
2007 encourages ‘compatriots’ living abroad to 
return to Russia. They will receive cash, social 
beneﬁts and support to gain or regain Russian
citizenship. However, the migration potential of 
this group only accounts for 6-7 million people 
and is limited and expensive. The reintegration of 
one million ‘repatriates’ will cost approximately 
USD 6 billion. (Banjanovic 2007)
Moscow
The most populous and economically vibrant 
capital city of the Russian Federation attracts the 
bulk of immigrants to the country. Metropolitan 
Moscow and the Moscow region (in Russian: 
‘Moskovskaya Oblast’) receive about 75% of 
them (cf. Galkina 2006, 183). The percentage of 
foreign born residents among Russia’s population 
of 145,166,731 was 8.3% (= 11,976,822) in 
the 2002 census, and the percentage of foreign 
born Muscovites was 10.9% (= 1,128,035).46 
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According to a research conducted by the Institute 
of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Science 
South Caucasians – Armenians, Georgians and 
Azerbaijanis – are the fastest growing ethnic groups 
in Moscow. Their migration-generated growth is 
much higher than that of other nationalities living 
in Moscow.47
Although the percentage of migrants from 
Armenia to the Russian capital is signiﬁcantlylower
than the above mentioned general immigration 
indicator of 75% – some 43% of all Armenian 
migrants to Russia go to Moscow – it remains 
still on top of the Armenian destination choice 
hierarchy according to the 2005 OSCE survey (cf. 
Minasyan & Hancilova 2006, 28). Compared with 
its neighbours, Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia 
has the highest share of out-migrants to Moscow, 
which has the largest concentration of Armenians 
in the Russian Federation, followed by Krasnodar 
and the Kuban region.
Links and interrelations between Russia and 
the South Caucasus go back to medieval times, 
when Armenian merchants and Georgian kings 
established early trade, diplomatic and even 
dynastic links ﬁrst with the Kingdom of Kiev
(Rus’), then with the Kingdom of Moscow. The 
roots of the Armenian and Georgian Diaspora 
in Moscow are deep, in contrast to the Azeri 
community that has emerged in recent times. 
Although migrants from most previous Soviet 
republics do not belong to the category of ‘illegal’ 
immigrants in a strict sense of the word – their 
entry is legal due to the lack of Russian visa 
regimes with most CIS states48 – they are regarded 
and treated as ‘illegal’ immigrants by many 
Russians, including authorities. We agree with 
the Russian scholar Tamara A. Galkina from the 
Russian Academy of Sciences who proposes to use 
the more precise and careful term of ‘unregulated 
migration’ instead of ‘illegal immigration’ with 
regards to migrants/immigrants from CIS states 
(cf. Galkina 2006, 190). Besides, it has to be 
taken into account that until the liberalization of 
migration regulations in 2007, legal immigrants 
could have easily turned into illegal ones, because 
the applications for temporary residency in Russia 
were processed over the duration of six months 
(cf. Gevorkyan 2006). Subsequently, if a citizen 
of a CIS country wanted to stay in Russia for 
more than three months he or she had to apply 
for a residency permit (‘propiska’) at least three 
months prior to arriving in Russia; otherwise he 
or she would have acquired an illegal status after 
a stay of three months (cf. Derderian 2006, 6). 
Moscow’s police seemed unable to cope with the 
ﬂow of undocumented workers into the capital.
Employers ﬂagrantly disregarded penalties and
failed to stick to quotas for the employment of 
foreign workers.49 
New Immigration Regulations
After human rights NGOs heavily criticized the 
amendment of Russia’s ‘Law on the Legal Status 
of Foreign Citizens’ (Law No. 62, 2002), Russia’s 
lawmakers adopted amendments in July 2006 that 
made Russia’s migration policies one of the most 
liberal in the world, according to some expert 
opinion.50 The main purpose of the legislative and 
procedural improvements, however, must be seen 
in the obvious attempt to better control and more 
effectively use foreign labour force.
On January 15, 2007, amendments to the 
existing 2002 Law No. 62, together with the new 
‘Law on Recording the Migration of Foreign 
Nationals and Stateless Persons’ (Law No. 109, 
2006) entered into force, stipulating simpliﬁed
procedures for temporary residents to register on 
the migration registry. It is mandatory for all non-
Russian nationals entering Russia to do this in 
order to obtain work permits including immigrants 
from former Soviet Union (FSU) countries for 
whom a visa regime does not exist. To obtain 
legal status, migrants from the FSU currently 
only need to register at the local Russian post 
ofﬁce where they reside.51 These reforms have 
helped many migrants to legalize their short-term 
stay in Russia. In 2007, 7.9 million migrants had 
registered on the migration registry, which meant 
a 65% increase as compared to 2006. Over 1.75 
million migrant workers entering Russia received 
work permits in 2007, up from 570,112 in 2006.52 
Also in 2007, 60% of the employers hiring 
migrant workers sent ofﬁcial notiﬁcations to the
Federal Migration Service of Russia (FMS) that 
they had hired migrant workers. While this degree 
of compliance resulted in a 2.5% increase in the 
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tax base in 2007, experts say that full compliance 
would increase the tax base by ﬁve percent.53 
The new laws also established annual entrance 
quotas on work permits. In Moscow, the annual 
quota is agreed between the Labour exchange of 
the Moscow Committee on Interregional Ties and 
Ethnic Policy, the city’s trade unions, the Union 
of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and other 
organizations. Against the opinion of the trade 
unions and other organizations, which did not even 
want to draw the entrance quotas dead-line over 
200,000, the entrance quota was ﬁxed at 300,000
for 2008. In 2007, the quota for Moscow was 
still 810,000, while in reality there were 953,000 
migrant workers in Moscow at that time.54 
There remain certain legal and procedural 
obstacles, such as signiﬁcant delays in issuing
work permits; early expiration of quotas for work 
permits; and other bureaucratic hurdles. Migrants 
with an irregular status are more vulnerable to 
abuses and less willing to seek assistance from 
government agencies out of comprehensible fears 
that approaching any ofﬁcial person or body will
result in a ﬁne or in expulsion.55 Extortion is still 
practiced on a large scale by employers and police, 
both of whom beneﬁt from the illegal status of
migrant workers. The police often demands bribes, 
threatening to conﬁscate or destroy identiﬁcation
documents or even to deport migrant workers. 
Employers frequently refuse to pay already low 
compensated migrant workers after services have 
been rendered.
Experts admit that not regarding some 
signiﬁcant changes in the Russian migration
system over recent years, profound ﬂaws remain:
“Some of the changes include several laws being 
amended and some new regulations being enacted 
to improve the procedures and make them more 
straight-forward, but this is not enough. 
The current situation concerning migration 
and employment of expatriates in Russia is still 
far from perfect and needs further thorough 
revision of state bodies and undivided attention of 
companies seeking to employ foreign nationals”, 
lawyer Marina Gordeeva summarizes the situation 
as seen from the point of view of employers. 
For employers or principals, the procedure for 
legalization of foreign employees is rather complex 
and involves obtaining various permissions from 
the Federal Migration Service, Federal Migration 
Department, Employment Center, as well as Tax 
and Labor Inspection and a number of other 
authorities; furthermore, companies in demand 
of foreign labour have to register at the Federal 
Migration Service, with only one year validity of 
such registration. The general procedure includes 
the following stages:
1. Submission of a foreign labour forecast; 
2. Submission of an application and its resolution 
in an employment center; 
3. Processing of employment permissions;
4. Processing of individual work permits;
5. Company accreditation for visa support;
6. Processing of a work visa;
7. Notiﬁcation of the employment center, tax and
labor inspections on employment of foreign 
nationals;
8. Undertaking migration recording.
According to government regulations each 
company seeking to employ foreign nationals 
has an obligation to participate in the forecasting 
campaign by submitting information about the 
demand for foreign specialists. This demand is 
taken into account when forming the quota rate 
for certain regions of Russia and an all-Russia 
rate. Employers must pay special attention to the 
timing: If a company wants to attract and hire 
foreign specialists in 2010, the forecast for 2010 
has to be submitted before May 1, 2009. Many 
new companies establishing a business in Russia 
are facing difﬁculties in applying work permits
because they were not able to submit forecasts 
in time.56 Because of the bureaucratic procedure, 
certain agencies offer their services to companies to 
help them through the submission and application 
hurdles. Tax evasion by employers may become 
another result of the existing ﬂaws: While there
were 13,000 economic entities in 2007, that were 
ready to employ foreigners, just nine employers 
informed the corresponding state services about 
foreigners working for them. The other employers 
simply did not pay taxes for hired foreign labor.57 
On July 25, 2008, another administrative 
regulation came into force that replaced the two-
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step procedure for obtaining conclusions with 
regards to attracting foreign workforce by a 
‘one window’ system:58 The Federal Migration 
Service, which receives all the documents from 
the applying employer or principal, will internally 
send requests to the Federal Employment Service. 
All phases of the document processing are 
recorded in the Trudovaya Migratsiya (‘Labour 
Migration’), an automated sub-system of the 
central foreign citizens’ data bank. The term for 
obtaining work permits should not exceed 30 
days. The practical side of implementing the new 
regulation is expected take some time, as there 
are a lot of internal changes to be applied to the 
Federal Migration Service.59
The 2002 Law on the Status of Foreigners in 
the Russian Federation stipulated, among others, 
that all foreign residents, regardless of nationality 
and occupation, must obtain a migrant card. The 
deadline for obtaining the card was February 15, 
2003. However, as of early February 2003, only 
a small number of foreign migrants had actually 
obtained a migrant card (in Moscow only 30,000 
out of the estimated 800,000 foreign residents 
or more in the city).60 In 2006, Mayor Luzhkov 
introduced his project of a magnetic plastic card as 
the new personal identity document for foreigners 
(‘migrant card’ or ‘migration passport’) which also 
serves as a work permit. The plastic card features 
a special microchip, which can access nearly all 
(including sensitive) information about migrants, 
including their photo, passport data, blood type, 
and medical history. The card will function as a 
foreigners’ primary document in Moscow, and 
employers will be able to determine whether an 
employee has passed a medical examination and 
is therefore allowed to work. The new ID regime 
will be mandatory, and workers will be unable to 
register in Moscow without a card.61 
Human Rights Violations and Hate Crimes
Russia’s ﬁght against undocumented immigration
is just one reason for the difﬁculties of South
Caucasian migrants in Moscow. Security concerns 
are another. After terrorist actions claimed a large 
number of victims in September 1999, Moscow 
City authorities held a new registration of all 
recent arrivals. Law enforcement agencies paid 
particular attention to those coming from the 
Caucasus, detaining and ﬁning some of them
without sufﬁcient grounds. Illegal detentions and
searches went on even after Mayor Yury Luzhkov 
established a telephone hotline “to keep permanent 
contacts with the ethnic public organizations 
for considering cases of illegal actions by law-
enforcement organs in the course of doing their 
duties” (cited in: Filipov & Filippova 2002, 164). 
But judging by the information received through 
the hotline service, illegal detentions and searches, 
seizures of valuables and documents, as well as 
unwarranted refusals of residence registration or 
other violations of human and civic rights by law 
enforcement agencies went on.
Although the peak level of immigration to 
Russia was in 1994, it was the second wave of 
work related migrants in the ﬁrst decade of the 21st 
century that coincided with a signiﬁcant increase
of ultranationalist sentiments and xenophobic 
violence in the indigenous majority society, in 
particular among young Russians. The Muscovite 
Human Rights Ofﬁce noted in 2005, an „increase 
of fascist sentiments“, of extremist publications, 
among them Nazi publications by otherwise 
respectable publishers. The Human Rights Ofﬁce 
estimates that between 2005 and 2007, the number 
of ultra-nationalist ‘skinheads’ in Russia rose from 
50,000 to 70,00062 and that hundreds of websites 
propagated chauvinist ideas in Russian language; 
the same NGO gives the number of extremists 
in Russia in 2007 with 500,000.63 Amnesty 
International reported 28 racist killings and 366 
assaults in 200564, but presumes the real ﬁgure to
be much higher, since the police registers most 
incidents not as racist or interethnic hate attacks, 
but downplays their relevance by categorizing 
them as acts of ‘hooliganism’.65 During the ﬁrst
six months of 2007, the Moscow based civic rights 
NGO Sova Center for Information and Analysis 
registered 37 racist killings66 and an additional 
193 physical attacks across Russia, which is an 
increase of 20% in comparison to 2006.67 Most 
such incidents occurred in the megalopolis of 
Moscow (January to May 2007: 21 killed, 62 
wounded), followed by St. Petersburg (3 killed, 56 
wounded).68 The increase of racist and xenophobic 
murder continued throughout 2008 and 2009, as 
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Table 5 shows, while there was a decline in the 
overall ﬁgure of assaults in 2008 (690 assaults
in 2007, against 525 in 2008). There was also a 
signiﬁcant increase in Moscow’s share (City and
Greater Moscow) in the overall ﬁgure of assaults,
reaching nearly 50% in 2008.
Table 5:
 Growth of racist assaults in Russia between 2004 and January 200969
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Jan 2009
1) Killed
2) Wounded
 3) Overall 
assaults
1) Killed 
2) Wounded
 3) Overall 
assaults
1) Killed 
2) Wounded 
3) Overall 
assaults
1) Killed 
2) Wounded
 3) Overall 
assaults
1) Killed 
2) Wounded
 3) Overall 
assaults
1) Killed 
2) Wounded
 3) Overall 
assaults
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
50 218 268 49 418 467 66 522 588 85 605 690 97 428 525 14 33 47
Including
Greater 
Moscow 
8 62 80 16 179 195 40 228 268 49 222 271 57 196 253 10 23 33
Petersburg 
and Region
9 32 41  4 45  49  6  56 62 11 111 122 15  38  53  2  6  8
Source: Galina Koževnikova 2009
Human rights NGOs, critical and/or 
independent journalists as well as representatives 
of migrant communities see the main reasons 
for the tacit acceptance of racist and xenophobic 
violence among Russian law enforcement and 
judicial institutions as the following:
• The wide distribution of racist and xenophobic 
bias in the majority population, including civil 
servants;
• The high ﬁgure of Neo-Nazis;
• Corruption in the law enforcement system;
• A low ﬁgure of indictments of racist and
xenophobic crimes;
• The lack of an active integration policy.
Galina Koževnikova (Sova Center) mentions a 
“near to complete impunity for radical elements”, 
blaming the Russian jurisdiction as the main 
reason for the increase of racist and xenophobic 
crimes. Despite the fact that in 2006, 588 persons 
had been victimized, only 33 court indictments 
were executed.70 In 2008, there were another 33 
court indictments (against 525 assaults).71 In 2007, 
however, the ratio was only 24 convictions for 
hate-related violent crimes against 690 assaults, 
which is the largest discrepancy between crime, 
jurisdiction and law enforcement over the last 
three years.72
Some progress was reported by Sova Center 
for 2006, from such neighbourhoods as Voronezh, 
where local civic rights NGOs took action and 
achieved a series of anti-racist court decisions.73 
Russia’s legislators were expected to consider 
amendments to various laws in order to strengthen 
the prevention and punishment of chauvinist 
crimes and propaganda74. In 2008, however, the 
appropriate activities of the Russian law-making 
institutions ceased. 
In an interview of March 6, 2007, the 
representative and Humanitarian Coordinator 
of the UN in the Russian Federation, Kasidis 
Rochanakorn, articulated his concerns about 
the rising xenophobia in Russia75. In his report 
of May 30, 2007, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerance, Doudou Diène, concluded: 
“that while there is no state policy of racism 
in the Russian Federation, the Russian society 
is facing an alarming trend of racism and 
xenophobia, the most striking manifestations 
of which are the increasing number of racially 
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motivated crimes and attacks, including by 
neo-Nazi groups, particularly against people 
of non-Slav appearance originating from the 
Caucasus, Africa, Asia or the Arab world; the 
growing level of violence with which some of 
these attacks are carried out, resulting in some 
cases in the death of the victim; the extension 
of this violence to human rights defenders, 
intellectuals and students engaged in the combat 
against racism; the climate of relative impunity 
that the perpetrators of such acts enjoy from law 
enforcement agents, despite a substantial increase, 
in recent months, of prosecutions and convictions 
for acts including racial hatred or enmity as a 
motivating factor; the rise of anti-Semitism as 
well as other forms of religious intolerance, in 
particular against Muslims; the existence and 
the increasing importance of political parties 
with racist and xenophobic platforms; and the 
virtual correspondence of the social, economic 
and political marginalization with the mapping of 
ethnic minorities and other discriminated groups 
in the Russian Federation.
The alarming rise of racist and xenophobic 
violence is linked to two fundamental trends 
in the Russian society. On the one hand, the 
ideological ground of the rise of this violence is 
rooted in the ethnic interpretation, by neo-Nazi 
and extremist groups and some political parties, 
of the political nationalism promoted by the 
Russian authorities to ﬁll the ideological void of
socialism and internationalism left by the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the deep 
social and economic crisis of the Russian society 
has nourished the political instrumentalization 
of the ideology of nationalism and promoted a 
culture of xenophobia and racism in the growing 
marginalized groups of the society. In this context, 
the dominant security approach to immigration 
and the growing association between ethnic and 
religious minorities and criminality, justiﬁed
by ‘the combat against terrorism’, are giving 
legitimacy to the rhetoric and violence of racism 
and xenophobia.” 76
In July/August 2008 the UN Committee Against 
Racial Discrimination reacted sharply to Russia’s 
ofﬁcial report on its progress in implementing the
‘International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination’ (ICERD)77, 
as adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1965 
and ratiﬁed by Russia in 1969. Among others, the
UN Committee’s ‘Recommendations’ of August 
20, 2008 to the Russian report suggested an 
independent inquiry of the 2006 campaign against 
Georgian nationals in Russia, demanding that the 
responsible for these actions, ofﬁcials and other
decision-makers, must be revealed.
Russian human rights defenders go even further 
with their criticism, emphasising the involvement 
and responsibility of the state for hate crimes. In her 
report for 2008, Galina Koževnikova highlights the 
“anti-Georgian” and “anti-migrant rhetoric” not 
only of the Russian mass media, but also by some 
MPs and representatives of the jurisdiction and 
law enforcement, who irresponsibly and without 
reason link Georgians and migrants in general 
with criminal activities (cf. Koževnikova 2009). 
As likewise worrying Koževnikova describes the 
xenophobia of Russian pro-governmental youth 
organizations, such as Evroaziatskiy Soyuz (Euro-
Asian Union), Rossiya Molodaya (Young Russia) 
and Molodaya Gvardiya ‘Edinoy Rossii’ (Young 
Guardians of United Russia), of which the latter 
is the most ofﬁcial, pro-governmental of them.
In October 2008, Molodaya Gvardiya ‘Edinoy 
Rossii’ launched a nation-wide campaign of 
ethnic protectionism ‘Our Money to our People’. 
It demanded the reservation of work-places for 
citizens of the Russian Federation. Under the 
protection of Greater Moscow’s Governor Boris 
Gromov the youth movement Mestnye (Locals) 
repeated their 2007 boycott of ‘non-Slavic’ cab 
drivers in autumn 2008. 
It should be noted that the Russian ultra-rightist 
segment was shaken in 2008 by a split in the 
Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) and 
various minor conﬂicts (cf. Koževnikova 2009).
Furthermore, already in 2007, and in imitation of 
the Russian chauvinist organizations some militant 
‘Caucasian’ youth gangs emerged. Experts explain 
their emergence as a reaction to the discriminatory 
attitude of law enforcement authorities and also by 
the failure of adequately addressing and preventing 
hate crimes (cf. Koževnikova 2009). The 
patterns for organising these young ‘Caucasians’ 
correspond to those of their Russian adversaries, 
not so much by identifying themselves by faith, 
ethnicity or nationality, but along the lines of 
counter-identiﬁcation by their geographical origin
(‘Caucasus’) and their potential victim status.
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Effects of the Current International Crisis
Under the impact of the international ﬁnancial and
economic crisis that started affecting Russia in 
2008, migrants will supposedly experience further 
severe discriminations in their work places. In her 
report ‘Are you happy to cheat us?’ (February 
2009) for Human Rights Watch (HRW) author 
Jane Buchanan found that “migrant workers in 
Russia are routinely denied wages, threatened 
with violence and abused by the police, and 
the economic crisis is likely to make their lives 
worse”.78 The report is based on interviews with 
146 current or former migrants in Russia who 
work or have worked in the construction sector. Of 
the estimated up to nine million migrants (World 
Bank) in Russia, it is said that approximately 
40% are working in the Russian construction 
industry. Construction has been among the worst 
hit sectors, when half a million people lost their 
jobs in Russia in December 2008 as the country 
suffered from its worst economic crisis in a 
decade. The HRW report states that “employers 
in most cases refuse to provide migrant workers 
with written employment contracts, as required 
under Russian law, making workers even more 
vulnerable to wage violations and other abuses 
and limiting their ability to access ofﬁcial avenues
of redress. In some of the worst cases, employers, 
intermediaries, and employment agencies 
conﬁscated migrants’ passports and forced them
to work without wages, in some cases conﬁning
them to worksites or physically abusing them” 
(Buchanan 2009). 
The report continues by deﬁning forced labour
as work extracted under the menace of a penalty 
and for which a person has not offered him or 
herself voluntarily. It reminds that forced labour 
is banned under both international and Russian 
law, and states: “International human rights law 
obligates the Russian government to protect all 
people from abuse, including by private actors. 
In the case of migrant workers, the Russian 
authorities have in most cases failed to do so. They 
have not provided sufﬁcient legal protections, nor
have they made existing protections effective. The 
government has also failed to take adequate action 
against police or other ofﬁcials who threaten or
abuse migrant workers. 
The Russian government should ensure 
effective regulation and monitoring of employment 
agencies and other intermediaries, and rigorous 
inspection and prosecution of abusive employers; 
accessible complaint mechanisms for victims 
of abuse; timely and effective investigations 
into allegations of abuse and the imposition of 
appropriate ﬁnes and sanctions. Russia must
provide guarantees of protection for all victims of 
abuse irrespective of migration status” (Buchanan 
2009).
4.3.1 Armenians in Moscow 
The Muscovite Armenian Diaspora is the most 
heterogeneous of Moscow’s migrant communities, 
having developed since medieval times with 
subsequent waves of Armenian immigrants from 
several countries. In the past, Armenian traders of 
Crimea, the South Caucasus and Iran likewise used 
the Volga River and its tributaries for international 
trade, which became so intense, that this trade 
route was sometimes called ‘the Armenian road’, 
while ‘Armenian Lake’ (Lacus Armeniacus) and 
‘Maritime Armenia’ (Armenia Maritima) became 
epithets for the Azov Sea and the Crimea in the 
14th and 15th centuries. Privileged by subsequent 
Russian Tsars, since Ivan IV Grozny conquered 
the Khanate of Astrakhan in 1556, Armenians 
held a key position in the production, manufacture 
and international trade in silk between Iran, the 
Ottoman Empire, Scandinavia and the Netherlands. 
Since the late 14th century a permanent Armenian 
colony of merchants in Moscow is documented, 
with a ﬁrst Armenian Apostolic Church in the 15th 
century. During the reign of Peter I the Armenian 
population of Moscow was already numerous. 
During the 18th century, many Armenian artisans 
and merchants in Moscow prospered as purveyors 
to the court. 
The South Caucasus came under Russian 
military and political control at the end of the 
18th and beginning of the 19th century. In the 
20th century, the collapse of the Russian Empire 
and later of the USSR led to independent South 
Caucasian republics (1918 to 1920/21; and since 
1991). Situated on an economically, as well 
as strategically relevant isthmus, the conﬂict-
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ridden area struggles hard for independence from 
competing regional supremacies (traditionally 
Russia, Turkey, Iran, and as newcomers: the USA 
and the European Union). 
During Soviet times, the labour market of the 
USSR offered many possibilities for numerous 
highly educated and skilled residents from Armenia 
and Georgia outside these Soviet republics, with 
Moscow as a prestigious, but restricted starting-
place for careers. Although a third of Soviet 
Armenia’s population lived outside their republic 
(cf. Brubaker: 1994, 57), migration was not yet 
perceived as external migration, due to the lack 
of a visa regime, legal differences and the many 
commonalities in Soviet everyday-life.
The inﬂux of South Caucasian (im)migrants
in late and post-Soviet times profoundly changed 
the composition of the Armenian community 
in Moscow and in all of Russia respectively: In 
addition to the already existing and established 
Armenian Diaspora of Russia with nearly 500,000 
members before 1988, many Armenian newcomers 
from conﬂict ridden republics such as Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan arrived 
as de facto refugees. Precise ﬁgures of the
recent state of affair are difﬁcult to ascertain.
The Russian census of 2002, recorded 1,130,491 
Armenians (4.4%) in the whole country, among 
them 124,425 in the capital (1.2% of Metropolitan 
Moscow’s 10,101,500 population, where 
Armenians form the forth largest ethnic group 
after Russians [84.8%], Ukrainians [2.4%] and 
Tatars [1.6%]). More realistic estimations by the 
Armenian Apostolic Church, however, mention 2 
to 2.5 million Armenians in Russia, half of them 
residing in Greater Moscow. Other estimations for 
the Armenian population of Moscow vary from 
160,000 to 500,000 (cf. Galkina: 2006, 186). The 
important difference of ethnicity and country of 
origin shows the fact, that Armenians – before 
Azeris and Georgians – form the forth largest 
ethnic group of Moscow, while Armenia – after 
Ukraine (35%), Azerbaijan (10%), Belarus (8%), 
and Georgia (7%) – is the ﬁfth among the top
ten countries of origin of foreign born Moscow 
residents.79
Community building is a more difﬁcult task
for the Armenians in Moscow than elsewhere, due 
to the lack of formal diasporic traditions in Soviet 
history and also to the highly diversiﬁed structure
of the current Armenian community. Although 
a quite substantial community of Armenians 
existed in Moscow already during Soviet 
times80, any Armenian cultural and community 
activity was oppressed by the Soviet authorities 
as ‘chauvinist’. Meanwhile there are 20 to 30 
registered Armenian cultural, compatriot81, or 
expat NGOs, attempting – similar to all Diaspora 
organisations – to serve the dual aim of preserving 
a minority identity, while at the same time aiming 
at a better integration into the majority society. 
The largest and most inﬂuential Armenian NGO is
the Moscow based Union of Armenians of Russia 
(Soyuz Armyan Rossii – SAR), an umbrella 
organisation of Armenian associations in more than 
350 cities of Russia, chaired by the businessman 
Ara Abrahamyan.82 With the Moscow Armenian 
Theatre, the Moscow Armenian Chamber Choir, 
schools, grammar schools and an Armenian 
language centre, the contribution of the Muscovite 
Armenian population to the cultural life of Russia’s 
capital is considerable (cf. Galkina: 2006, 190). 
There are four ethnic Armenians among the 450 
MPs of the Russian State Duma (2008-11), and 
the state education system offers ﬁve Russian-
Armenian schools in Moscow (ibid. 188), where 
children study some subjects in Armenian and the 
Armenian language.
Scholars have paid attention to the fragmented 
nature of the Armenian community in Russia, 
trying to develop typologies for the various 
‘diasporic milieus’. This is being done by 
differentiating between the socio-economically 
and legally well adapted ‘old Armenians’, and the 
newcomers of the second wave of immigration of 
the post-Perestroika era in the 1990s. The latter 
are divided into successful Armenian businessmen 
and much less successful ‘borderline Armenians’, 
characterized “by bi-locality, syncretism, and 
ambiguity” (Oussatcheva: n. d., 16). It is this 
second group of newcomers, “who still have no 
secure legal status, reliable jobs or places to live. 
Many of these people still have families left behind 
in their hometowns and villages. Often they move 
between Russian cities and their places of origin.” 
(Ibid. 15) So far, the most elaborate typology is that 
by Galkina (2006), who identiﬁed seven83 socio-
cultural sub-groups in the Armenian diaspora 
of Moscow, determined by differences in the 
country of origin, language commands (bilingual 
or Russian speaking), levels of education and 
social status, profession, duration of permanence 
in Moscow etc. (ibid., 186 et seqq.).
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Table 6: 
Estimated Language adherence among Armenian migrant cohorts to Moscow
Country of origin Russian as ﬁrst
language
Armenian as ﬁrst
language
Armenia Ca.  10% 90 %
Azerbaijan Ca. 90 % 10 %
Georgia Ca. 75 % 25 %
Central Asian republics Ca. 90 % 10 %
European part of FSU 100 % ---
Republics of FSU and/or unsuccessful settlement in Armenia due 
to lacking command of Armenian
100 % ---
Other regions of Russian Federation 100 % ---
Moscow born or residents for more than 20 years 100 % ---
Not surprisingly, the most successfully integrated 
fragments of the Muscovite Armenian population 
are those who speak only or predominantly 
Russian and live for a long time in Moscow as 
in the case a) of those Armenians ‘deeply rooted 
in the Muscovite society’, whose ancestors have 
lived there for generations, or b) with mainly or 
only Russian speaking Armenian immigrants of 
the 1990s from different places of the previous 
USSR (Georgia, Azerbaijan, partly from Russia/
North Caucasus). Vice versa, the least integrated, 
educated, skilled and successful group are the 
predominantly Armenian speaking immigrants 
of recent years, who come from Armenia or from 
areas in South-Western Georgia, predominantly 
inhabited by Armenians (Javakhetia, Abkhazia) 
(ibid., 187). As the table below conﬁrms, with 75%
(1987) and 89% (2000) the migrants/immigrants 
from the South Caucasian states have the highest 
share in the migration of ethnic Armenians to 
Moscow. Whereas this trend is increasing, the 
share of Armenian migrants from Russia and other 
post-Soviet republics declined considerably from 
35% to 11%. The decline of this subgroup means 
that the share of Russophone or predominantly 
Russian speaking Armenians is roughly one tenth, 
whereas most of the newcomers of the 21st century 
speak predominantly Armenian.
Table 7:
Armenian migrants in Moscow by origin (1987 and 2000)
Country of origin 1987 2000
Armenia 44 % 50%
Georgia and Azerbaijan 31 % 39 %
Russia and other post-Soviet republics 35 % 11 %
Source: Arutyunyan 2001
The difference between ‘old’ resident Russian 
speaking Armenians and new immigrants from 
Armenia and Georgia is also reﬂected in the
occupational stratiﬁcation ofArmenian employees
in Moscow: with 44%, the ‘old’ resident Armenian 
hold the highest share in education, science, public 
health and culture; at the same time, most of them 
are occupied in the public sector; whereas 50% of 
the new Armenophone migrants are employed in 
private companies or are else engaged in individual 
labour activities (22%); while only 19% work in 
the public sector. The newcomers to Moscow often 
start in simple occupations and in physical jobs 
such as construction and road works, taxi driving 
etc., while the “restaurant business serves as a 
common professional niche for all migrants from 
Transcaucasia” (Galkina: 2006, 188 et seq.).
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Table 8:
 Occupational distribution of Armenians employed in Moscow
Groups of 
Armenians
Industry, construction, 
transport, communication
Trade, 
services
Education, science, 
public health, culture
Whole
Old residents 29 % 27 % 44 % 100 %
New 
immigrants
34 % 47 % 19 % 100 %
Source: Arutyunyan: 2001
Armenians in Russia fall frequently victims to 
‘Caucasophobia’, a variety of xenophobia that is 
equally directed against Muslims and Christians 
from the North and South Caucasus. According 
to the Human Rights Ofﬁce in 2007, Armenian 
immigrants were, together with Uzbeks, Azeris 
and Africans, the most threatened group by 
racism.84 Negative attitudes towards the ‘people 
from Caucasia’ are stronger in Moscow than in 
other Russian regions (15% of the Muscovites 
mention them as the group that they ‘like the 
least’; 10% of respondents in St. Petersburg, and 
14% in Novosibirsk said the same). 53% of the 
Muscovites are against the freedom to settle in 
Moscow; the respective numbers for residents 
of Novosibirsk and St. Petersburg are 11% and 
38%.85
As Table 9 indicates, Caucasian victims 
(killed and/or wounded) of racial and Neo-Nazi 
assaults in Russia form the second largest of 
eight subgroups of such victims, followed by 
victims from the ﬁve Central Asian countries.
Considering, that ‘Caucasus’ (covering both the 
Russian North Caucasus and the three independent 
South Caucasian republics) covers a much smaller 
area with a corresponding smaller population, the 
victim tolls below are quite dramatic. Furthermore, 
the ﬁgures reveal a distinct difference in the
intensity of the assaults: While persons of ‘Non-
Slavic appearance’ form the main victim groups 
of racial killings (including premeditated murder), 
subgroups 7 and 8 show the highest amounts of 
wounded Russians etc.:
Table 9:
Victim groups of racial and Neo-Nazi assaults in Russia 2004-January 2009
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Jan 2009
1) Killed 
2) 
Wounded
1) Killed
2) 
Wounded
1) Killed
2) 
Wounded
1) Killed
2) 
Wounded
1) Killed
2) 
Wounded
1) Killed
2) 
Wounded
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Overall 50 218 49 418 66 522 85 605 97 428 14 33
Including
1) Dark 
coloured
1 33 3 38 2 32 0 37 1 22 1 8
2) From  
Central Asia
10 23 18 34 17 60 30 81 49 108 7 5
3) From 
Caucasus
15 38 12 52 15 72 25 57 23 72 3 5
4) From the 
Near East + 
North Africa
4 12 1 22 0 11 1 21 1 12 0 0
5) From 
China, 
Vietnam, 
Mongolia 
etc.
8 29 4 58 4 52 2 43 1 34 3 3
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In particular Armenian migrants were hit 
by the pogrom of July 8, 2002, in the town of 
Krasnoarmeysk (Moscow region) with a population 
of 25,000 Russians and a few hundred migrants 
from Caucasia and Central Asia.86 Among those 
migrants murdered in Moscow during 2006, there 
were at least seven Armenians, who were stabbed 
or shot, in most cases by young Russians, some of 
them being university students. For example, the 
Russian icon painter and student Artur Ryno (born 
1989), who admitted to have murdered 37 non-
Russians, among them one Armenian87, expressed 
particular hatred against Caucasians, “who come 
to Moscow, unite here and oppress Russians“.88
The liberalization of migration laws in early 
2007, the subsequent regularization of the 
residency and work of many migrants and the 
feasible increase of taxes, paid by migrants to the 
Russian tax authorities did not reduce the number 
of hate crimes. A new wave of anti-Armenian 
aggression in Moscow started in early 2009, 
when, within a few days, four ethnic Armenians, 
including a 50 year old mother and her 12 year old 
son89, were stabbed to death in Greater Moscow. 
In contrast to previous years, when most victims 
were young males, victims are now also in the 
cohort of immigrants aged 50 and more, including 
a woman for the ﬁrst time.
Human rights advocates in Russia blame the 
law enforcement, prosecution and jurisdiction 
authorities to delay or even suspend investigations 
of cases of racist violence.90 For example, in the 
case of the 19 year old Armenian Artur Sardaryan, 
who was stabbed in 2006 at a Moscow city 
train station by Neo-Nazis, while screaming 
„For Russia’s glory!“ the authorities refused to 
categorize the case as related to inter-ethnic hate. 
On May 30, 2007, a Moscow court acquitted 
Roman Polusnyak of the murder of A. Sardaryan, 
although two witnesses had identiﬁed him.91 In 
2007, a centre for legal assistance to Armenians 
of Russia was founded in Moscow as a result of 
the increasing incidents.92 
In Armenia, the increase of killings of 
Armenians in Moscow and the frequent inactivity 
of Russian law and law enforcement authorities 
caused strong protest by human rights NGOs and 
western orientated political parties, who called 
on the Armenian government to a more powerful 
defence of the rights of Armenian migrants. 
Under pressure of such public protests, President 
Robert Kocharyan and Prime Minister Andranik 
Margaryan articulated ofﬁcial protest for the ﬁrst
time, when a high-ranking Kremlin representative 
paid an ofﬁcial visit to Yerevan in June 2006 (cf.
Danielyan 2006). In amazing contrast to this more 
recent development, the representative OSCE 
survey of 2005 revealed that 52% of Armenian 
migrants to Russia still considered the attitudes of 
the host country authorities to be either good or 
satisfactory. Even more are satisﬁed with the local
population: 46.5% believe that they were positive, 
28.6% rate them as satisfactory, and 18.7% as 
neutral (cf. Minasyan & Hancilova: 2006, 26 et 
seq.). Our project will help to ascertain whether 
this surprisingly positive opinion still lasts among 
migrants in and from Armenia.
Since the 1990s, Russian scholars have 
conducted several surveys to explore the perception 
of foreign immigrants by the Russian population. 
A 1994 survey revealed that 30 to 34% of ethnic 
Russians do not trust Armenians, Azerbaijanis 
6) Other 
victims of 
‘non-Slavic 
appearance’
2 22 3 72 4 69 20 87 12 36 0 2
7) Victims 
of youth 
subcultures 
or leftist 
orientation
0 4 3 121 3 119 5 193 3 75 0 4
8) Others 
(including 
Russians) 
or no 
information
10 57 5 21 21 107 2 86 6 69 0 0
Source: Galina Koževnikova 2009
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and Chechens; the only ethnic group that are 
viewed more suspiciously by Russians are the 
Roma (36.3%).93 More recent surveys conﬁrm the
signiﬁcant increase of this trend. A study among
2,500 respondents, published by the Moscow 
based demoscopic institute Expertisa in February 
2004, found that one third of all Russians favour 
limiting the entry of foreigners to Russia, with 
60% of those polled expressed dislike for people 
from the Caucasus regions, 51% for Chinese, 
48% for Vietnamese, 47% for Central Asians, and 
28% for Africans and Jews. Mark Umov, the head 
of Expertisa, commented in an interview that 
“chauvinism, xenophobia, and authoritarianism 
are worsening. Not because life in Russia is so 
hard. On the contrary, such phenomena occur 
whenever life becomes just a little easier, and 
people immediately want more. The rest depends 
on the moral climate within society.”94 
Xenophobic and racist sentiments are also 
widely spread among the academic youth of 
Moscow, as a survey of 2002, conducted by 
the sociology department of the Moscow State 
Institute of International Relations revealed: 
Among 306 students only 21% of the respondents 
say they are tolerant towards people of other ethnic 
groups. More than half (54%) concede that they 
express intolerance and resentment against people 
who do not look like them. Also, only 33% say 
they are ready to marry people from other ethnic 
groups, against 40% preferring only their own 
nationality. About 20% say the choice depends on 
the nationality. Other ﬁndings indicated that about
45% were against having Roma as neighbours, 
31% were against Chechens, and 14% were 
against Jews. Finally, 69% say they will support 
any measures to restrict the freedoms and rights of 
Caucasus and Central Asia residents in Moscow.95 
A 2004 study by the University of St. Petersburg 
on the anti-foreign sentiments of Russians between 
the ages of 16 and 19 revealed that four out of 
ten young Russians support extreme nationalist 
groups, and one in ten of those aged 16 to 19 would 
be willing to beat up foreigners for money. Two 
out of three respondents felt that Russia belongs 
to the Russians, while at the same time only one 
ﬁfth felt opposed to nationalism.96 In late 2005, 
Alexander Brod of the Muscovite Human Rights 
Ofﬁce declared that according to polls 60% of the
residents sympathize with xenophobic slogans.97 
In a survey from 2005, headed by Tatiana Yudina, 
60.5% of the Muscovite respondents admitted to 
have a “negative attitude towards migrants” while 
almost 40% do not want Armenian immigrants to 
live in Moscow (cf. Yudina 2005, 4). 
The phenomenon of the rapid increase of 
xenophobia in Russian cities and in particular 
in the megalopolitan milieus of Moscow and St 
Petersburg in the middle of the ﬁrst decade of the
new century, demands further research and, above 
all, explanation, because, as Galkina rightly pointed 
out, in “Russia there are no obvious cultural and 
civilizational distinctions between the indigenous 
population and most migrants. Basically, they all 
come from CIS countries (…), with Russian as 
the language of intercultural relations” (Galkina 
2006, 190). 
4.3.2 Georgians in Moscow
According to realistic, but unofﬁcialestimations,
there are about one million Georgians living in the 
Russian Federation98. Russian ofﬁcials estimate,
that their number is 300,00099, and half of them 
are ‘illegals’100. The ofﬁcial ﬁgure of Georgians
in Moscow, according to the 2002 census, is 
54,387, or 0.5% of Moscow’s population. Roin 
Konjaria, vice president of the Moscow Georgian 
Community, however, remarked in 2006, that 
there are between 150,000 to 200,000 Georgians 
living in Moscow and some 500,000 throughout 
Russia.101 Annually an estimated 90,000 citizens 
of Georgia migrate to Russia.102
Georgia’s Central Bank estimates Georgians 
transferred 161.5 million EUR from Russia to 
Georgia in the ﬁrst half of 2006 – accounting for
nearly 15% of Georgia’s GDP103, while a Russian 
ofﬁcial report of April 2006, mentioned 152
million EUR104. 
The Georgian residents of Moscow founded 
the Moscow Georgian Community (Moskovskoe 
Gruzinskoe Zemlyačestvo - MGZ)105, to which 
the choir Lomisi (founded in 1989), a children’s 
theatre (founded 1993) and the literary club 
Monatreba are afﬁliated. The Georgian Orthodox
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St George’s Church in the Presna district, founded 
in 1750 for the Georgian colony of Moscow was 
returned to the Georgian Orthodox church in 1991, 
and re-opened after restoration in 2000. There are 
two ethnic Georgians among the 450 MPs of the 
Russian State Duma (2008-2011). 
Table 10:
 South Caucasian ethnic groups in Moscow
Ethnic group or 
country of origin
Census 
1989
Census 2002 Estimated ﬁgure
(ca. 2007) 
Percentage of ‘legal’ 
(registered) residents
(before 2007)
Armenians 43,989 142,425 (1.2% of the 
entire population)
1-1.5 million Ca. 10%
Azeris 20,727 95,563 (0.92%) 600,000 Ca. 15%
Georgians 19,608 54,387 (0.5%) 150-200,000 Ca. 44%
 T. Savvidis
Although the annual inﬂux of migrants from
Georgia to Russia surmounted that of immigrants 
from Armenia at least until 2004 (see Table 11), 
the total amount of Georgians in Moscow is 
roughly a third of the ofﬁcial Armenian ﬁgure
and only a tenth of the unofﬁcial estimation. For
this reason, perhaps, their Diaspora and migration 
patterns have been less researched than it is the 
case with Armenian residents in Russia in general 
and in Moscow in particular. We assume that 
the Georgian community shares otherwise many 
features with the Armenians. 
There are distinct differences as well: 1) a 
major difference to the Armenian community 
is the more than four times higher share of 
registered (‘legal’) residents among Muscovite 
Georgians (before the laws amendments of 2007). 
2) While Armenians and Azeris are targeted in 
the ﬁrst place by societal xenophobic violence,
Georgian migrants to Russia fall victims to state 
orchestrated campaigns. In autumn 2006, when 
Tbilisi initiated its current conﬂict with Russia
by arresting four Russian ofﬁcers for espionage,
the Russian government reacted with large 
scale repressions and deportations. It advised its 
citizens not to visit Georgia, stopped issuing visas 
to Georgian nationals, and cut off all air, land, sea 
and postal links with its southern neighbour, which 
affected the land blocked Armenian Republic as 
well, because as a result of the joint Azerbaijani-
Turkish blockade of Armenia since 1993, all land 
transfer of goods from Russia come to Armenia 
via Georgia. 
Moscow has also imposed restrictions on 
bank transfers, directly hurting the hundreds 
of thousands of Georgian nationals working in 
Russia. Georgian immigrants and entrepreneurs 
were targeted by increased police, health and tax 
inspections, prompted by closures of businesses, 
two casinos, car services, markets and stores. 
Under the pretext of ﬁghting economic and
tax crimes, the police and secret service FSB 
uncovered migrants who resided unregistered. 
When the police acquired volunteers from the 
population, the ultranationalist Movement against 
Illegal Immigration (DPNI) offered its services 
and called on their web site on nationalists to 
report on the places of possible living of ‘illegal’ 
Georgian migrants, their stores and clubs.106 The 
Russian Home Ministry ordered some Muscovite 
schools to provide the names of pupils with 
Georgian family names in order to check their 
parents.107 Moscow courts issued 700 deportation 
orders108, regardless of the fact whether Georgians 
lived documented or undocumented in Russia or 
whether they considered themselves Georgians 
at all or Russians, had Georgian or Russian 
surnames.109 According to the Georgian Foreign 
Minister, the number of Georgians evicted from 
Russia is as high as 4,600110, according to other 
sources 2,500.111 Several Georgians died while 
in custody or during deportation hearings.112 Due 
to the suspension of rail and air links between 
Russia and Georgia, deportees have had to take 
alternative routes back home. Many have ended 
up in Minsk, Yerevan or Baku.
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A representative opinion poll of October 14-
15, 2006, explored the views of 1,500 residents of 
100 residencies in 44 Russian regions on Russia’s 
policies towards Georgian immigrants and 
entrepreneurs. The results revealed ambiguities: 
In Moscow, 39% of the respondents declared 
that their attitude towards Georgians was still 
positive, despite the Georgian-Russian conﬂict
and the actions taken by the Russian authorities, 
while 13% said that their attitude had worsened. 
Simultaneously, most respondents (57%) believe 
that law-enforcement agencies should in fact 
be more vigilant with regards to the activity of 
Georgians living in Russia. Only 28% of Russians 
are against such ethnically selective attention. It 
is indicative that half of those expressing their 
invariably positive overall attitude towards 
Georgians demand nevertheless a more careful 
attention on the part of law-enforcement agencies 
to Georgians’ activities in Russia. According to 
the same survey, many respondents deal with 
Georgians on an everyday basis and judge on 
the basis of personal acquaintance: 18% of all 
respondents even say that they have Georgians 
among their friends, acquaintances or neighbours. 
More than half of the respondents (53% in 
Moscow) say that there are Georgians where they 
live, 29% believing that there are many of them in 
their locality113. 
In an opinion poll in Georgia, conducted in 
March 2006 (and before the conﬂict of autumn
2006), respondents were given a choice between 
three commonly discussed approaches to relations 
with Russia. 53% of the respondents in Georgia 
said the two countries must be on friendly terms 
“no matter what”, while only about a third (32%) 
said Georgia must stand its ground with regard 
to Russia and not yield under any circumstances. 
Insigniﬁcant three percent said Georgia should
cease any relationship with Russia, while 12% did 
not offer a response114.
Migration both of Georgians and Armenians to 
Russia has constantly declined since the second 
half of the 1990s, in particular since 2001, as the 
table below suggests; the decline of two thirds 
(Armenia) or a half (Georgia) of arrivals from 
both countries coincided with a change of the 
relationship towards departures: While less persons 
from Armenia and Georgia arrived in Russia, the 
number of those departing was relatively higher 
(by more than 10%). However, in 2005 the 
situation changed again, reaching its so far peak 
level since 1997 for immigration from Armenia in 
2007. Immigration from Georgia reached 10,595 
arrivals in 2007, which is more than twice the 
amount of the bottom level of 2004. At the same 
time the number of departures to Armenia only 
slightly increased since 2004, while the amount 
of departures to Georgia slightly decreased:
Table 11: 
Armenian and Georgian Departures and Arrivals to and from Russia
Arrivals from 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Armenia 19,123 15,951 5,814 6,802 5,124 3,057 7,581 12,949 30,751
Georgia 24,517 20,213 9,674 7,128 5,540 4,886 5,497 6,806 10,595
Departures to
Armenia 2,578 1,519 1,362 1,114 1,098 654 620 686 728
Georgia 3,286 1,802 1,339 964 939 740 691 593 603
Source: Russia Federal State Statistics Services, International Migration Web site: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b08_11/
IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/05-09.htm
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The International Migration Web Site of the 
Russian Federal Statistics Services does not yet 
offer the 2008 data. Drawing conclusions from 
the data of previous years, the new increase of 
arrivals from Armenia and Georgia is the more 
remarkable. The crisis of 2006 – the serial killings 
of Armenians and the increasing deterioration 
of Georgian-Russian relations – obviously had 
no lasting repercussions on the migration ﬂows
between Russia, Armenia and Georgia, thus again 
illustrating that international migration develops 
its own, complex dynamics. Tentatively, we 
offer the conclusion that the legal liberalizations 
of early 2007 had a more positive effect on 
immigration than the above mentioned negative 
events had. But it remains to be seen, whether this 
trend will continue throughout 2008 and 2009, 
when Georgia’s attempt to regain control over 
South Ossetia by military means caused a war 
with Russia in August 2008.
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
migration from former Soviet countries joined 
international migration ﬂows. Additionally to
migration out of these countries, the movement 
of people distinctly increased within and among 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
which is the successor entity of the USSR after 
1991. According to data from the European 
regional bureaus of the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), between 1991 and 1992, 
700,000 refugees and 2.3 million Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) were registered in 
the countries of the CIS (cf. Migration and 
Development 1999).
In 1999, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) issued a special report (“Migration 
in the CIS: 1997-1998”), in which it mentions in 
particular, that in 1997 the main destination of 
migrants from CIS countries was Russia. While by 
that time out-migration from Russia had already 
decreased (by 20%), immigration to Russia, mainly 
from the CIS, decreased only by 7.5% (cf. IOM 
1999). According to the report, more than half of 
all migrants in CIS countries are Russians (54%), 
16% are Ukrainians, 3.5% come from Belarus, 
and 6% left the countries of Transcaucasia (ibid.). 
The educational and occupational composition of 
migrants consisted predominantly of a working 
population, qualiﬁed workers, specialists, and
highly educated people. Each year about 220,000 
migrants from the CIS migrate to Germany and 
other countries of Western Europe, to the USA 
and Israel (cf. IOM 1999).
Against this backdrop of tendencies within and 
from the CIS, speciﬁc processes are taking place
in the South Caucasus region. Severe changes 
of historical traditions are in progress. The 
main historical changes of the last decade of the 
previous century for Armenia are characterized 
by depopulation and mono-ethnization of the 
population as a result of migration processes. 
The historically unprecedented process of 
depopulation in the countries of the South Caucasus 
was one of the many negative consequences of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and of the attempts 
to modernize those countries. In total, about three 
million people left the South Caucasus. By the 
end of the 1990s, around a million people had left 
Armenia. The main reasons causing such a huge 
out-ﬂow of population is the abrupt reduction of
work places, the economic crisis, and the decrease 
of living standards. Armenia became an ‘export’ 
country for unskilled and skilled workers. The 
‘export’ of labour resources, the outﬂow of the
economically active population on such a large 
scale, essentially changed the demographic 
structure of the Armenian society. 
OUT-MIGRATION FROM ARMENIA AFTER 1990
Gevorg Poghosyan
1: Introduction
2: A Brief Historical Overview of Armenian Out-Migration 
Migration processes, however, have their history. 
There were several huge waves of migration from 
Armenia taking place during the 20th century. 
Armenians ﬂed because of genocide, deportation,
political and religious pressure, war, bad economic 
conditions and crisis, social conﬂicts and natural
disasters. The reasons for migration did not differ 
from those that prevailed in previous centuries, 
except for the Genocide of 1915 (cf. Karakashian 
& Poghosyan 2003).
According to the data of the National Library 
archives in 1917, 202 settlements of Armenians 
spread from Madras in India to Australia, 
Argentina, Ethiopia, North America, as well as to 
European and Russian cities. There is information 
about a certain degree of out-migration of 
Armenians from Turkey to the USA and Europe 
even before 1895. The vast majority of Ottoman 
Armenians were peasants; but in urban settlements 
they worked also as craftsmen and merchants. 
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Religion played an important role in the moral, 
spiritual and intellectual life of the people. The 
trading centre, royal residence and capital city 
of Ani (10th/11th centuries), whose ruins are to be 
found at the North-East border of today’s Turkey, 
was also known as the ‘City of 1,001 Churches’. 
Many ruins of Armenian churches in the recent 
territories of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and 
Iran witness the Armenians’ once wide-spread 
area of settlement in the Near East. 
Besides, areas of settlement were not always 
voluntarily chosen. Since ancient times, rulers of 
the Near East used to deport entire populations, as 
it happened in the early 17th century, when Iranian 
rulers during their retreat from Ottoman forces 
depopulated parts of the Armenian Highland by 
marching their population to Iran115 and resettling 
the survivors in different areas. As a secondary 
result of the massive forced settlement in Iran, 
substantial Armenian communities emerged in the 
Far East (Japan, China and the Philippines), but 
are almost extinct at present.
Currently, far-away Armenian communities 
can still be found in India, but also in Australia, 
New Zealand, Sub-Saharan Africa (Sudan, South 
Africa, and Ethiopia), in Singapore, Myanmar and 
Hong Kong. 
The Genocide against the Armenians during 
the Ottoman Empire
At the turn of the 19th century, tragic 
changes took place in the lives of Armenians 
in the Ottoman Empire: During the reign of the 
reactionary sultan Abdülhamit II (1876-1909) 
300,000 Armenians perished in local massacres 
(1894-96) and from starvation and disease in their 
aftermath (cf. Dadrian 1995)116. Further 100,000 
Ottoman Armenians ﬂed their homeland and
found sanctuary in neighbouring countries such 
as the Balkans, Iran and the Russian Empire (cf. 
Dadrian: 1995). But an increasing number sought 
already trans-Atlantic refuge in the ‘New World’: 
Between 1895 and 1899, about 70,980 Armenians 
left for the USA (cf. Tashjian 1947). Emigration of 
Armenians from the Ottoman Empire continued 
until the beginning of the 20th century and resulted 
in even more signiﬁcant ﬂows between 1915 and
1922.
These were caused by the genocide (nation-
wide massacres and forced deportation) against 
the remaining Ottoman Armenians, planed and 
organized by the chauvinist Committee for Union 
and Progress (CUP; in Turkish: Ittihat ve Terakki 
Cemiyetı), that autocratically ruled the Ottoman 
Empire since 1913. This party attempted to 
stabilise the collapsing multi-religious and multi-
ethnic Empire by means of ethnic homogenization, 
namely by Turkiﬁcation. Its results were the
annihilation of 1.5 million of a pre-war population 
of 2.5 million Ottoman Armenians117. Survivors 
who did not return into the territory of the newly 
founded, post-war Republic of Turkey (in 1923) 
lost their right to obtain Turkish citizenship under 
the new Kemalist regime during the 1920s.118 To a 
large extent, the present-day Armenian diasporas 
represent the consequences of the genocide during 
the years 1915 to 1917.
Though Armenian settlements of refugees 
and traders existed since Medieval times (since 
the loss of Armenian statehood in 1045), they 
grew in size only after the genocide, when the 
survivors did not dare to return to their homelands 
for fear of continuing persecution, or were barred 
from Turkey by the above mentioned legislative 
regulations. Similar to the survival patterns of 
previous decades, they established themselves 
predominantly in neighbouring areas of their 
historic homeland: in the Balkans and in Middle 
East countries (Lebanon, Syria, Iran). Further ten 
thousands settled in Western Europe, in particular 
in France and in the Americas (North and South).
Migration from and to Armenia during the Soviet Era
A massive wave of immigration of ethnic Armenians 
from the Middle East into Soviet Armenia started 
in 1946119. At that time the government of Soviet 
Armenia, with the approval of the central Soviet 
government appealed to the diasporas, hoping 
to compensate for Armenia’s losses of its male 
workforce120 during World War II. Although the 
Soviet Armenian intention was primarily to attract 
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unskilled labourers (Karakashian & Poghosyan 
2003, 236), many skilled and highly qualiﬁed
migrants of different professions arrived from 
Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Greece, 
after giving up their properties. During 1946 to 
1949 alone, some 100,000 ethnic Armenians 
immigrated, mainly from the Balkans (Rumania, 
Bulgaria, Greece) and from the Near and Middle 
East (Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran), but also from 
France121 and the USA122; among them, 32,000 from 
Lebanon and Syria, 21,000 from Iran, 18,000 from 
Greece and 5,300 from France. The total ﬁgure of
ethnic Armenian immigrants to Soviet Armenia 
in the period between 1921 and 1962 was given 
as 220,000, and for the period of 1962 to 1973, 
with 26,140.123 These ﬁgures include also the
inﬂux of Armenians from other Soviet republics,
which increased when the inﬂux of foreign ethnic
Armenians decreased after 1965 to some 3,000 to 
4,000 immigrants annually. In all, the number of 
immigrants to Soviet Armenia between 1965 and 
1985 was as high as 178,000 people. 
At the same time, the Soviet regime harshly 
limited the freedom of movement, especially 
concerning out-migration.124 But Armenia used to 
be a region of labour surplus, as far more labour 
resources existed than there were employment 
possibilities. Thus, the seasonal departure of 
Armenians to other destinations within the USSR 
was a well known phenomenon.
The Nagorno-Karabakh War
Due to the still unsolved Nagorno-Karabakh 
conﬂict (since 1888) and subsequent undeclared
war (1991 to 1994), the ﬂight of Armenians from
Azerbaijan resulted in refugee movements to 
Armenia, Russia, the USA and other countries. 
According to data from the UNHCR, out of 
360,000 Armenians expelled from Azerbaijan, 
264,339 found refuge in Armenia (cf. UNHCR 
2001); of these, about 100,000 were naturalized. 
Many others left the country in search of earnings 
and a better life elsewhere. The admission of 
refugees from Azerbaijan lasted over many years. 
Neither the Armenian society, nor the Armenian 
state was capable of tackling the accommodation 
and integration of such dimensions of refugees. 
Most of them came from predominantly urban, 
industrialised societies (like Sumgait and Baku), 
and were often specialised in the petroleum 
industries. Subsequently, they did not ﬁt into the
different proﬁle of professions needed in Armenia.
Great efforts to determine state policies concerning 
refugees and aiming at their full integration were 
ﬁnally successful during the late 1990s.
Armenian Out-Migration and Diasporas Today
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, migration 
processes revived after having been restrained for 
seven decades. Despite the generally extended 
freedom of movement after 1991, Armenians 
continued on their routes to Russia and to other 
countries of the CIS, where already established 
business contacts and relationships with the local 
Armenian Diaspora existed. Visa regimes outside 
the CIS and the lack of a command of foreign 
languages other than Russian were further reasons 
for the continuity of migration patters. During that 
period 800,000 to 900,000 people migrated from 
Armenia (cf. IOM 2002), which is about one third 
of the current overall population. According to 
census data, 3.2 million people lived in the country 
in 2001 (cf. http://www.armstat.am). 
According to various experts’ estimations, 
the number of Armenians in the world today 
amounts to approximately eight to nine million. 
Today, the countries with the largest numbers of 
Armenians (excluding Armenia and Nagorno-
Karabakh) in rank of order are Russia, the USA, 
France, Georgia, Lebanon, Argentina, Iran, Syria, 
Canada, and the Ukraine. Since most states in their 
census do not include the category of ethnicity, 
but poll only nationalities or citizenships, 
estimates can only relate to the registration of 
baptism, weddings and burials, as established by 
the Armenian Apostolic Church that is the only 
universal Armenian organization. However, such 
ﬁgures do not only exclude Armenians of other
denominations (Catholics, Uniates, Protestants), 
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but may be artiﬁcially enlarged or decreased
for various political reasons, depending on the 
situation in the given countries.125 Tentatively, 
some ﬁgures are suggested here for the above
mentioned countries:
- Russia: While in 1989, 532,390 ethnic 
Armenians were counted in the Russian 
Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR), the 
2002 census revealed 1,134,491 residents with 
Armenian citizenship (nationality). However, 
in 1996, the Armenian Apostolic Arch-Bishop 
for Russia, Tiran Gyuregyan, mentioned an 
inﬂux of 1.63 million ethnic Armenians who
settled in Russia after 1991: 850,000 of these 
came from the Republic of Armenia, 350,000 
from Azerbaijan, 250,000 from Georgia and 
Abkhazia and further 180,000 from the ﬁve
Central Asian republics, in particular from 
Turkmenistan.126 Together with the ‘old’ 
Russian residents of Armenian ethnicity this 
makes a total of 2,162,390 ethnic Armenians in 
the Russian Federation in 1996. More current 
estimates of approximately 2.5 million ethnic 
Armenians in Russia therefore do not seem 
improbable.
- USA: Reliable estimates vary from 1.2 to 1.4 
million.127
- France: Reliable estimates vary from 400,000 
to 500,000.
- Georgia: The number of ethnic Armenians 
declined from 437,273 (census of 1989) to 
248,929 (2002 census, not covering South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia). However, Armenian 
NGOs and representatives of the Armenian-
Apostolic Church in Georgia believe that as a 
result of assimilation the real number is higher 
(estimates vary between 300,000 and 500,000). 
The 2003 census in Abkhazia revealed 44,870 
Armenians (1989: 76,500), but the results are 
generally refuted as exaggerated not only by 
Georgian authorities, but also by international 
NGOs such as the International Crisis Group. 
- Lebanon: With the last ofﬁcial census being
conducted in 1932, everything is guesswork. 
Estimates put the number of ethnic Armenians 
as high as 150,000 (1975: 186,000). 
- Argentina: The last census of 2001 did not 
consider ethnicity or nationality. There may 
live 130,000 ethnic Armenians in the largest 
Armenian community of South America.
- Ukraine: According to the 2001 population 
census, there were 99,894 ethnic Armenians 
residing in the country. 50,363 of them were 
nationals of the Republic of Armenia, 5,798 
were Ukrainian nationals and further 43,105 
were nationals of the Russian Federation.128 
- Iran: While details of the 2006 population 
and household census were not available, 
estimates vary considerably between 80,000 
and 500,000, with a probability rather being 
something between 80,000 and 100,000 
(1979: ca. 300,000). Since Armenians are the 
Christian showcase minority in Iran, they are 
given the right of two mandate seats in the 
National Assembly (one seat for each 100,000 
members of a minority among the recognized 
‘book religions’).129 This indicates an ofﬁcial
acknowledgement of 150-200,000 ethnic 
Armenians in Iran.
- Syria: Ca. 75,000 – 200,000 (1985: 150,000), 
with the low ﬁgure being the more probable.
In Central Europe, migrants from Armenia 
ﬁrst tried to settle in Germany (cf. Poghosyan
1997), Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland (cf. 
Marciniak 2001).130 
Social Composition of Out-Migration from Armenia Today
Many migrants from Armenia have departed 
without any preparation of documents, such as 
visas. Initially, they intended not to leave for 
long, but assumed they would earn some money 
and return. But the absolute majority of them has 
not returned yet and continues to live in different 
countries as undocumented migrants. The 
remainder (incomparably less) joined the group 
of seasonal workers which periodically leave, 
generally to Russia and to other countries of the 
CIS (cf. Poghosysan 2003). 
The social-demographic composition of 
migrants is highly differentiated. In general 
these are people between the age of 18 and 55. 
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The majority of them (65%) are men of working 
age. Their educational level is quite high – as a 
rule these are qualiﬁed workers with an average
and professional-technical education. A further 
30 to 35% of the migrants from Armenia have 
completed higher education (cf. UNDP 1999). 
At the beginning of the period of massive out-
migration (1991 to 1994), male migrants were 
leaving unaccompanied, when trying to settle 
abroad. Only at a later stage entire families would 
migrate (cf. ibid.).
Migration processes are serious factors of 
social transformation and have an inﬂuence
on the demographic and social situation in the 
country. Armenia was among those countries that 
‘exported’ its labour surplus, including qualiﬁed
specialists and intellectual workers. Due to this 
‘brain drain’ Armenia has lost intellectual and 
spiritual wealth that it had spent on the education 
and training of specialists (cf. Yudina 2002).
Economists predict that future out-migration 
from Armenia will annually number between 
70,000 and 80,000: “If to proceed from the fact 
that the economical development will be 6% 
a year, that can create 30-35 thousand work 
places, then even under these circumstances the 
domestic market will not be able to take up the 
incoming labour force within the next few years” 
(Papoyan & Bagdasaryan 1999, 9). Armenian 
scholar Khojabekyan notes that between 1986 
and 1990 the population of an active economic 
age (25-50) numbered one million on average. 
But between 1996 and 2005, it already numbered 
1.35 million people (cf. Khojabekyan 2001). In 
other words, the number of working age persons 
increased dramatically, and will certainly make 
the continuation of out-migration likely.
The mechanism of migration allowed hundred 
of thousands of Armenian nationals to ﬁnd work
abroad and in that way prevented a signiﬁcant
increase of the unemployment rate in the country. 
The unregulated redistribution of the workforce 
from Armenia complemented the need for labour 
in other regions of the CIS. Though migrants 
promote the economical survival of the people, 
their absence nevertheless harms the economy of 
the Republic of Armenia at the same time. The 
formation of a middle class has suffered to a large 
extent.
Today new migration processes take place 
in the country, and the state still does not play 
an active role in regulating them. This concerns 
ﬁrst of all the return of undocumented Armenian
migrants and their reintegration into society; 
secondly, the trafﬁcking of women for exploitation
including the sex-industries; and ﬁnally transit
migration in Armenia. The above listed relate 
to new phenomena in the sphere of migration in 
Armenia, but has an increasing impact.
Causes of Out-Migration from Armenia
Thorough, socio-historical analysis of the reasons 
and circumstances that cause large-scale migratory 
ﬂows provides evidence of multidimensional
factors that have sometimes been inappropriately 
simpliﬁed. An analysis of the causes of migration
here shall provide a detailed categorisation of the 
key motives and objective circumstances which 
have caused the large scale outward ﬂow of the
population during the last ten years (cf. Kharatyan 
2003): 
Cultural-historical factors: Armenians have a 
historically conditioned tendency to high mobility 
and adaptability to new living conditions. Numerous 
historically formed Armenian diaspora(s) in many 
countries of Europe, Asia and America verify this 
fact. The presence of diasporas is without any 
doubt an important ‘pull’-factor that stimulates 
the mobility of labour.
Historical-political factors: The collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and as a result the emergence of 15 
new independent states, led to what is commonly 
called the ‘anti-block’-syndrome, i.e. when the 
citizens of the previous Warsaw Pact countries, 
who were limited by a strict migration regime and 
limited options to travel abroad, suddenly obtained 
the freedom of movement and left for other 
countries. Long-standing political propaganda led 
by Western powers towards the population of the 
Soviet Union should also be considered a factor 
in this context. The praise of Western values, 
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freedoms and a ‘Western way of life’ certainly 
had an impact on many Soviet people and they 
took their ways to Europe in search of a higher 
living standard as soon as they were given this 
opportunity.
Furthermore, a particular political situation 
emerged in the development of the new 
independent states, when political power was 
redistributed. In the case of Armenia (as in 
Georgia and Azerbaijan) over the ﬁrst years of
the establishment of a state system, the focus 
shifted to the declaration of ‘national values’: 
of the language, culture, traditions etc. This 
‘national’ revival created some discomfort for 
the Russian-speaking part of society that in turn 
intensiﬁed its migratory dispositions. It is well
known that among the migrants who left Armenia 
within the ﬁrst years of independence, many
Russian-speaking residents and even Russophone 
specialists of Armenian descent preferred to leave 
for Russia out of political considerations. 
The change of the political regime played 
a decisive role in the historical-political push-
factors. Usually, literature on migration tends to 
underestimate this, but in our opinion it has a high 
relevance. Under Soviet rule large groups of skilled 
state ofﬁcials, including their family members,
settled in Armenia (as in other republics). For the 
majority of them the collapse of the regime meant 
the end of their professional career, a change of 
their life strategy. These people found themselves 
if not in the position of social outcasts from the 
new society, then at any rate among the socially 
and economically disadvantaged. Many of them 
emigrated to Russia and other countries at the ﬁrst
opportunity.
War and conﬂict factors: The Nagorno-
Karabakh armed conﬂict that in the end of 1991
transformed into a war became the cause of the 
displacement of huge amounts of people from 
both sides. About 500,000 ethnic Armenians were 
forced to escape from Azerbaijan, of which the 
majority, 360,000, came to Armenia. 
As a result of the war, an additional 78,000 
Armenian refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh 
arrived in Armenia. A further 75,000 residents 
of villages situated near the Armenian border to 
Azerbaijan were forced to leave their homelands 
because of constant bombings, destruction, 
kidnapping and hostage-taking. The depressing 
situation of war and long lasting, unsolved 
conﬂict, combined with the failure of international
mediation and conﬂict settlement caused the ﬂight
of hundred of thousands of Armenians. 
Economical factors: A whole set of difﬁcult
economic conditions, such as the blockade of roads 
and communication by neighbouring Azerbaijan 
and Turkey, the suspension of almost half of the 
industrial enterprises of the country, a violent 
energy crisis, a high level of unemployment and 
the abrupt decrease of living standards for the 
majority.of the population, the loss of former 
markets for export goods and the loss of providers 
of raw materials became the main reasons for the 
emigration of almost one third of the Republic’s 
population during recent years.
Psychological factors: These factors relate to 
a sensed loss of the ‘tranquil life’ and a desperate 
situation for certain parts of the population. In 
search of a better future for themselves and in 
particular for their children people try to improve 
their life by going abroad. The psychological 
factor of despair and mistrust towards the future 
in Armenia played a major ‘push’-role in the 
formation of migratory dispositions. Throughout 
different periods, these factors sometimes 
weakened, sometimes intensiﬁed, but as a rule they
had a strong impact on the social self-esteem of 
citizens. Nowadays they have slightly weakened, 
but remain relevant. 
Transit Migration
In recent years Armenia has become a buffer zone 
through which transit migrants try to cross to enter 
Western Europe. For example, it was reported that 
Kurdish refugees from Turkey have crossed the 
Armenian-Turkish border, reached the Armenian 
capital and were arrested at the nearby international 
‘Zvartnots’ airport when attempting to depart 
to Amsterdam (cf. Karakashyan & Poghosyan 
2003). Armenia has also become a transit country 
for migrants from India, Afghanistan, Iran and 
Pakistan, and even from some African countries 
for those making their ways to Russia and Europe. 
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Transit migrants do not appear in large numbers, 
and do not make for the main type of migration in 
Armenia. However, a certain quantity of migrants 
crosses the territory of the Republic every year, 
usually making their ways from South to North. 
As our own research and observations has shown, 
these migrants are predominantly male and of 
working-age (between 18 and 40). Their aim is to 
study or work elsewhere in order to support their 
families at home, and/or they intend to bring their 
spouses later. The main reasons for migration are 
the unfavourable economic, political and social 
condition in their countries of origin. Between 
2000 and 2001, about 95 transit migrants were 
registered in the country (cf. IOM 2002). Many of 
those transit migrants are being assisted to return 
with the help of international organizations. 
Return ﬂows of transit migrants occur as
well within the territory of Armenia. Thus, for 
example during the recent military operations 
in South Ossetia and Georgia, a huge ﬂow of
migrants (about 20 thousand) from Georgia left 
for Armenia. Among those were ethnic Georgians 
and Armenians who left their homes because of 
the martial law imposed in Georgia, and also 
because of the termination of air communication 
between Moscow and Tbilisi. Georgian nationals 
who used to live in Russia returned to Georgia via 
Armenia. 
Vague Statistics
The system of statistics on out-migration or 
emigration carried out by the passport services of 
the territorial divisions of the Police of the Republic 
of Armenia, based on the data on population being 
registered or expunged from the register, does not 
reﬂect the full volume of population movements.
A considerable proportion of the population leaves 
the Republic and resides abroad for a rather long 
period of time without being expunged from the 
register. In order to ﬁll this gap of information and
to acquire a clear understanding of the external 
migration volumes of the Republic, the State 
Department for Migration and Refugees of the 
Republic of Armenia in collaboration with the 
National Statistical Service of the Republic of 
Armenia, transportation companies and services 
of the Republic of Armenia (hereinafter: RA) 
border-crossing posts, have initiated the data 
collection on persons arriving in and leaving from 
Armenia. Since 2000, the Department monthly 
receives information on the numbers of arrivals 
and departures in Armenia (a) through the RA 
Central Department of Civil Aviation, (b) the 
RA State Customs Committee, and (c) from the 
Armenian Border Guards of the RA National 
Security Service. 
According to data from the Agency on 
Migration at the Republic’s Ministry of Territorial 
Administration’s, the quantity of arrivals and 
departures in Armenia in March 2008 was as 
follows: 
Table 1:
Total
Including transport
Airway Railway Car
Arrived 88,524 38,423 1,137 48,964
Departed 104,109 56,369 1,301 46,439
Balance -15,585 -17,946 -164 2,525
The quantity of persons that had arrived and 
departed from Armenia between January and 
March 2008 reads as follows:
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The analysis of the passenger registration 
made at the entry points of the Republic of 
Armenia shows that between January and 
March 2008, the quantity of departures from the 
Republic outnumbered the quantity of arrivals 
(negative migratory balance) by 32,100 persons. 
This is 10,900 persons (or: 51.7%) more than the 
corresponding index of the same period of the 
previous year. The negative balance in March 
was 15,600 persons, which in comparison to the 
same month in the previous year represented an 
increase of 5,400 persons, or 52.4%.
The amount of passenger transportation 
between January and March 2008, in comparison 
to the same period during the previous year has 
increased by 85,500 persons or 20%, totalling 
512,100 persons (cf. www.dmr.am). 
Occasionally and in dependence from the 
deterioration of the political situation in the 
region these ﬂows intensify. This happened, for
example in 2003 at the beginning of the USA-led 
war in Iraq. Several thousand refugees then left 
Iraq for Armenia and headed further to the West. 
The majority of these migrants came from those 
families who were troubled and frightened by the 
state of emergency in their country. Among the 
thousands of migrants from Iraq to Armenia, the 
majority were ethnic Armenians who have been 
resided in Iraq since long. 
Table 2:
Total
Including transport
Airway Railway Car
Arrived 240,003 114,303 3,719 121,981
Departed 272,109 153,746 3,734 114,629
Balance -32,106 -39,443 -15 7,352
The Role of NGOs
In 1989, a State Committee on Migrants and 
Refugees was formed in order to provide help 
for and to work with the 360,000 Armenian 
refugees from Azerbaijan. In the meantime the 
Committee has extended the ﬁeld of its activities
and has included different categories of migrants 
and asylum seekers into its spectrum of work. 
Several buildings have already been allocated as 
a temporary residence for migrants and refugees. 
A group of specialists has also been formed, 
composed of jurists, doctors, and interpreters. 
However, the contribution of social and 
international organizations in this work should 
not be underestimated. Both the government 
of Armenia and accredited international 
organizations highly welcome the efforts and 
support of local non-governmental organizations. 
Today 10 to 15 NGOs are working in this ﬁeld.
Many of them are situated in Yerevan, but have 
their branches in distant and marginal regions 
of the Republic as well. By now, they have 
accumulated great experience by working with 
refugees, undocumented and transit migrants, 
victims of trafﬁcking and migrants returning to
Armenia.
3: Return Migration of RA Nationals  
and the Importance of Reintegration Assistance 
Massive out-migration from Armenia started 
during the 1990s when, according to expert 
estimates, one million people emigrated from 
Armenia, of which 65% departed to settle in 
Russia and 10 to 15% in various other European 
countries.
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In recent years a different pattern can be 
observed. If before the year 2002 the negative 
migration balance was 50,000 to 60,000, in 2002 
that number decreased to 3,000, and in 2003 
increased again to 10,000. Moreover, from 2004 
on the negative balance of migration turned into 
a positive one: in 2004, the net migration was 
2,000; in 2005, it was 12,500; and in 2006, it 
was 21,800. These statistics allow us to observe a 
slow, but stable return ﬂow of RA nationals from
foreign countries.
The majority of migrants from Armenia hold an 
undocumented status in countries of destination. 
In order to attain a legal status they attempt to 
apply for asylum, but as a rule their applications 
are rejected and they face a demand to return. 
Readmission agreements have been concluded 
by Armenia with ﬁve European countries
(Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Lithuania 
and Bulgaria), allowing the foreign signatories 
to deport undocumented migrants and obliging 
Armenia to receive the deportees. Negotiations 
continue for additional readmission agreements 
with nine other countries. 
However, after returning to Armenia, the vast 
majority of RA nationals depart again. After 
having spent in the average ﬁve to six years
abroad, they ﬁnd the legal environment inArmenia
totally changed and unfamiliar; new institutions 
have meanwhile emerged. Returnees ﬁnd that
they have lost social connections (relatives; kin; 
friends); that they would prefer to escape the 
stressful experience of leaving and returning. In 
other words, the returnee ﬁnds her or himself in an
absolutely different environment and is therefore 
looking for ways to leave again. For example, 
in 1996, the German authorities deported 
approximately 1,500 persons to Armenia. One 
year later the Faculty of Sociology of the State 
Yerevan University conducted an investigation into 
the destiny of those people. The survey revealed 
that 92% of them re-migrated from Armenia and a 
vast majority of them returned back to Germany. 
A study conducted by the IOM among returnees 
to South Caucasian countries conﬁrmed these
ﬁndings. To avoid re-migration, the provision
of reintegration assistance for nationals seems 
highly important. Existing programs prove that 
re-migrating effects can be avoided or at least 
limited131. 
Recently, the Migration Agency of the 
Ministry of Territorial Administration of the RA 
has elaborated a concept paper on the return 
and reintegration of Armenian migrants. The 
concept paper includes an “Implementation of 
Return and Reintegration Assistance Package”. It 
includes the obtaining, changing and registering 
of documents; job placement; social assistance 
issues; health protection issues; education issues; 
issues connected with the military service. Within 
the frameworks of return and reintegration 
assistance programs, returned nationals would 
have the possibilities to: 
- be informed about policy and programs carried 
out in the RA in the ﬁeld of social support,
education, health protection, etc; 
- receive advisory and, if available, practical 
assistance on the issues of obtaining, changing 
and registering of documents; 
- receive information about job opportunities, 
professional skill trainings, organizations 
providing loans for organizing a small business, 
etc; 
- receive information regarding state beneﬁt
programs on health protection as well as 
psychological assistance (free of charge); 
- receive information regarding measures taken 
with the purpose of overcoming the language 
barrier occurring in children’ education, 
trainings organized within the frameworks 
of state order, as well as acknowledgement 
of diplomas and other issues connected with 
education; 
- receive information about amnesty applicable 
to persons who have not completed their 
obligatory military service (many of RA 
citizens have fear that after their return to 
Armenia they may be prosecuted because of 
draft or service escape).
Today, the following programs on return and 
reintegration are in action in Armenia: 
- ‘Return Assistance Program for RA Nationals 
from Switzerland’, which is run by the 
Migration Agency at the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration for the Republic of Armenia, 
the Swiss Federal Ofﬁce for Migration (FOM),
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and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation. 
-  The program ‘Return to Origins’, which is 
run by the French-Armenian Development 
Foundation in Armenia and the National 
Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and 
Migration under the Government of France 
and the Armenian Association of Social Aid in 
France. 
- The program ‘Stable Reintegration after 
Voluntary Return’, which is run by the 
Armenian Caritas, the Government of Belgium 
and the International Caritas of Belgium. 
- The program ‘Support for Migration 
Policy Development and the Forming of 
Correspondent Potentials in Armenia’, which 
is run by the British Council of Armenia, the 
Migration Agency at the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration for the Republic of Armenia 
and the International Centre of Human 
Development with the support of the European 
Union. 
Within the framework of these programs, the 
webpage www.backtoarmennia.com was created, 
which provides potential returnees from foreign 
countries with valuable information on issues 
of return and reintegration in their homeland. 
Potential returnees and others also receive 
irrefragable answers to their questions through a 
hotline on this site. 
The Swiss Model
The aim of the ‘Return Assistance Program for 
RA Nationals from Switzerland’ was to organize 
return and further reintegration of those RA 
nationals residing in Switzerland and whose 
applications for asylum had been rejected. The 
program started on April 19, 2004, on the basis 
of the memorandum ‘On Assistance Programs for 
RA Nationals in Switzerland’ signed between the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
and the Migration Agency of the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration for the Republic of 
Armenia. The program terminated on December 
31, 2008.
The assistance program for returnees had 
been implemented in the following ﬁve areas:
(1) Catch-up courses for minors; (2) Training 
courses for adults; (3) Support in setting up a 
business company; (4) Job placement support; 
(5) Psychological counselling, social and medical 
assistance.
Within the framework of this program, 22 
families (in all, 52 persons) have returned from 
Switzerland. Six families of beneﬁciaries received
loans for setting up a business company. These 
loans have been spent on mushroom cultivation, 
cattle-breeding, soft furniture production, fruit 
preservation and the sale of fresh fruit. One 
returnee received a job placement, three returnees 
have completed computer courses, further ten 
returnees have passed medical examination and six 
minors have attended accelerated learning courses. 
All beneﬁciaries have received psychological
counselling. Program staff also helped them on 
the issues of obtaining documents, accessing a 
disability group, and in pension related matters. 
Since April 1, 2006, a new component had been 
introduced into the program: an advisory assistance 
sub-program for returnees from European and 
CIS countries. This program included hot-line 
expert consultancy on migration issues. An 
information booklet had been developed for RA 
nationals residing in Switzerland who intend to 
return. According to the Program, the number of 
RA nationals seeking asylum in Switzerland has 
signiﬁcantly decreased.
In 2008, it was decided to implement the 
following measures:
- To research, through the Foreign Ofﬁce and the
Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency, 
which European authorities are responsible 
for returnees to their countries of origin. The 
objective is to keep the program, which is 
implemented in cooperation with Switzerland, 
operational;
- To present a program proposal to partner 
European authorities for the implementation of 
the Swiss program model, taking into account 
peculiarities of the given countries; 
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- To hold a joint conference in Yerevan with the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
and the Federal Ofﬁce for Migration (FOM) of 
Switzerland, inviting staff members of foreign 
representations in Armenia and interested 
international organizations (IOM, OSCE, ILO, 
etc.); 
- To inform Swiss state authorities about the 
importance and results of the program;
- To produce a ﬁlm translated into English about
the program’s successful results and present it 
to partner European authorities; 
- To organize meetings with high ofﬁcials of
embassies of European countries in the 
Republic of Armenia and to keep them aware 
of the importance and procedures of the 
reintegration program; 
- To highlight the importance of the program at 
various international conferences; 
- To prepare a website titled Return and 
Reintegration; 
- To provide RA nationals returned from 
Switzerland with reintegration assistance in 
the prescribed procedures. 
4: Conditions for the Legislative Basis
It must be mentioned that the migration related 
legislation in Armenia needs improvement. The 
existing rules, as accepted by the National Assembly 
of the Republic of Armenia, cover migration 
issues in an incomplete way and different aspects 
are regulated by separate rules and government 
decrees. For instance, until 2007, the normative 
ﬁeld that regulated the migration of foreigners,
was not completed and in several aspects did 
not correspond with internationally accepted and 
effectively used standards. Sometimes regulations 
did not even correlate with the current Constitution 
of the RA (1995), but left substantial regulations to 
the decision of executive authorities and, in doing 
so, called into question the democratic nature 
of the principles of law enforcement practices 
on migration issues (cf. Kabeleova et al. 2007). 
The key problem for the Armenian legislation on 
migration is that many procedures are not deﬁned
clearly enough in the laws and sub-legislative 
acts, including governmental resolutions and 
decrees, presidential decrees and also many 
rules and orders, established by different state 
committees and commissions (ibid.). Another 
problem concerns the democratic content of the 
legislation. At present law projects, government 
resolutions and decrees are discussed several 
times and are reviewed in different committees 
of the Parliament, while sub-legislative acts 
(for example, the rules established by the state 
ministries and agencies) are not thoroughly 
reviewed. The working order and the distribution 
of responsibilities among different state organs 
are not deﬁned in precise and transparent ways,
and sometimes functions overlap. The practice 
and rule of secondary legislation, i.e. sub-
legislative acts deriving from basic law, hamper 
the formation of a stable, effective legal ﬁeld
and limits to administrative power. While an 
implementation of sub-legislative acts may be 
effective for a short period of time, a clear and 
distinct legislation must be worked out, a proper 
democratic supervision must be established and 
as a consequence the administrative dispositions 
must be fully excluded (ibid.).
In June 2004, the government of Armenia 
adopted and approved the draft on the state 
regulation of migration. Afterwards a number of 
important drafts were adopted, in particular the 
draft of the government decision on border control 
implantation by the two-way inspection system 
and also the regard of the entry and departure of 
the RA nationals. In the near future the Armenian 
legislation on migration will be developed and 
improved by the adoption of several new statutes. 
Legislative projects which have already been 
submitted for discussion to the corresponding 
committees of the Parliament include ‘The Law 
of immigration’, ‘The Law of the Regulation of 
the Labour Employment Regulation Abroad’, 
and ‘The Law of Entry and Departure of the 
Citizens of the RA’. These and a number of other 
actions allow improvements of the legislation 
that regulates migratory processes. However, 
the control over the law enforcement practices 
must also be reinforced and the administrative 
structures which are engaged with migration, both 
in the country and outside, must be strengthened.
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The Republic of Armenia, after proclaiming its 
independence in 1990, adopted a number of laws, 
which, together with other issues, were intended 
to regulate issues of migration. Among the major 
laws adopted were the ‘Law on Language’ (1993), 
the ‘Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals 
in the Republic of Armenia’ (1994), the ‘Law 
on State Borders’ (1994), the ‘Law on Foreign 
Investments’ (1994), the ‘Law on Citizenship’ 
(1995)132, and the ‘Law on Consular Services’ 
(1996). 
In 1999 the State Department for Migration 
and Refugees was founded as a special state 
body dealing with migration issues. Since then 
legislative actions on migration have gained 
momentum:
5: National RA legislation on migration
The RA Law on Refugees (March 3, 1999):
As early as 1993 Armenia acceded to the Geneva 
Convention of 1951 and its ‘Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees’ of 1967. The 1999 law 
deﬁnes grounds, order and conditions for the
temporary accommodation of asylum seekers 
on the territory of the RA, for the granting, 
rejecting or terminating of the refugee status, 
the responsibilities of the authorized state bodies 
engaged in refugee issues, the rights and duties of 
the asylum seekers, guaranties for their legal and 
social protection.
The Law Concept on the State Regulation of 
Population Migration in the Republic of Armenia 
(November 29, 2000):
The law contains the principles of state migration 
policy, priorities and possible mechanisms and 
directions for their solution. It also outlines 
the changes required for the harmonization of 
the legislative ﬁeld with the priorities of state
migration policy. The law lists the state bodies 
engaged in migration issues and their functions, 
the proposals concerning the separate functions, 
and the mechanisms securing active collaboration 
between migration related bodies.
Subsequent to this law, the Government of the 
RA adopted six decrees:
• The Decree on the Procedure for Issuing 
Refugee IDs and Travel Documents in the RA 
and on Approving Their Samples (Decree No. 
695; 20.11.1999) 
This decree stipulates that persons who were 
granted refugee status in the RA are provided with 
a refugee certiﬁcate and travel documents. The
ﬁrst serves as an identiﬁcation document inside
the territory of the RA, the second one for foreign 
countries. 
• The Decree on the Movement and Choice of 
Residency of Applicants for Refugee Status 
in the Territory of the RA (Decree No. 52; 
04.02.2000) 
It stipulates that after being accommodated 
in a temporary residency, an asylum seeker is 
granted the right of free movement within the 
administrative territorial unit being under service 
of that division of the RA Home Ofﬁce where the 
temporary residency is located (in Yerevan over the 
whole territory of the city). If there is a necessity 
to move all over the territory of the Republic, the 
asylum seeker must notify in a written form the 
division of the Home Ofﬁce that is in charge for 
him.
• The Decree on Placing Applicants for Refugee 
Status in the Territory of the RA in Special 
and Temporary Dwellings, Subjecting them 
to Medical Examination, Providing them with 
Free Legal Consultations and Translation 
Services, with Medical Assistance and Service 
(Decree No. 86; 23.02.2000 )
This decree stipulates that after entering 
the territory of the RA, an asylum seeker is 
accommodated in a special reception centre by the 
State Department for Migration and Refugees for 
undergoing medical checks and the examination 
of documents within a month. Then the person is 
accommodated in temporary dwellings provided 
by the Department. While the asylum application 
is processed, the asylum seeker is provided with 
free legal and interpreter services as well as 
medical assistance and service. 
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• The Decree on Allocation of a Lump-Sum 
Allowance to Applicants for Refugee Status 
in the Territory of the Republic of Armenia 
(Decree No. 82; 23.02.2000)
It stipulates that the asylum seeker, before an 
ofﬁcial decision on her or his application is made,
will be provided with a monitory allowance to 
cover living and subsistence expenses. 
• The Decree on the Procedure for Issuing IDs 
to Applicants for Refugee Status in the RA 
(Decree No. 594; 04.07.2001) 
It stipulates that a persons who applied for 
refugee status in the RA, is provided with an 
asylum seeker certiﬁcate, which certiﬁes that
this person applied for refugee status to the State 
Department for Migration and Refugees.
• The Decree on Refugee Status Determination 
Procedure (19.07.2001) 
It safeguards the implementation of the RA Law 
on Refugees and regulates the issues concerning 
the decision on the refugee status.
• The Law on Legal, Socio-Economic 
Guarantees to the Persons Forcibly Deported 
from the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1988-1992 
and Acquired Citizenship of the RA (December 
6, 2000)
The law stipulates safeguards to persons 
forcibly deported from Azerbaijan between 
1988 and 1992, and who meanwhile acquired 
the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia for 
exercising their rights as well as social and legal 
guarantees for the protection of their interests. The 
law is aimed to encourage refugees to naturalize.
Subsequent to this law, the Government of the 
RA adopted three sub-legislative decrees:
• The Decree on the Procedure of Providing 
Housing for Persons Forcibly Deported from 
the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1988-1992 and 
who Acquired the Citizenship of the Republic 
of Armenia (May 14, 2001) 
It stipulates that deportees from the Republic 
of Azerbaijan, who acquired the RA citizenship, 
must be provided with housing in the same way 
as refugees. 
• The Decree on Privatization of Housing Areas 
of Communal Centres Being at the Disposal 
of State Budgetary Institutions in favour of 
Persons Forcibly Deported from the Republic 
of Azerbaijan in 1988-1992 and who Acquired 
Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia (May 
14, 2001) 
It stipulates that deportees from Azerbaijan who 
adopted the RA citizenship and who occupied for 
more than three years rooms in communal centres 
belonging to the state budgetary institutions 
have the right to privatize the aforementioned 
accommodation.
• The Decree on the Procedure of Compensating 
for Damages Done to Temporary Housing 
due to their Occupation by People Forcibly 
Deported from Azerbaijan in 1988-1992 and 
who Acquired the Citizenship of the Republic 
of Armenia (May 14, 2001) 
It stipulates that compensation for damages done 
to temporary dwellings due to their occupation by 
deportees from Azerbaijan, who adopted the RA 
citizenship, will be made in the same manner as 
for refugees until a new respective governmental 
decree is adopted.
The Ministry of Justice of the RA released the 
following departmental normative acts: 
On August 30, 2001:
• The Decree of the Head of the State 
Department for Migration and Refugees of 
the RA on Approving the Order of Registering 
of Refugee IDs, Issued to Persons Applied for 
Refugee Status, as well as an Order of Keeping 
the Register on Issued, Exchanged, Lost and 
Returned IDs (Decree No. 36; 09.08.2001). 
• The Decree of the Head of the State Department 
for Migration and Refugees of the RA on 
Approving the Application Form for Refugee 
Status, Order of Registering as well as Form 
of Questionnaire to be Completed by Asylum 
Seekers (Decree No. 37; 09.08.2001)
On July 30, 2002: 
• The Decree of the Head of the State 
Department for Migration and Refugees of 
the RA on Approving the Application Form for 
Compensating for Damages Done to Temporary 
Dwellings due to their Occupancy by Refugees 
as well as Persons Forcibly Deported from 
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Azerbaijan between 1988 and 1992, and Who 
Adopted the Citizenship of the Republic of 
Armenia (Decree No. 22; 15.07.2002).
The RA Law on Amendments in the RA Law on 
State Duty (December 13, 2000): 
The law stipulates exemption from state duty 
in courts 
- For refugees who seek to redress for his/her 
violated housing rights;
- For persons who applied for refugee status 
and appeal after the rejection of his/her refugee 
status.
At the session of the RA Government, held on 
December 14, 2000, the following projects were 
approved:
• The Project on Providing Housing for Persons 
Forcibly Deported from Azerbaijan between 
1988 and 1992:
The project envisages actions to be taken to 
provide about 13 thousand refugee families with 
housing.
• The Project on Post-Conﬂict Rehabilitation of
Bordering Territories of the RA:
The project envisages actions to be taken to 
return 39 thousand displaced persons to the places 
of their permanent residence as well as to settle 
ﬁrmly 28 thousand people who have already
returned to the places of their residence, as well as 
those who have not moved from their permanent 
residencies.
The RA Law on Amendments in the Refugee 
Law of the RA (March 5, 2001): 
The adoption of the amendments was caused 
by the necessity of improvements to be made in 
the existing Refugee Law of the RA.
The RA Law on Political Asylum (September 
26, 2001): 
The law regulates the grounds and the procedure 
for acquiring political asylum, the conditions of 
rejecting the application and the termination of 
an already acquired right, as well as other related 
issues. 
The RA Law on Amendments in the RA Law on 
State Duty (October 5, 2001): 
The law stipulates the following privileges for 
deportees from Azerbaijan, who adopted the RA 
citizenship: 
- Those persons, who are recognized as tenants 
of occupied living spaces owned by the 
community housing funds are exempted from 
the state duty to be paid for registration of 
tenancy agreements of these living spaces by 
notary. 
- Those persons, who privatized occupied living 
spaces of communal centres, being at the 
disposal of state budgetary institutions, as well 
as those persons who are recognized as tenants 
of occupied living spaces of the community 
housing funds are exempted from state duty 
to be paid for registration of their rights to the 
mentioned property.
The RA Law on the State Border (November 
20, 2001):
The law deﬁnes the rules of crossing the state
border, the procedure of conducting boundary 
control and the passage of persons through the 
state border. 
The RA Law on Frontier Troops (November 
20, 2001):
It stipulates the concept of RA border troops, 
legal grounds, principles, rights and duties of their 
activity, legal and social protection of the frontier 
troop staff, citizens participating in maintenance of 
the state border and the members of their families, 
ﬁnancial and logistical support of frontier troops.
The RA Law on Amendments in the Refugee 
Law of the RA (March 19, 2002): 
The law stipulates the basis for granting 
temporary asylum (temporary residence permit) to 
foreign nationals and stateless persons in the RA 
as well as deﬁning their rights and obligations.
The RA Law on Amendments in the RA Law on 
Citizenship (March 20, 2002): 
The law stipulates the prolongation for being 
recognized as a citizen of the RA until December 
31, 2003.
The RA Law on Allocating the Apartments 
Built for the Refugees Deported from the Republic 
of Azerbaijan between 1988 and 1992 to Refugees 
with Ownership Right (November 20, 2002):
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The law regulates the relations connected 
with the allocation of apartments in residential 
buildings and cottage-shaped houses constructed 
on the territory of the RA by the resources of the 
state budget, foreign countries and international 
organizations for deportees from the Republic of 
Azerbaijan to refugees with ownership rights.
The RA Law on Citizens that Have not Served 
the Mandatory National Service in Violation of 
the Deﬁned Procedure (March 17, 2003):
The law covers the period from the ﬁrst fall
draft of 1992 until October 31, 2005, and is 
applied to the RA citizens, who escaped the draft 
in violation of the RA Law on Military Draft, and 
reached the age of 27 (ofﬁcers in reserve the age
of 35), or being under the age of 27 (35), and have 
acquired reasons for exemption from the national 
service or have been granted draft deferment from 
the mandatory national service as deﬁned under
the RA Law on Military Draft. The document 
deﬁnes the sums to be charged for each of the
conscriptions avoided. 
The RA Law on Foreigners (December 25, 
2007):
It regulates the entry of foreigners into the RA, 
their sojourn and habitation on the territory of the 
RA, their employment, transit movement, exit 
from the RA, as well as other issues in connection 
with foreigners.
In the same period a number of resolutions 
and decrees regulating migration issues were 
adopted:
• The Government Decree on State Institutions 
on Refugees (1999);
• The Government Decree on the Transformation 
and Choice of Residency for Applicants of 
Refugee Status (2000);
• The Government Decree on Refugee Status 
Designation (2001);
• The Government Decree on the Procedure of 
Granting Provisional Asylum to Foreigners 
and Denationalized Persons (2003);
• The Government Decree on the Procedure 
of Issuing Identity Cards for the Status of 
Provisional Asylum Seekers and the Deﬁnition
of Status (2003). 
Legislative Acts Presented for Consideration:
Within the date speciﬁed in the Concept on the
State Regulation of Population Migration in the 
RA, the following draft laws have been developed 
and put into circulation by the ministries in charge 
during the last years:
The RA Draft Law on Exit from and Entry 
into the RA by Citizens of the RA - responsible 
implementers are the RA Home Ofﬁce and the 
State Department for Migration and Refugees of 
the RA:
The draft law stipulates a detailed regulation to 
exercise the constitutional right of exit from and 
entry to the RA by citizens of the RA. It deﬁnes
the exceptional cases when the exit of a citizen 
may be temporarily prohibited. 
The RA Draft Law on Overseas Employment:
Responsible implementer is the State 
Department for Migration and Refugees of the 
RA. The draft law stipulates issues of overseas 
employment. It deﬁnes principles for organizing
overseas employment, order and conditions of 
leaving for overseas employment, responsibilities 
of the governmental bodies and licensed 
organizations in the ﬁeld of overseas employment.
The draft law is presented to the Government of 
the RA.
The RA Draft Law on Making Amendments in 
the Law on Licensing:
Responsible implementer is the State 
Department for Migration and Refugees of the RA. 
The draft law stipulates that organizations dealing 
with organizing overseas employment are added 
to a number of establishments to be licensed. The 
draft law is presented to the Government of the 
RA.
The RA Draft Law on Ethnic Minorities:
Responsible implementer is the State 
Department for Migration and Refugees of the 
RA. The draft law legislatively conﬁrms the
preservation of historical, cultural, language 
and scientiﬁc values of the nationals of the RA
belonging to ethnic minorities, and the speciﬁcstate
attitude towards the full exercise of their political 
and legal rights and guaranties for participation in 
the public and social life of the country. The draft 
law is presented to the Government of the RA.
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The RA Draft Law on Legal Status of Foreign 
Citizens in the RA:
Responsible implementers are the RA Foreign 
Ofﬁce and the State Department for Migration and 
Refugees of the RA. The acting RA Law on Legal 
Status of Foreign Citizens in the RA was adopted 
before the adoption of the Constitution and hence 
contains some contradiction to constitutional 
norms. The new draft law ensures great ﬂexibility
and provides the government with an opportunity 
to regulate immigration policy and to respond 
adequately to international developments.
 The RA Draft Law on Tourism:
Responsible implementer is the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry. The draft law deﬁnes legal,
managerial, socio-economic grounds for state 
policy implementation in the ﬁeld of tourism
as well as those state policy principles that are 
directed towards establishing legal grounds for 
the tourism market.
The RA Draft Law on Making Amendments in 
the RA Law on Citizenship:
Responsible implementer is the State 
Department for Migration and Refugees of the 
RA. The acting RA Law on Citizenship contains 
some contradictions to constitutional norms. The 
Constitution of the RA prohibits dual citizenship; 
however, the law in force does not completely 
exclude dual citizenship. As a result many citizens 
of the RA practically are found to be in a dual 
citizenship situation. For purpose of ﬁlling the
existing gap, the draft law stipulates provisions 
for making amendments in the relevant articles of 
the law in force. The draft law is presented to the 
Government of the RA.
The RA Draft Law on Immigration:
Responsible implementer is the State 
Department for Migration and Refugees of the 
RA. The draft law regulates the entry, residence 
and exit of foreign nationals entering the territory 
of the RA for permanent residence, including 
foreigners of Armenian origin.
Subsequent to the Concept on the State 
Regulation of Population Migration, as approved 
by the Government of the RA, the following 
concepts and draft decrees were presented to the 
Government of the RA:
• The Concept on Resettlement in the RA;
• The Concept on Creating an Information 
System on Population Movement;
• The Draft Decree of the RA Government on 
the Implementation of Entry to the RA and Exit 
from the RA Registration at the State Border 
Points of the RA;
• The Draft Decree of the RA Government on 
the Project of Resettlement and Consolidation 
of the Population in the Territory of Meghri; 
• The Draft Decree of the RA Government 
on Approving the Procedure for Granting 
Temporary Asylum in the Territory of the RA 
to Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons;
• The Draft Decree of the RA Government on 
Recognition of the State Body Authorized in 
Granting Temporary Asylum in the Territory 
of the RA:
• The Draft Decree of the RA Government on 
Procedure for Issuing Temporary Asylum ID 
and Approving its Sample;
• The Draft Decree of the RA Government on 
Procedure of Inspection at the State Border 
Points of the RA through a System of Primary 
and Secondary Inspection.
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NOTES
115 Editorial note: Overall ﬁgures of the deportees differ from
200,000 to 500,000. About a tenth of those 100,000 deported 
during the winter 1603-04 perished from exhaustion and 
when crossing the border river Arax. Cf. Koutcharian 1989, 
239 et seq. 
116 For details, cf. also: Lepsius (1897); Dadrian (2002)
117 Editorial note: The estimate of victim tolls, based on 
polls of the deportees’ conveys by the Swiss nurse Beatrice 
Rohner from Aleppo, derives from the German Embassy 
at Constantinople in its letter to German Chancellor von 
Bethmann Hollweg of October 4, 1916. Cf. Gust: 2005, 519 
et seqq.
118 Cf. Hofmann 2002, 15 
119 Editorial note: Euphemistically labelled as ‘repatriation’ 
by Armenian organizations and Soviet Armenian institutions, 
the idea of settling Near East survivors of the Armenian 
genocide in Soviet Armenia dates back to a scheme that was 
put forward by the Armenian National Delegation at Paris 
in August 1923. “The idea was to irrigate the Sardarabad 
desert [in the Ararat Plain; Ed.], and populate it with 50,000 
Armenians; it was taken up by the council of the League 
of Nations, which requested the great Norwegian explorer 
and philantropist, Dr Fridtjof Nansen, to investigate the 
possibilities of the scheme” (cf. Walker 1980, 350). Since 
the project remained under-ﬁnanced (with Germany, Greece,
Norway, Romania and Switzerland as main donors, while 
Great Britain refused any contribution for fear that Soviet 
Russia could gain controll over it) the total number of those 
‘repatriates’ who immigrated until 1937, remained relatively 
small, with 44,000 immigrants, predominantly from Greece 
(which was desperately burdened with integrating its own 
ethnic compatriots from Asia Minor), Iraq (1921-22) and 
Istanbul. In addition, since 1936 the number of immigrants to 
Soviet Armenia drastically declined due to the deterioration 
of international relations and the Stalinist Purges (1936-39). 
A slightly smaller ﬁgure of immigrants, 42,300, is to be
found in the work of Avagyan, Grigor Yeremi: Haykakan 
SSH bnakchutyune [The population of the Armenian SSR; 
in Armenian]. The Soviet Armenian Encyclopaedia, Vol. 6, 
gives the total number of 42,286 (p. 207). 
120 Editorial note: Out of the 450,000 ethnic Armenians 
in the Soviet forces who participated in battles, 300,000 had 
been killed in action during WWII.
121 Editorial note: As the cases of French and Near East 
immigrants to Soviet Armenia reveal, the integration of 
immigrants was very uneven. In contrary to the immigrants 
from the Middle Eastern states – in particular those from 
neighbouring Iran – the integration of the immigrants from 
France into a completely Soviet Armenian society largely 
failed. Nearly all of the overall 10,000 ethnic Armenians 
from France therefore returned to their country of origin, 
when given the opportunity of emigration after direct French-
Soviet negotations. Cf. Richardot 1982, 126 
122 Suny 1993, 225 
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123 Koutcharian 1989, 196
124 Editorial Note: The situation slightly improved after 
the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act of Agreement on the 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975): The uniﬁcation
of families, as safeguarded by this agreement, allowed a 
limited emigration of Jews, Germans and Armenians from 
the USSR.
125 Editorial note: The reduction of ﬁgures relating to
minorities may be indicative for repressions against this 
group. Under such circumstances, even in ofﬁcial polls,
minority members would not reveal their ethnicity. On the 
other hand, the increase of ﬁgures may be caused by the
attempt to give an ethnic group more statistical weight as a 
base for demanded inﬂuence and participation.
126 Cited in: Hofmann 2006, 193
127 Editorial note: The decennial US census is based 
on the highly disputable category of ‚races’ (i.e. ‘Black - 
Black or African American’, ‘AIAN - American Indian and 
Alaska Native’, ‘NHPI - Native Hawaiian and Other Paciﬁc
Islander’, ‘SOR - Some Other Race’).
128 Cf. web site: http://ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/
nationality_population/nationality_popul1/select_51/
?botton=cens_db&box=5.1W&k_t=00&p=25&rz=1_1&rz_
b=2_1%20&n_page=2
129 According to the Muslim interpretation in Iran, a 
book of revelation is possessed by Zoroastrians, Jews and 
Armenians (Armenian-Apostolic Church). 
130 Editorial note: This migration pattern of the early 1990s 
somehow contradicted the usual practice of immigrating to 
countries, where large communities and networks already 
exist. This may have been caused by the fact, that prior to 
1990 nowhere beyond the Soviet borders a community of 
emigrants from Soviet Armenia existed. In Central Europe, 
post-Soviet Armenian migrants ﬁrst came to countries with
only new (post WWII) and small Armenian communities, 
such as Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Failing 
to stay in Germany due to strict asylum regulations and the 
lack of other ways to legally obtain residency, the focus of 
immigration shifted to Austria and Southern Europe, where 
traditional Armenian diaspora(s) are small. In Poland, the 
traditional Armenian community is extinct due to religious 
and cultural assimilation, but a new community of post-
Soviet immigrants from Armenia emerged very soon.
131 According to the Return Assistance Program for RA 
Nationals from Switzerland conducted since 2004 by efforts 
of the Federal Ofﬁce for Migration (FOM) of Switzerland, 
the Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency as well 
as the Migration Agency at the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration of the Republic of Armenia no returnee from 
Switzerland has left Armenia within the following four 
years.
132 The law was introduced on November 6, 1995. It 
deﬁnes the procedure of the acquisition and termination of
RA citizenship. The procedure of acquiring RA citizenship for 
foreign nationals of Armenian ethnicity has meanwhile been 
simpliﬁed, as well as documents conﬁrming RA citizenship.
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Emigration or out-migration is a new phenomenon 
for Georgia that only appeared since the 1990s. 
Modern Georgia is quite a typical post-Soviet 
country that after its independence has been 
seriously affected by external migration. During 
the Soviet period ethnic Georgians tended to 
remain in Georgia; more than 95% of them stayed 
there. Migration was then primarily limited 
to internal migration, predominantly directed 
towards the capital Tbilisi, and mainly related to 
economic development and private purposes, but 
also strongly regulated by Soviet rules. There was 
some immigration of Russians to Georgia during 
Soviet times; by 1989 they made up some six 
percent of the Republic’s overall population of 
5.4 million. 
When the union split, the new emerging 
international borders radically changed the situation 
and many members of minorities or persons 
suffering from economic and social hardships felt 
locked in the new independent countries and were 
subsequently interested to emigrate. The collapse 
of the USSR caused two main changes: 1) internal 
Soviet migration suddenly became international 
migration, and 2) relative peace among ethnic 
groups, safeguarded by the Soviet power turned 
into major local conﬂicts, including wars.
In Georgia a large decrease in population ﬁgures
between 1989 and 2002 could be observed. The 
2002 population level shows a decline of some 
20% from the 1989 census, while Georgia was still 
a republic of the Soviet Union. It seems, however, 
likely that this was a once-off event linked to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ensuing 
political disruption. Part of this decrease is due 
to a declining birth rate; but the main reason is 
emigration. Russian soldiers returned home and 
some other ethnic groups also left in large numbers 
– again with the possible intent of returning to their 
countries of origin and/or historic homelands. 
Analysts suggest that at least half of the people 
who left Georgia during the 1990s went to the 
Russian Federation, and that many of them may 
well have been ethnic Russians. But Georgians did 
not leave in large numbers, except from Abkhazia 
where anecdotal evidence suggests that a large 
proportion of the ethnic Georgian population left 
for Russia following the break-away of the region 
and were now applying for Russian citizenship. 
OUT-MIGRATION FROM GEORGIA AFTER 1990
Irina Badurashvili
1: Ofﬁcial (state) statistics
1.1 Statistical problems and methodological ﬂaws
1.1.1 State estimates on migration 
In the traditional Soviet system, strictly controlled 
in- and out-migrations through the registration of 
a citizen’s permanent address was implemented by 
the local agencies of internal affairs. The USSR’s 
Goskomstat centralized information from local 
authorities and established a complete matrix of 
inter-republic migration ﬂows based on entries.
In the ﬁnal years of this system, registration got
worse and the national registration systems failed 
to capture the scale of migration ﬂows. With
the collapse of the USSR, migration statistics 
deteriorated for three main reasons: 1) Out-
migration from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
became possible, 2) inter-republic collaboration 
to produce a general matrix ceased and, 3) the 
quality of in- and out-registration declined.
As has been mentioned before, comparing 
census data of 1989 to 2002, Georgia lost one 
million of its citizens through emigration (i.e. a 
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ﬁfth of the population).At the same time the ofﬁcial
statistical data on migration (cf. State Department 
for Statistics of Georgia 2002) presented below 
did not represent the real scope of these migration 
movements:
Table 1:
 International migration of population (in thousands)
1990133 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Arrivals 20,0 16,6 8,6 12,6 12,7 5,7 1,2 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,1
Departures 59,0 60,6 49,6 38,9 44,2 25,9 12,9 0,9 0,6 1,3 1,5 1,5
Net 
migration
-39,0 -44,0 -41,6 -26,3 -31,5 -20,2 -11,7 -0,5 -0,2 -0,9 -1,3 -1,4
For this reason and starting from 2003, the 
Georgian Statistical Ofﬁce ﬁnally decided not
to use for its estimation of external migration 
ﬂows from Georgia the data received from local
registers on the registration of Georgian citizens 
by place of permanent residence on which the 
Georgian migration statistics had been based for 
the second half of the 1990s; also, the ofﬁce did
not publish these data anymore.
On the basis of the 2002 census the Georgian 
Statistical Ofﬁce re-calculated migration ﬁgures
for the period between 1989 and 2002, with 
the main result that the negative net-migration 
of 998,500 persons for the whole period was 
determined as the negative balance between the 
total population ﬁgures of the 1989 and the 2002
census, including the natural increase. The result 
was then interpolated on an annual basis. The 
methodology of this interpolation by annual time-
periods is not yet published anywhere and is based 
on so called ‘expert estimations’ of the Georgian 
research team that conducted these estimates. 
From this time on, the Georgian Statistical 
Ofﬁce does not produce any data on emigration 
and immigration and publishes only data on net-
migration in Georgia. All previously circulated and 
published Georgian ofﬁcial migration statistics on
the 1990s were qualiﬁed as unreliable and hence
are no longer in use. Table 2 presents the results 
of this work (State Department for Statistics of 
Georgia, 2003, p. 67):
Table 2:
 Net-migration (in thousands)
1989 -17,9 1996 -123,1
1990 -13,2 1997 -59,9
1991 -22,6 1998 -39,2
1992 -139,3 1999 -36,3
1993 -140,9 2000 -35,2
1994 -142,6 2001 -31,2
1995 -127,2
Table 3 presents the latest published Georgian 
ofﬁcial migration statistics for the most recent
period (Department of Statistics under the Ministry 
of Economic Development of Georgia 2008, 35)
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Unfortunately, again, there is no methodology 
of estimations of net-migration of Georgia’s 
population for the years 2002 and 2003, as 
ofﬁcially published by the Georgian Statistical 
Ofﬁce, and again statisticians refer to expert’s 
estimations.
From the year 2004 onwards, ofﬁcial statistics
on migration in Georgia is based on the data on 
passenger-ﬂows provided by the Georgian Border 
Department on the basis of the registration of 
Georgian citizens crossing the borders. This 
method has been suggested to the Georgian 
Statistical Ofﬁce by foreign experts. However, it 
is doubtful that recent estimates of migration in 
Georgia are correct due to the artiﬁcial peak of
in-migration in the years 2004 and 2005 that is 
followed by another round of out-migration for 
obvious reasons. This methodology resulted 
in criticism of local experts. Nevertheless, it is 
currently still in use due to the lack of any other 
data sources for migration statistics in Georgia.
During the 2002 Georgian census attempts 
have been made to obtain also some statistical 
information about migrants. For this purpose a 
special questionnaire on emigration (‘Form EM’) 
has been designed in order to register any family 
member residing abroad. The category ‘emigrant’ 
has been deﬁned in the census as a person who
left Georgia for abroad forever or temporarily and 
who at the time of the census is absent from the 
household for at least one year. The information 
received about emigrants during the 2002 census 
does not, of course, comprise emigration ﬂows
from Georgia in the period since its independence. 
One reason for this is that entire families have left 
Georgia, so that there were no household members 
left to name these emigrants. Another reason is that 
Georgians tend to hide information about absent 
family members working abroad. Due to the close 
relationships within families in Georgia they 
are regarded to be family members even if they 
stay away for a long period of time. Hence, the 
number of emigrants from Georgia identiﬁed by
the 2002 census is as low as 113,726 persons. This 
ﬁgure has provoked a lot of criticism in Georgia
and led to the conclusion that the questionnaire 
on emigration actually did not work. At the same 
time it should be mentioned that the census data 
about migrants corresponds with data about absent 
family members as revealed by the Integrated 
Household Survey of the Georgian Statistical 
Ofﬁce. 
Nevertheless, the Georgian population census 
of 2002 provides us with some interesting 
information on the proﬁle of Georgia’s migrants:
their age and gender ratio, reasons for migration, 
socio-demographic characteristics etc. Some 
ﬁndings of the census data on migration is brieﬂy
presented below:
• 78% of emigrants are abroad for improving the 
economic position of their family.
• Only 10% of them were employed before 
leaving.
• Less than 7% of them left for study and only 
1% applied for political asylum.
• Around 40% of emigrants send remittances to 
Georgia and 7% of them receive support from 
families in Georgia.
• Emigrants are presented by both sexes (58.7% 
are males) and by a fairly young population 
(over 80% are people of working age).
• One fourth of migrants have completed 
higher education and 17% more secondary 
professional education.
• More than half of the emigrants (57%) are 
married.
• The majority of migrants left for Russia (64%); 
Greece (16%); Germany and the USA (4%), 
and for the Ukraine and Israel (2%). 
Table 3: 
Balance of international migration of population (in thousands)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
-32.6 -27.8 -27.5 5.5 76.3 -12.1
International Migration. Local Conditions and Effects 83
str. 83
These data on the ﬂows of people migrating
to Russia for permanent (or long-time) residence 
reveal: 1) a decrease of emigration from Georgia 
until 2005, and 2) the reverse trend during 2006 
and 2007. Nevertheless, it seems that persons who 
have intended to emigrate from Georgia to Russia 
have settled there already; while current migration 
ﬂows to Russia are mainly related to temporary
labour migration. This assumption is conﬁrmed
by ofﬁcial Russian sources on the registration
1.1.2 Other National and International Estimates on Migration - Estimates in Georgia
Some experts in Georgia give, differing from 
the ofﬁcial statistics, estimations of migration
processes in Georgia as presented in Table 4 (cf. 
Tsuladze et al. 2004, 205). 
Table 4: 
External migration of Georgian population (in thousands)
1990 -15,8 1999 -39,5
1991 -27,5 2000 -38,6
1992 -156,3 2001 -35,2
1993 -157,2 2002 -35,9
1994 -156,9 2003 -35,5
1995 -139,4 2004 -31,5
1996 -135,0 2005 -30,4
1997 -65,2 2006 -28,7
1998 -42,3
Estimates on migration to Russia
The statistical data of the Russian Federation 
related to emigration from Georgia to Russia, 
despite that it is by opinion of Russian experts 
far from completeness, presents the following 
data134:
Table 5: 
External migration between the Russian Federation and Georgia  
(by Federal Service for State Statistics of Russia)
Arrivals Departure Net-migration
1997 24,517 3,286 21,231
1998 21,059 2,933 18,126
1999 19,626 2,574 17,052
2000 20,213 1,802 18,411
2001 9,674 1,339 8,235
2002 7,128 964 6,164
2003 5,540 939 4,601
2004 4,886 740 4,146
2005 5,497 691 4,806
2006 6,806 593 6,213
2007 10,595 603 9,992
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of foreign employers (that are very far from real 
ﬁgures). According to the Federal Migration 
Service of the Russian Federation in 2003, 3,200 
citizens from Georgia and in 2004, 3,800 were 
working in Russia. At the same time the number of 
refugees and internally displaced persons in Russia 
has diminished for the same period from 2,537 to 
1,889. According to the 2002 Russian census the 
number of ethnic Georgians has increased by 50% 
due to the massive emigration to Russia during 
the 1990s, compared to the year 1989 (198,000 in 
2002, against 131,000 in 1989). 
Estimates by international organisations
Some existing international data-sources on 
migration provide us with estimated numbers of 
international migration in Georgia. In the table 
below the data of the United Nations Population 
Division are presented as used for the medium 
variant of World Population Prospects of 2006 
Revision (http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp).
Table 6: 
Net-migration in Georgia
Period
Net migration (per year) 
both sexes combined
1950-1955 26
1955-1960 17
1960-1965 -8
1965-1970 0
1970-1975 -13
1975-1980 -16
1980-1985 -4
1985-1990 -13
1990-1995 -112
1995-2000 -70
2000-2005 -50
2005-2010 -30
2010-2015 -15
2015-2020 -15
2020-2025 -10
2025-2030 -10
2030-2035 -10
2035-2040 -10
2040-2045 -10
2045-2050 -10
From the table above we can see that the 
United Nation Population Division has different 
estimates on the external migration in Georgia. 
It continues to predict a negative net-migration 
in the frame of 30,000 persons per year for the 
period between 2005 and 2010. 
Analyzing the emigration trends from Georgia 
the data on asylum applications of Georgian 
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Analysing different sources of information on 
migration from Georgia it becomes obvious 
that Georgia has a large external migrant 
population and it is believed that the lack of 
work opportunities continues to spur massive 
emigration. The previously established method 
for estimating migration ﬂows from Georgia was
based on the system of the population registration 
set up when Georgia was still a member of the 
Soviet Union. This system no longer functions 
and factual evidence has been more difﬁcult to
obtain recently. Various estimates of emigration 
have been made by experts over the past few 
years. These estimates vary considerably but all 
are high in per capita terms. What is known is 
that between the 1989 and the 2002 census the 
population count for Georgia fell by over one 
million people, amounting to a loss of almost 
one ﬁfth of the population. The UN forecasts that 
Georgia’s population will continue to decline at 
substantial rates for the foreseeable future. The 
recent emigration ﬂows from Georgia are related
to temporary labour migration. 
citizens provided by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2007) and 
presented in Table 7 below, represents the country 
preferences of migrants and shows the increasing 
intention of residents in Georgia to migrate to 
particular countries.
Table 7:
 Asylum applicants from Georgia during the year 2005 (main destinations)
Asylum 
country
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Greece ... 1 ... ... 1 ... 8 48 323 1897
Austria ... ... 25 33 34 597 1921 1,525 1,731 954
Cyprus ... ... 1 ... ... 24 19 178 759 886
France 74 110 127 184 373 1,067 1,554 1,726 1,563 788
Germany 2,441 3,328 1,979 1,096 801 1,220 1,531 1,139 802 493
Other 642 1,372 2,423 2,515 2,939 3,529 3,409 4,013 3,895 2,281
Total 3,157 4,811 4,555 3,828 4,148 6,437 8,442 8,629 9,073 7,299
1.2 Preliminary Conclusion on Estimates on Migration in Georgia
2: Specialized Surveys Conducted by Governmental or Independent 
Organisations and Institutions 
2.1 Four Surveys on the Causes of Emigration
The ﬁrst survey has been carried out in 1994, with
the assistance of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, 
Development and Democracy; the second in 1996 
with the support of the Open Society-Institute 
– Georgia; the third in 1998 with the assistance 
of the Regional Ofﬁce for the Caucasus of IOM 
and the last one in 2001 with the support of the 
Department of International Development of the 
UK (DFID). All surveys have been conducted by 
Guram Svanidze or under his supervision. 
The questionnaire of all four surveys was similar 
with the exception of the last study conducted in 
2001. The sample size of the surveys varied from 
500 respondents in 1994 to 1,000 interviewed in 
2001. Also the coverage of the surveys varied 
from the capital city, Tbilisi, to several Georgian 
regions. 
Tessa Savvidis (Hg.)86
str. 86
The survey questionnaire included 13 questions 
concerning the migration background of the 
respondents and their families and the respondents’ 
intention to emigrate in the future. Respondents 
were also asked to express their opinion about the 
reasons of emigration from Georgia and about 
reasons of abstaining from leaving Georgia. 
According to the author, a sensitive feature 
of emigration from Georgia in the 1990ies 
was the emigration of a signiﬁcant number of
representatives of ethnic minorities. Therefore 
it was one of the main goals in all four studies 
by Svanidze to determine the signiﬁcance of
discriminatory factors for emigration desires 
among the interviewed representatives of ethnic 
minorities in Georgia. A guiding hypothesis of 
his last survey was that there is an increase of 
intentions to migrate in the population of Georgia 
as compared with the 1998 survey. Labour 
migration has become more typical and is now one 
of the main coping strategies for the population.
Despite some changes in the programme, 
the last survey, conducted in 2001, gave the 
authors a possibility to determine the dynamics 
of the background and intentions of migration 
of Georgian citizens in regions with ethnically 
homogenous and mixed populations. According to 
this last study the intention to migrate is increasing 
in Georgia and the main reasons of external 
migration may be explained by unemployment and 
decreasing living standards in Georgia. His study 
on migration of the ethnic minorities in Georgia 
revealed that the emigration desire is strongest 
among Armenians, who, at the same time, are less 
inclined to immigrate to Armenia, compared with 
the higher ratio of ethnic Azeris, who emigrated to 
Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation 
remains the main destination for migrants of all 
ethnic groups, including ethnic Georgians.
2.2 Migration Surveys by the State Department for Statistics of Georgia
2.2.1 The World Bank Supported „Consumer Barometer“
In the years 1999 and 2000, the Georgian 
Statistical Ofﬁce included questions relating to 
migration issues into its survey on consumption 
behaviour. The sampling survey was based on 
the initial data-base of the Integrated Household 
Survey conducted by the statistical ofﬁce and
hence insured the representativeness results on 
the national level. In total, 1,500 respondents in 
Georgia have been interviewed four times, starting 
from December 1998 until April 2000. 
According to the above mentioned surveys 
there were 6.4% of households in Georgia having 
at least one member abroad at the time when the 
interviews were conducted. The share of women 
among the migrants counted one forth in 1999, and 
one third in 2000, which indicated the increasing 
feminization of migration from Georgia. The 
majority (85%) of migrants are persons below 
50 years of age. 40% of the migrants are higher 
educated persons. 
The majority (66%) of the migrants left 
for Russia. Other destinations such as Greece, 
Germany and the USA were also on the list of 
main recipient countries for Georgians at that time. 
Slightly more than half of the migrants are abroad 
for more than one year; 80% of the migrants left 
Georgia for labour abroad and 70% of them are 
sending remittances to their families in Georgia. 
The employment of emigrants from Georgia 
abroad differs considerably and depends on 
whether these emigrants work in Russia or 
elsewhere. While one third of the migrants from 
Georgia in Russia run their own business and 
another 25% are engaged in qualiﬁed jobs, 45%
of those in other countries have no regular work 
and further 30% are engaged in unskilled work. 
 The conducted surveys revealed that a 
signiﬁcant part of residents in Georgia intended to
leave the country in the following six months for 
migration, and these ﬂows increased from 43.3% in
1999 to 49.3% in 2000. The dynamics or obtained 
results in the period under scrutiny also revealed 
that the proportion of higher educated persons 
in the potential emigration ﬂows have increased
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According to this unpublished migration survey 
that has been conducted in 2006 (in the framework 
of the project component GEc1502 – Reform 
of Ofﬁcial Statistics – Statistics 8 Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia – EuropeAid/120571/
C/SV/Multi) the sampling procedure was based 
on a combination of methods: random selection 
and snow-ball sampling. The random selection 
was of two stage designs, the ﬁrst phase based
on the systematic selection of approximately 
33,000 households from 425 census units, and the 
second on the ﬁndings of potential respondents
during the household visits. During the ﬁnal stage
the snow-ball method has been used for ﬁnding
returnees in the close surrounding of randomly 
selected potential respondents. The proportion of 
respondents found by this method ﬂuctuated from
10 to 30% depending on the sampling unit. In total 
1,006 respondents in all regions of Georgia have 
been interviewed, among them 329 returnees and 
677 families with at least one household member 
abroad.
The analysis of survey data has shown 
that over 60% of the respondents are married 
people with children. Female migrants are more 
numerous among returnees then among those 
migrants currently abroad: 38% against 31%. This 
might be explained by the fact that women are 
more likely to return to their families. It may also 
indicate that the recent out-migration ﬂows from
Georgia are more male-speciﬁc. At the same time
women prevail among migrants to the far abroad 
(European countries, USA etc.), while men prevail 
among migrants to the New Independent States 
(NIS). For example, in our sample of returnees 
from Russia females comprise only 18%, while 
they are 75% among previous migrants to Greece, 
68% to the USA and 48% to Germany. 
As a matter of fact young, well educated 
women from Georgia are highly prone to migrate 
to Western European countries and the USA, 
while the typical migrant to the NIS-territory is 
a married and less educated man in the age group 
of 40 years. 
Hardly without exception migrants from 
Georgia go abroad to ﬁnd a job and earn an
additional income. Labour migrants from Georgia 
usually do not rely on employment mediation, but 
instead rely on their own informal contacts and 
networks abroad such as friends, relatives and 
family members. Two-thirds of our respondents 
found a job abroad with the help of relatives and 
acquaintances who settled there earlier, 12% found 
it by themselves and only 4% of the migrants 
found a job through an agency in Georgia or 
abroad. Due to the lack of ofﬁcial mechanisms for
a legal organization of labour out-migration these 
are replaced by informal networks. 
According to our survey, most migrants from 
Georgia (72%) did not hold an ofﬁcial contract
with their employer. In very few cases (2%) 
the contract was drawn up, but formally with 
another person. So, three of four migrants from 
Georgia have worked abroad undocumented. In 
general, North America (USA and Canada) is 
the most attractive destination for migrants from 
Georgia due to the highest level of earnings there. 
According to our survey migrants in the USA 
earned in average 2,966 GEL per month. Even 
compared with Germany (1,257 GEL) this is more 
than twice higher and exceeds a lot the earnings 
in Greece (1,000 GEL), France (872 GEL) and 
Turkey (919 GEL). The monthly earnings in 
Russia and other countries of the NIS-territory are 
around 750 GEL per month. Of course, the living 
expenses also differ considerably by countries, 
but the material advantages of some destinations 
for labour migrants from Georgia are obvious. 
The majority (65%) of the out-migrants from 
Georgia had a permanent occupation, additional 
30% managed to ﬁnd a temporary work (for more
than one month). Despite the fact that migrants 
are mainly involved in non-prestigious and low 
skilled areas of the labour market, it is not always 
easy for them to ﬁnd a job at all; 30% of the
respondents experienced refusal when applying 
for a job. Employment abroad requires a certain 
command of foreign languages; one forth of the 
(from 37.6% in 1999, to 50% in 2000). There was 
also an increase of persons leaving for a period 
of more than one year (from 29.1% to 41.4%). 
The ratio of ethnic Georgians against emigrants 
of other ethnicities increased from 73.6% in 1999, 
to 80.2% in 2000. 
 2.2.2 Migration Survey 2006 
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refused respondents were refused by employers 
due to their insufﬁcient command of language;
further 45% because they were not local citizens, 
while 31% did not know the reason for the 
refusal.
Our survey revealed that more than half of the 
migrants who had been professionals in Georgia 
worked as service workers or shop and market 
sales assistants abroad and an additional 11% as 
unskilled workers; one third of the technicians 
and associate professionals were hired abroad as 
unskilled workers. According to our survey, the 
majority of migrants from Georgia (more than 
70%) supported their families in Georgia, when 
being abroad. The average amount of remittances 
varies according to the different countries. The 
highest remittances are sent from the USA (in 
average 480.3 GEL per month), followed by 
Greece (323 GEL) and Turkey (269.7 GEL). The 
average scopes of remittances from migrants from 
Georgia who work in Russia are 250.5 GEL per 
month. 
In addition to the systematic support of their 
families in Georgia, labour migrants try to save 
some money during their stay abroad. Our study 
revealed many cases of migrants who did not send 
money to their families, but instead preferred to 
save and bring the money along when returning 
to Georgia. According to our survey, 85% of the 
interviewees managed to make savings while 
working abroad. The average amount of savings 
was approximately 20,000 GEL for the total 
sample of returnees, which is a huge amount of 
money for residents of Georgia. 
There are indications that in many actual cases 
migration becomes the main activity and the 
main source of income for a signiﬁcant portion of
Georgia’s population. Taking into consideration 
that up to 7 to 8% of all households in Georgia 
currently have at least one member residing 
abroad for work, it is obvious that the economic 
consequences of labour migration are extremely 
signiﬁcant and they cannot be ignored or neglected
in any analysis of the social and economic situation 
of Georgia. 
During the interviews we posed the question 
about positive and negative impacts of migration 
on the lives of the respondents. It should be 
emphasised that only 8% of the respondents noted 
that migration had no positive impact at all; over 
40% of the respondents pointed out to the positive 
ﬁnancial inputs of their labour activity abroad,
such as earning more money, and ﬁnding a better-
paid job; 5.2% bought a house after their return 
to Georgia. Around 60% of all migrants declared 
that migration had no negative impact on them. 
14% of the respondents complained that they felt 
unable to ﬁnd an employment in their country of
origin that is ﬁnancially satisfactory, while 7%
mentioned during the interview that they felt 
isolated from the life of their family when they 
lived abroad. 9% of the respondents mentioned 
among the negative impacts that they were unable 
to take part in the upbringing of their children. But 
looking at the data received from the sample of 
families with migrants currently abroad, we notice 
that the families at home evaluate the negative 
impacts of the absence of their family members 
twice more often than the migrants themselves. 
Almost half of the returnees mentioned that it was 
their family, who insisted on their return while 
they were abroad. 
Comparing the employment status of migrants 
prior and after migration it becomes evident 
that in general migration somehow improves it. 
According to our survey 71% of those who worked 
as unskilled workers before their emigration 
became self-employed after their return, which 
means that they were able to invest the money 
brought from abroad. Although 62.5% of the 
respondents declared that not much changed in 
their lives after their return, around 36% of the 
returnees mentioned that their family lives are 
much more comfortable. But it seems that often 
returnees to Georgia felt difﬁculties in ﬁnding
a job: Around 30% of those who had worked as 
professionals before their departure - including 
18% as technicians and 7% as managers - were 
still unemployed at the time of the interview. 
All respondents were asked to provide some 
information about the family members that are 
intending to leave Georgia in the near future 
(including themselves). Our survey showed 
that 30% of the previous migrants plan to go 
abroad again in the nearest future; 4% more 
mentioned during the interview that other family 
members plan to go abroad and one percent of the 
interviewees mentioned that their entire family 
will leave Georgia in the following six months. 
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Again, the most favoured destination is Russia 
(41% of all respondents), while 14% named 
Greece. Thus, in total, more than a third of the 
interviewed mentioned that in the next six month 
at least one member of their family is leaving 
Georgia; over 90% of the potential migrants go 
temporarily abroad for work.
2.3 Study by the Georgian Mission of the IOM
The study titled ‘Labour migration from Georgia’ 
is based on a special migration survey of 600 
households having at least one member abroad. 
Its main ﬁndings are based on the secondary
source or information received not from the 
migrants themselves (being abroad for the time 
of the interview), but from their family members. 
Unfortunately, the available publication does 
not provide readers with the methodology of 
sampling of the respondents. It only mentions 
that 300 respondents have been interviewed in 
Tbilisi, and further 100 respondents each in the 
cities of Rustavi135, Tkibuli136 and Akhalkalaki137, 
representing different Georgian regions.
The survey revealed four main countries of 
destination for migrants from Georgia: Russia, 
Greece, the USA and Germany, with migration to 
Russia being three times higher than that to any 
other country. According to this survey, almost all 
social-demographic groups participate in labour 
migration. The survey conﬁrmed the higher
level of education of migrants: On the average 
they studied 13.8 years. At the same time, their 
employment abroad does not correspond to their 
education and professional qualiﬁcation obtained
in Georgia, partly due to the lacking command of 
foreign languages.
According to the information obtained from 
respondents the average earning of labour migrants 
abroad is $755 of which one-ﬁfth ($162.40) is
monthly sent to their families. Georgians who 
have migrated to Russia maintain the most regular 
contacts with their families in Georgia. Almost 
half of them have visited Georgia during their 
stay abroad (against only 20 to 25% of those in 
other countries). The survey also revealed that, 
given the opportunity, family members of the 
respondents would join them: Only 48% of the 
interviewees mentioned that they do not intend to 
go abroad for work. 
2.4 Migration Studies by the Tbilisi State University
The ﬁrst survey by Natia Chelidze has been
conducted in 2000, in the capital Tbilisi and 
in the Ambrolauri district (Racha-Lechkhumi 
region) of Georgia. The questionnaire consisted 
of 26 questions related to socio-demographic 
characteristics of persons currently abroad; the 
reason of migration; the destination country; 
issues of labour; social and climate adaptation 
abroad; living conditions abroad; character of 
labour activity; contacts with family members; 
and future plans and conditions concerning the 
return to Georgia. Information was obtained from 
the family members of the migrants. 
In total, 300 families were interviewed, among 
them 100 in the Ambrolauri district from July to 
August of 1999, and 200 in Tbilisi from September 
to October 1999. The author mentions that this 
survey can not be considered as representative, but 
in the absence of any comprehensive information 
on labour migration in Georgia it sheds some light 
on the studied processes. 
The main results of the survey are:
• In Tbilisi the gender composition of migrants 
is almost equal for men and women (53.5%: 
46.5%). At 87% men prevail within the 
migration ﬂows from Ambrolauri by far.
• If at the beginning of the 1990s migrants from 
Georgia mainly went to Russia and Turkey, 
an increase in the migration to the USA and 
Western Europe could be observed during the 
time of the survey. 
• More than half of the migrants (56.6%) are 
married, and the rate of highly educated 
persons is 46.3% in total. 
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• The main motivation to migrate is related to 
economic reasons, such as no job in Georgia, 
and the wish to improve the economic situation 
of one’s family. 
• Through the information obtained from the 
family members almost 40% of those who left 
for migration very well adapted abroad. The 
remainder expressed certain problems with 
adaptation, missing their family very much 
and disliking the style of living abroad.
• According to this survey, the average earning 
abroad was 847.2 USD and the average amount 
of remittances sent to the family in Georgia 
was 199.2 USD. 
The second migration survey has been 
conducted between 2000 and 2004. In total, 
Chelidze interviewed 1,132 households in seven 
settlements, including the cities of Tbilisi and 
Rustavi and one district in ﬁve selected provinces
of Georgia. Furthermore, between 2002 and 2004, 
the researcher interviewed 150 returnees to Tbilisi, 
and in 2005, Chelidze conducted interviews with 
125 migrants in the receiving countries, namely 
Germany (63), Russia (32), Greece (10), and 
in the USA (20). For ﬁnding respondents of the
last category of migrants she applied ﬁrst to
the Department for International Affairs of the 
Ministry of Education and obtained a list of email 
addresses of 96 students who were abroad at that 
time. A successful contact and the receipt of ﬁlled
in questionnaires by email have been established 
with up to 30 respondents. Respondents who 
agreed to cooperate have also been asked to 
mention several other migrants from Georgia 
whom they personally knew and who would 
agree to be interviewed by email. At this last 
stage the snow-ball method had been applied for 
ﬁnding potential respondents. Chelidze compares
the information related to migration of Georgian 
citizens obtained from the family members with 
information received during the interviews with 
returnees. She concludes by observing that the 
results are nearly identical. Therefore the author 
believes that the method of interviewing family 
members of migrants delivers reliable data in 
Georgia. 
2.5 Surveys on Returnees by the Georgian Centre of Population Research 
I have conducted two special migration surveys 
in Georgia, the ﬁrst in 2000 and the second in
2003. In both surveys Georgian citizens were 
interviewed, who had left for abroad during the 
1990s with the intention to work there and have 
returned to Georgia by the time of interview. In 
face-to-face interviews they were asked about 
issues of their living and labour activities abroad 
(departure process, problems of legalization of 
stays and working activities), remittances to 
families and personal plans for future migration. 
The sample size in the ﬁrst migration survey was
400 respondents and in the second 1,000. 
The main results of the ﬁrst study are:
• Since the majority of migrants are between 16 
and 50 years, they are at the best working age. 
Only 10% of the respondents were older than 
50 years. 
• The vast majority of the interviewees (95%) 
described the ﬁnancial position of their family
as dissatisfactory or bad. According to other 
known observations such estimations generally 
do not exceed 50 to 60%. Therefore we should 
assume that migrants from Georgia come from 
comparatively poor families. At the time of 
the interview 40% of migrants returned from 
CIS countries. 35% of the returnees from far 
abroad did not ﬁnd a job in Georgia.
• The types of employment available to migrants 
differ considerably between Commonwealth 
of Independent State (CIS) countries and other 
countries. Almost 60% of the returnees from 
the CIS say that they have been running their 
own business or have been hired as qualiﬁed
employees. But only 15% of the returnees from 
countries abroad had comparable jobs. Forty 
percent of the migrants from abroad have been 
working as baby sitters or housekeepers. One 
out of ﬁve has been working as an assistant in
the service sector, while the percentage of such 
migrants in the CIS is only 15%. 
International Migration. Local Conditions and Effects 91
str. 91
• The main reason of migrants was to improve 
their economic situation. They tried to support 
their families in Georgia ﬁnancially.
• The monthly average remittances sent to the 
family in Georgia was $127 for CIS-returnees, 
and $121 for those working far abroad. The 
majority of the interviewed returnees (78% in 
CIS and 70% from abroad) were able to save 
some money during their stay.
• During their stay abroad Georgian citizens 
experienced certain problems with police and 
migration ofﬁces.Accordingto therespondents’
explanations (in addition to the questionnaire) 
in Russia these difﬁculties were caused by
the obligation of ofﬁcial registration. Usually
this problem was solved by bribing the local 
police. 18% of the respondents had problems 
with the migration ofﬁce in countries abroad
that are not part of the CIS.
The ﬁndings of the second survey have been
presented at the Population Association of America 
(PAA) Annual meeting of 2004 in Boston and the 
International Union for the Scientiﬁc Study of
Population (IUSSP) conference in Tours in July 
2005 (both papers are available online).
Key ﬁndings from the survey are as follows:
Nearly without any exception Georgian 
citizens go abroad to ﬁnd a job. This was a main
motivation of migration for well over the total 
sample of the interviewees.
Labour out-migrants from Georgia usually do 
not rely on employment mediation, but rely instead 
on their own non-formal contacts and networks 
abroad such as friends, relatives and family 
members. Two-thirds of our respondents found 
a job abroad with the help of acquaintances who 
settled there earlier, 21% found it by themselves 
and only less than 10% of the migrants found a 
job through an intermediate ﬁrm in Georgia or
abroad. 
In lack of any bilateral agreements between 
Georgia and the receiving countries the 
possibilities for organized, legal labour migration 
are rather poor and may remain like this for a long 
time. Flows of irregular labour migrants from 
Georgia increase annually. This is a process that 
does not only concern Georgia, but involves also 
the labour markets of the recipient countries. It 
seems that employers are much more interested 
in cheap, undocumented labour force, in order to 
avoid both taxes and responsibilities in case of 
any work accident. Migrants from Georgia reach 
the foreign country by short-time tourist visas and 
than overstay visas (on average, our respondents 
stayed abroad around two years), thus neglecting 
the regulations envisaged by the legislation of 
the host country. According to our survey, most 
of the out-migrants from Georgia (73%) did not 
hold an ofﬁcial contract with their employer. In
rare exceptions (2%) the contract was drawn up, 
but formally on another person. So, two thirds 
of the migrants from Georgia worked abroad 
irregularly.
The status of Georgian migrants abroad 
causes many reasons for pressure from various 
administrative bodies. According to our survey 
14% of the returnees were paying some money 
(except taxes) to representatives of the local 
administrations or police on a more or less regular 
base. Such experiences were mainly reported 
by the returnees from Russia and other NIS-
countries, who mentioned during interviews that 
law enforcing bodies and criminals, oppressed 
many of the irregular migrants in these countries. 
The majority of former migrants declared 
that they were also discriminated by employers 
in issues of work compensation. Every tenth 
respondent mentioned during the interview that 
when he or she has been working abroad there 
were at least one or two cases, when he or she 
did not receive the compensation for his or her 
work or received a lower amount of money than 
has been agreed on beforehand. 
Evidently there is a clear distinction between 
two groups of labour migrants: Those who have 
been in Western European countries and the 
USA and those, who have returned from Russia 
and other NIS-countries. Respondents of the ﬁrst
group were much more frequently discriminated 
by employers in issues of work compensation. 
It is worth noting that women are almost 
twice as probable to be discriminated in that 
respect. These results conﬁrmed our theoretical
expectations arising from the general literature on 
international migration: That female immigrants 
are economically more disadvantaged than male 
immigrants. The gap in the earnings of immigrants 
from Georgia and local citizens appeared to be 
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the highest in the USA: Every ﬁfth of the female
respondents received a salary four times lower, 
while 35% of the male migrants earned three 
times less than the local citizens for the same kind 
of work.
The questionnaire also addressed the size of the 
average monthly income abroad as it is believed 
that a high salary abroad is a major push factor 
for migration. It seems that North America is the 
most attractive country for Georgian migrants due 
to the highest level of earnings there. According 
to our survey Georgian migrants in the USA 
earned on average 1,410.4 USD per month. Even 
in comparison with Germany (736 USD) this is 
almost twice more and signiﬁcantly higher than in
Greece (582.1 USD) and Turkey (457.6 USD). The 
monthly earnings in Russia and other countries of 
the NIS-territory are around 607 USD per month. 
Admittedly the living expenses also differ by 
countries, but the advantages of some destinations 
for labour migrants from Georgia are obvious. 
Considering the gender discrepancies in 
the earnings we received results different from 
those in the general literature on international 
labour migration that conﬁrm higher incomes for
immigrant men than for women. Our survey found 
more or less signiﬁcant gender disparities in the
average incomes only for labour migrants in the 
NIS-territory: 662 USD for men and 471 USD for 
women. A number of reasons could explain this 
fact, for instance a gender-distinctive employment 
structure that causes disparities in the salaries of 
men and women: Male migrants from Georgia 
in Russia are mainly engaged in own business 
activities or perform construction works that 
are usually better paid than service occupations. 
Another possible explanation is the fact that a 
main motivation for many women to move to 
Russia or other NIS-territory is to accompany 
their husbands (which is much more difﬁcult to
realize in the case of other countries). In such 
cases women do not act as an independent social 
actor and consequently have fewer possibilities to 
work. 
The majority (65%) of the migrants from 
Georgia had a safe job. Additional 31% managed 
to ﬁnd jobs for the duration of more than one
month. Despite the fact that migrants are mainly 
involved in less-qualiﬁed work, the employment
abroad requires a certain command of foreign 
languages. A ﬁfth of the migrants declared during
the interview that they were rejected by employers 
due to their insufﬁcient knowledge of the language
of the country.
As mentioned above, one of the most striking 
features of labour out-migration from Georgia is 
the usually high level of education and professional 
qualiﬁcation of irregular migrants. The work that
labour migrants usually perform abroad actually 
does not demand such skills. During our survey 
only a quarter of the respondents mentioned that 
their labour activity abroad corresponded to their 
professional qualiﬁcation.
It should be noted that working abroad requires 
of a migrant to be well informed about the foreign 
labour market situation, to possess a command of 
foreign languages and to be ﬂexible in terms of
territorial mobility. The highly educated stratum of 
the Georgian society meets all these requirements. 
These people have a high ability to establish 
contacts in foreign countries and to adapt to new 
environments. However, despite their high level 
of education, migrants from Georgia are often not 
adequately qualiﬁed to work abroad in particular
sectors. Furthermore, the irregular status of 
labour migrants abroad as well as the restricted 
range of available workplaces cause particular 
requirements of employees in the non-prestige 
and low paid professions. Therefore the irregular 
labour migration of Georgian citizens must be 
characterized as a certain kind of ‘temporary brain 
waste’ and as a behaviour typical for a population 
in a crisis situation. 
2.6 “Enhancing Gains from International Migration in Europe  
       and Central Asia”138
This special migration survey among 1,200 
returnees in various regions of Georgia, conducted 
in 2005 in the framework of the international project 
“Enhancing Gains from International Migration 
in Europe and Central Asia” and commissioned 
by the World Bank (Washington ofﬁce) revealed
that men (60% of our sample) prevailed among 
Georgian nationals that worked temporarily 
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abroad. The mean age of migrants in our survey 
was 40.5 years. Most of the interviewed labour 
migrants were married (63.1%) with children. 
The average size of households consisted of four 
persons with one to two dependants in the family. 
According to our ﬁndings only 26% of the
former migrants have less than a secondary level 
of education. Over 43% of the labour migrants 
hold a university degree and almost 30% a college 
degree. The women are likely to be even higher 
educated than the interviewed men. In their lives 
prior to ﬁrst migration, more than half of the
respondents were employed in some way. This 
includes self-employment and a large number 
employed in the agricultural sector.
The main countries of destination for labour 
migrants from Georgia are Russia, Greece, 
Germany, Turkey and the USA. While being 
abroad they were not visiting families in Georgia, 
to which they returned more than two years later in 
the average. Migrants from Georgia going abroad 
usually do not rely on employment mediation, but 
instead make use of their own informal contacts 
and networks such as friends, relatives and family 
members abroad. Three-fourths of our respondents 
found a job abroad with the help of acquaintances, 
relatives and friends, less than 5% found it by 
themselves and less than 2% of the male migrants 
from Georgia and around 7% of the females found 
a job through an intermediate ﬁrm (e.g. dealing
with ‘au pair’) in Georgia or abroad.
Nearly without exception migrants from 
Georgia leave their country of origin for economical 
reasons (to ﬁnd a better paid job, to earn money).
Abroad they were working mainly in private 
households, as service workers, as craft or related 
trade workers, and contract work as unskilled 
workers. The average income of Georgian labour 
migrants abroad exceeds 600 USD. Labour 
migrants send to their families in Georgia slightly 
more than 40% of their earnings. The majority of 
migrants (54%) send remittances on a monthly 
base and 35% more send money home every two 
months. Most migrants from Georgia send money 
through friends and acquaintances travelling 
back to Georgia and considered this as the most 
convenient way of transfer. But more than 20% 
of the interviewed for the same reason and with 
the argument of highest reliability have used rapid 
bank transfers. The average size of remittances by 
migrants from Georgia is around 270 USD. That 
money is used by family members in Georgia 
mainly on food, closing and household appliance. 
More than the half of those migrants that did not 
send money brought upon their return goods and 
household appliances. 
It seems that labour abroad improves the 
ﬁnancial position of migrants. Comparing the
employment of migrants before and after their 
return, we found that many returnees managed 
to start an own business. However the evaluation 
made by the respondents of their life at the time 
of the interview is rather pessimistic: Only 40% 
of the interviewed mentioned that their family life 
is now much more comfortable than before the 
migration. Among those who are not interested 
in starting any business activity, 42% mentioned 
as a reason that they did not save money for this 
purpose. 
In general, returnees to Georgia positively 
evaluate their labour activity abroad. More than half 
of the interviewed mentioned as a positive result 
of migration the ﬁnancial gains of labour activity
abroad, 11% more are satisﬁed with learning a new
language and 5% with the experienced adventure. 
At the same time, some 16% of the migrants felt 
stressed due to their separation from family and 
from their irregular status abroad. 
3: Analysis of Socio-Economic Trends in Georgia
Georgia, once reputed to be the wealthiest republic 
in the USSR due to its tourism industry and 
bountiful agriculture, experienced a precipitous 
decline in the early years of its independence. 
The per capita GDP decreased from 4.646 
USD in 1990 to 507 USD in 2000. As a newly 
independent, multi-ethnic state it was almost 
immediately gripped by two civil wars with South 
Ossetia (1988 to 1992) and Abkhazia (1992 to 
1993).139 At the same time Georgia was plagued 
by a general social and economic collapse. A 
period of lawlessness and hyperinﬂation followed
the cessation of the multilateral civil wars.
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Since the 1990s, an increasing number of 
Georgian citizens have adopted economic (or 
labour) migration as a household survival strategy. 
The most reliable available data estimates that 6 
to 10% of all households in Georgia have at least 
one member working abroad, with some regional 
ﬂuctuation.
In 1995, the emergence of a constitutional 
government under Eduard Shevardnadze provided 
for some stability. The economy’s rapid growth 
(11.4% GDP growth in 1996, 10.6% in 1997), 
however, soon slowed down, while unemployment 
continued to climb, as Georgia was jolted by the 
1998 Russian rouble crisis, then plagued by drought 
and pervasive corruption. The World Bank noted 
that poverty in Georgia deepened in the last years 
of the Shevardnadze administration, estimating 
that extreme poverty rose from 14% in 1998, to 
17% in 2003. Causes include rising inequality 
(with a Gini coefﬁcient of 0.35 per capita and
0.48 totals for 2003) and expanding rural poverty, 
particularly as subsistence farming became less 
viable. Despite Georgia’s lasting problems with 
corruption and unemployment, the GDP grew 
at an average annual rate of 6.8% between 2001 
and 2004. It is unsettled which impact the current 
growth had on the depth of poverty. 
The 2003 Rose Revolution marked a turning 
point in Georgia’s economic and political 
development. When the Western-oriented 
government of Mikheil Saakashvili came to power 
at the beginning of 2004, it aggressively pursued 
expansive market oriented reforms and an anti-
corruption campaign which have improved both 
macroeconomic stability and the perception of 
an improved business environment. One of the 
notable successes of the Georgian economy has 
been the strong growth of GDP per capita, from 
5.9% in 2004, to around ten percent in 2005 and 
2006, and even 12% for 2007. In 2006, Georgia 
was listed as the world’s most reformed economy 
by the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ survey 
(cf. web site: http://www.doingbusiness.org/
economyrankings/).
At the same time poverty, along with 
unemployment, was acknowledged to be among 
the most urgent problems. At that time 52% of 
Georgia’s population lived below the poverty 
line, according to the UNDP. According to the 
government, this number dropped to 39.4% in 
2005, while the GDP grew from 5.9% in 2004, to 
9.3% in 2005, and 9.4% in 2006. However, though 
there may be disagreements over the precise level 
of poverty in Georgia, there is general consensus 
that neither poverty nor extreme poverty has 
been signiﬁcantly reduced. The discrepancy
between a strong GDP growth and persisting 
poverty indicates that economic reforms have 
not efﬁciently impacted on the lives of Georgia’s
society.
3.1 Persistent Poverty in Georgia
Going beyond the strong GDP ﬁgures and
transforming them into an increased prosperity is, 
as the government recognizes, a key priority for 
the next phase of the reforms. The government’s 
main policy for poverty alleviation has been its 
attempts to stimulate growth, but increasing social 
payments has also been a priority and a central 
plank of the 2008 budget. Social assistance 
payments have increased from GEL 100 million 
(USD 47 million) in 2003, to GEL 778 million 
(USD 465 million) in 2007, with a projected 
budget of GEL 1.1 billion (USD 723 million) for 
2008.
Still the question remains, how could poverty 
remain persistent in the face of such GDP 
increases? The government believes that both 
tendencies are so incompatible that it has called 
into doubt the Integrated Household Survey that 
serves as the base of poverty calculations and is 
produced by the Department of Statistics. This 
in itself highlights the need for developing an 
improved collection of information and analytical 
capacity inside the Government if evidence driven 
social policy is to move forward.
There are four possible explanations why 
poverty may have remained high despite the 
government’s efforts to alleviate it. Firstly, socially 
vulnerable groups may be disproportionately 
affected by external effects. In this way, events such 
as the closure of the Russian market to selected 
Georgian export products and the ﬂood disaster
in rural areas in April 2005, may have hit hardest 
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those groups with the least capacity to recover. 
Secondly, the macroeconomic improvements had 
little impact on the agricultural industry, which 
employs over half of the population. Agriculture’s 
share in the GDP has fallen from 19.3% to 9.7% 
between 2003 and 2007, while the agricultural 
production declined by approximately ﬁve percent
in real terms over the same period. Thirdly, the 
vast majority of social payments are not well-
targeted at those who need it most. While social 
assistance that targets low-income families (as 
opposed to pensions that targets the elderly) was 
introduced in 2006, the value of the payments 
has not been increased to compensate inﬂation.
In addition, total income-targeted payments 
remain relatively low compared to total pension 
payments. In 2008, the total cash payments made 
to the extremely poor - about GEL 80 million (USD 
52.6 million) - was only about one eighth of the 
amount distributed as pensions. This is not a very 
effective way of providing social assistance, if the 
objective is poverty reduction, since pensioners 
are fairly evenly distributed among both rich 
and poor households. Fourthly, a combination 
of inﬂation and taxes could have reduced the
consumer possibilities of the poor even if they 
were receiving assistance. Though ofﬁcially,
inﬂation has just passed ten percent in 2008, there
are indications that food prices may have risen far 
faster than prices for other goods, and food is the 
main expenditure of the poor. The effect may be 
further exacerbated by the fact that VAT collection 
rates have grown signiﬁcantly. These new taxes
would present themselves to the consumer as an 
increase of prices. Overall the government has put 
in place the necessary structures for alleviating 
extreme poverty but more research needs to be 
done to understand why poverty has persisted in 
spite of the reforms.
The increase in average nominal wages has 
been impressive, with eight percent real growth 
for 2003, 22% for 2005, 18% for 2006 and 
10% for 2007. However, these income ﬁgures
relate to those with a full-time employment and 
are probably not representative for the entire 
population. The income distribution is difﬁcult
to ascertain. Ofﬁcial ﬁgures show a slight drop in
the Gini coefﬁcient, suggesting a slight reduction
in the level of inequality, but this does not seem 
to be consistent with most people’s day-to-
day experience: A relatively small segment of 
Georgia’s society seems to have dramatically 
prospered during the last few years, while the 
majority has not seen any signiﬁcant income
improvements.
Understanding and estimating poverty is 
one of the biggest challenges for any human 
development assessment. In 2003, government 
ﬁgures show that 54% of all families were living
in poverty. This ﬁgure slightly declined to 52%
in 2004. There are good reasons to believe that 
this estimation of poverty in Georgia may be too 
high. The poverty ﬁgures are calculated using the
State Department of Statistics (SDS) Integrated 
Household Survey and this is considered by many 
to be an unreliable source. In addition, the basket 
of goods the SDS historically used for calculating 
poverty contained more high-value food items 
(like meat) than poor families typically consume. 
It also counted poverty in terms of the percentage 
of households, not in terms of people. This leads 
to an overestimation of poverty, since small 
households are generally poorer.
As an alternative indicator, the estimates 
published by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), using World Bank’s ﬁgures, suggests that
absolute poverty has increased marginally, from 
27% in 2004, to 31% in 2007. Slightly more than 
this, about 1.5 million people, or slightly over 
one third of the population classify themselves 
as poor by registering in the database of socially 
vulnerable families. Finally, by the UNDP’s two-
dollars-a-day-deﬁnition of poverty, 25% of the
population in Georgia lives in poverty. This crude 
ﬁgure allows comparisons with other countries
in the region. While there is no expert consensus 
about the absolute level of poverty in Georgia, 
there seems to be a general understanding that 
there has been little change in either poverty or 
extreme poverty cohorts over the last four years. 
In addition to the IMF assessment, the European 
Commission’s assessment for 2007 reports that 
no progress can be reported as regards to poverty 
reduction and social welfare.
This is further supported by the household 
expenditure patterns. Expenditure on food as 
a proportion of income is a classic indicator 
of poverty, because as the income goes up, the 
percentage of income spent on food goes down. 
In Georgia, since 2003 household expenditure on 
food has remained fairly constant, at 50% of the 
income.140 
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Polling also suggests that people do not feel 
that their lives have economically improved. The 
International Republican Institute conducted 
six polls since 2004, and only once during that 
time did more people state that their ﬁnancial
situation had rather improved than worsened over 
the preceding three months. In September 2007, 
eight percent said their situation had improved 
while 46% said that it had worsened. Similarly, 
the Caucasus Research Resource Centers Data 
Initiative, which polls a representative sample of 
3,300 people nationwide, said only 18% reported 
their ﬁnancial position to have improved between
2005 and 2006.
Indicators characterizing the scale of poverty 
in Georgia presented in the table below also do 
not reveal any signiﬁcant improvement in the
living standard of Georgia’s population in recent 
years. 
Table 8: 
Main Poverty Indicators* (%)
1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Poverty level 52.2 51.8 51.1 52.4 54.5 35.7 39.4 38.5
Poverty depth 20.9 20.2 19.3 19.8 21.1 12.2 13.5 13.4
Poverty severity 11.3 10.7 9.9 10.3 11.2 6.1 6.6 6.7
Poverty indicators differ between urban and 
rural areas of Georgia. Extremely poor households 
are more numerous in rural areas, although the 
share of households below the poverty line is 
higher in cities. Additionally, the share of poor 
households in Tbilisi is lower than their share in 
the total population nationwide. The poverty in 
cities is mainly associated with insufﬁcient food,
while the rural population basically relies upon its 
own produce. The main problem there is the lack 
of monetary incomes and, consequently, the low 
affordability of services and household goods. 
In the years 2000 to 2007, the monetary and 
non-monetary per capita income increased by 
2.4 times, but the indicator is still below the 
minimum subsistence level that represents the 
absolute poverty line. In 2004, the minimum 
subsistence level of a working age male was GEL 
84.3 in average, in 2005 it was GEL 95.7, in 2006 
it was GEL 106.5, and in 2007 it totalled GEL 
118.6. The monetary income of the majority of 
the population is still low and amounts to half of 
the subsistence minimum of an average consumer. 
Most of the population is self-employed. At the 
same time, the share of employment in private 
enterprises and agriculture has somehow increased 
whereas the employment in the public sector and 
self-employment in non-agricultural areas has 
decreased.
More than half of the income of poor people 
is represented by various types of transfers 
including remittances from abroad, the sale of 
property, money borrowing and the use of savings 
or state allowances. The majority of extremely 
poor households are led by single women. A third 
of the households have no breadwinner whilst a 
fourth of the households comprise pensioners.
The table below shows the upward trend of 
the average monthly per capita income between 
the years 2000 and 2007. In the same period the 
monetary income and transfers almost trebled, and 
incomes from employment and self-employment 
also grew at relatively high rates.
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Remittances from abroad increased by almost four 
times. The largest remittance ﬂows from labour
migrants from Georgia were sent from Russia 
(63.1%), followed by the USA (13.6%), Greece 
(3.3%), Spain (3%), the Ukraine (2.1%), Turkey 
(2.1%) and Austria (1.7%).
The National Bank of Georgia (NBG) regularly 
publishes information on the volume of electronic 
remittances and their origin by countries, which 
is based upon the data of swift transfer systems, 
operating in Georgia’s banking sector (Western 
Union, MoneyGram, Anelik, Caucasus Express, 
etc). These data reﬂect the money transferred
to Georgian citizens or other physical persons 
in Georgia by physical persons from foreign 
countries. The amounts include transfers made 
by foreign citizens, including Georgian nationals 
who permanently reside outside Georgia and are 
not necessarily labour migrants. The same is true 
for amounts transferred by citizens of foreign 
countries to their compatriots in Georgia.
The electronic remittances therefore do 
not always reﬂect the phenomena that we are
interested in, especially if considering the fact 
that labour migrants’ remittances can also be 
transferred through other channels such as bank 
accounts or non-bank means, in the form of cash. 
Nevertheless, the data of swift transfer electronic 
systems give a rather clear idea about the key 
countries where these remittances originate from.
Table 10 reﬂects the electronic remittance ﬂows
to Georgia from several countries with Russia 
well in the lead position. Over the past three years 
(2004 to 2006) Russia accounted for 60% of all 
remittances in the average, although its average 
Table 9:
 Average Monthly Income per Capita (GEL)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total income 39.4 45.3 60.8 64.6 73.4 80.8 90.2 101.4
Total monetary income  
and transfers
28.8 34.0 41.0 45.8 50.3 59.8 68.5 81.2
Wages and salaries 11.7 13.7 16.1 16.1 17.8 23.3 28.6 36.2
Self-employment 5.8 6.3 8.2 8.6 9.7 10.5 10.8 11.6
Sale of agricultural produce 5.6 5.6 7.7 8.2 9.1 8.5 8.6 7.4
Asset holdings (rent, interest 
on bank deposit, etc.)
0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.4 1.1
Pensions, stipends, allowances 2.3 3.2 2.2 2.2 4.1 6.8 8.7 11.3
Remittances 1.0 2.2 2.9 4.9 3.3 3.7 3.9 4.7
Money received from relatives, 
close friends
2.2 2.5 3.2 5.4 5.7 6.0 7.5 8.9
Non-monetary income 10.6 11.3 19.8 18.8 23.1 21.1 21.8 20.2
Total other monetary means 7.2 4.8 12.4 11.1 11.3 11.5 12.4 13.8
Sale of property 1.9 1.8 2.9 2.2 2.5 1.4 1.8 1.6
Debt or use of savings 5.3 3.0 9.5 8.9 8.8 10.1 10.6 12.2
Debt or use of savings 36.0 38.8 53.5 57.0 61.6 71.2 80.9 94.9
Total monetary  
and non-monetary means
46.6 50.1 73.3 75.7 84.7 92.3 102.7 115.2
3.2 Evaluation of the Amount of Remittances to Georgia
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share in earlier years (2001 to 2003) did not exceed 
27% and was well below the corresponding US 
indicator. At that time, the swift wire transfer 
was a comparatively new service both in Georgia 
and in Russia and was used by a very limited 
group of migrants, especially if considering that 
an intensive transport communication existed 
between the countries which facilitated the transfer 
of cash. The above mentioned type of service was 
used more extensively by labour migrants from 
Georgia in countries with strict migration regimes 
which, along with high travel costs, made frequent 
trips to Georgia difﬁcult. This may explain the
rather low indicators of electronic remittances at 
the beginning of the 21st century, which do not 
depict the real frequency of migrant workers’ 
remittances.
Table 10:
 Electronic Remittances to Georgia (thousand USD)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007*
Total 63,269 69,559 72,122 96,085 259,122 403,133 546,340 352,801
USA 28,196 24,292 20,297 23,641 30,612 42,631 59,497 48,269
Russia 14,841 18,776 21,597 26,382 132,129 253,523 364,642 222,141
Germany 2,408 3,057 3,380 5,439 5,370 6,025 4,968 2,814
Israel 1,903 2,575 2,632 2,922 2,492 3,936 4,189 3,137
Spain 1,504 1,775 1,716 2,063 4,170 6,300 11,348 10,470
Greece 1,860 2,762 3,729 5,895 7,971 15,671 16,401 8,860
Belgium 1,200 1,559 1,313 1,472 1,796 1,368 1,901 1,637
Ukraine 1,206 1,458 1,706 1,755 7,361 15,252 11,146 8,589
United Kingdom 1,170 1,531 1,677 2,341 5,902 4,904 5,923 3,851
Poland 291 215 179 321 282 285 339 222
The Netherlands 532 481 371 732 829 887 1,022 477
Kazakhstan 883 1,002 838 863 2,663 1,638 3,652 3,845
Canada 591 710 618 1,266 1,093 1,604 2,049 1,055
Turkey 834 1,221 1,598 2,819 5,721 10,215 13,929 7,299
France 424 946 1,627 3,167 3,148 3,651 3,545 1,580
United Arab 
Emirates
510 499 609 670 899 1,200 1,302 457
Azerbaijan 46 52 49 100 160 2,256 567 386
Turkmenistan 140 91 83 115 519 120 231 30
Other countries 4,630 6,558 8,104 14,123 46,002 31,667 39,690 27,703
Source: NBG
*Note: Data covering a period of six months
The National Bank of Georgia, since 2007 
in charge of the compilation of the balance of 
payment141, collates the results of the periodic 
household surveys with the data of the banking 
sector, primarily of swift transfer electronic 
systems. Based upon this data, there are three 
remittances related statistical categories which can 
be distinguished as follows: 1) workers’ remittances 
(money sent by those Georgian citizens who 
have been working in foreign countries for more 
than a year), 2) the compensation of employees 
(remittances of citizens employed for seasonal, 
temporary or seasonal jobs in foreign countries 
for less than one year) and 3) migration-related 
transfers (a monetary equivalent to assets brought 
by a labour migrant from a foreign country to the 
country of origin at the time of his ﬁnal return).
The sum of the indicators recorded under the 
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abovementioned categories represents the ofﬁcial
total volume of labour migrants’ remittances. 
The total labour migrant’s remittances to 
Georgia (see Table 11) substantially differ 
from the data of electronic remittances. This is 
especially true for the period from 2000 to 2003 
when migrants used swift transfer electronic 
systems much less frequently. In order to perform 
its task, the State Department for Statistics had 
to ﬁll the informational gap with regards to the
transfer of remittances by collating the data from 
various sources including the results of household 
surveys and special statistical studies together 
with the scarce data from the banking system. 
This, naturally, did not provide the desired result.
Afterwards, as the size of electronic 
remittances sharply increased and their record-
keeping improved, it became possible to obtain 
more accurate data. The lack of special statistical 
studies, however, which is caused by the lack of 
ﬁnancing such studies, does not allow a more
objective quantitative evaluation of remittances.
Table 11:
 Structure of the Total Labour Migrants’ Remittances to Georgia (in million USD)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007*
Total 274 181 231 235 303 346 485 305
Labour compensation of workers 179 94 152 168 236 247 315 182
Workers’ remittances 95 87 75 64 64 94 153 101
Migrants’ transfers … … 4 3 3 5 17 22
Source: NBG, World Bank, Migration and Remittances Fact Book
*Note: Data covering a period of six months
The table clearly reveals that the labour 
compensation – the remittances of those citizens 
who stay abroad for less than a year – prevails in 
the ofﬁcial remittance ﬂows of migrant workers.
The balance of payment statistics, however, does 
not even regard such citizens as migrants when 
applying the term in its strict deﬁnition. Taking
into account the increase of emigration and visa 
regimes applied to citizens of Georgia, especially 
in recent times, as well as the high costs of and 
the difﬁculty to travel, it can hardly be assumed
that short-term migrants send twice as much 
money to their country of origin as those migrants 
who stay abroad for extended periods of time. 
It is, however, this very category of migrants 
that is the most numerous. Moreover, the share 
of migrant transfers in the overall remittance 
ﬂow is extremely small. This can be explained
by the difﬁculty of their recording, which is a
typical problem for all countries concerned, not 
only for Georgia. In conclusion, there is a need 
for introducing a more elaborated practice of 
recording and classifying migrants’ remittances 
especially since the signiﬁcant part of the ﬁnancial
resources from Georgian migrants arrive to their 
family members by other means than the ofﬁcial
money transfers. 
The results of a survey conducted in 2003 
under the aegis of the International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM) and the Association for 
Economic Education offer a certain indicator 
that only ﬁfty percent of the migrants sent money
via banking institutions, whereas 17% made the 
dispatch via post. Subsequently, the remaining 
33% send cash by physical persons.
It should be noted that the share of non-bank 
remittances was much higher in Georgia at the 
end of the 1990s. According to expert estimates 
of that time, the overall volume of the ﬂow of
remittances ranged between 600 and 720 million 
USD. The comparison of the given data with the 
ofﬁcial remittance indicator of 2000 suggests that
the share of unofﬁcial remittances varied from
between 54 and 62% at that time. Considering 
that Russia did not yet impose a visa regime 
and travel procedures with other countries were 
not as strict as they are now, thereby favouring 
non-bank remittances, it can be assumed that 
the unofﬁcial remittance share reached and even
exceeded 60%. In the following period, however, 
it showed a downward trend which was somewhat 
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strengthened over the past few years (2004 to 
2006) and led to a notable decrease in the share 
of unofﬁcial remittances in total ﬂows by the year
2006.
This observation of a decline of unofﬁcial
remittances is also supported by empirical data 
showing that remittances to Georgia came mainly 
from the main destinations of Georgian citizens, 
namely from Russia and Greece. According to 
an IOM survey, more than half of the remittances 
from these countries were transferred through 
acquaintances; friends and long distance bus 
drivers, whereas 84% of migrants’ remittances 
from the US came in the form of bank or other 
types of electronic transfers.
An extreme aggravation of Russian-Georgian 
relations, which resulted in the imposition of 
a transport, visa and mail blockade by Russia 
and the deportation of Georgian citizens from 
Russia, increased the ofﬁcial remittance ﬂows
signiﬁcantly. The communications blockade made
it very difﬁcult for Georgian migrants to transfer
money through informal channels, thus forcing 
them to use the service of banking institutions and 
their swift transfer systems more extensively. In 
the second quarter of 2007, the amount of money 
transferred to Georgia from Russia through the 
above mentioned systems grew by 50% compared 
to the same period of the previous year. Moreover, 
another observation suggests that irregular 
migrants tend to accumulate money in larger 
amounts in order to send it to Georgia at the ﬁrst
possible opportunity.
According to the National Bank of Georgia, 
remittances from abroad constituted an increasing 
share of the GDP – from 4.8% in 2003, to 6.3% in 
2006. This data, based on money transfer operators 
is believed to capture approximately one-third or 
less of the actual ﬂows, given the high utilization
of informal channels. Remittances actually may 
constitute as much as 20% of the GDP. Ofﬁcially,
Russia was the largest source of remittances, 
accounting for 63% (253 million USD) of all 
ofﬁcial ﬂows in 2005.
A 2006 estimate by the UN Global Commission 
on International Migration (GCIM) shows a much 
higher ﬁgure of remittances to Georgia – USD 1
billion annually. 
Table 12:
 Aggregate Labour Migrants’ Remittances to Georgia and their Scale
2000 2006
Aggregate volume of remittances* (USD mln) 720.0 800.0
Ratio between aggregate volume of remittances and GDP, % 23.5 10.2
Ratio between aggregate volume of remittances and export volume, % 223.1 80.6
Ratio between aggregate volume of remittances and the volume of foreign 
direct investments, %
548.8 67.2
Source: Department for Statistics of the Ministry of Economic Development, NBG, World Bank
It is also interesting that the aggregate volume 
of remittances against the GDP substantially 
decreased between 2000 and 2006, which can be 
explained by a sharp increase in the GDP, on the 
one hand, and less impressive dynamics in total 
remittance ﬂows, on the other. The strengthening
of the national currency also contributed to this 
process. The ratio of migrant remittances to the 
GDP is still quite high, although it remains modest 
in international comparison.
Although the volume of remittances of labour 
migrants has sharply decreased against the GDP 
as well as against the total export volume and the 
size of direct foreign investments since 2000, such 
remittances still remain one of the most relevant 
sources of foreign currency ﬂows. Therefore
the maintenance of their intensity represents an 
important factor for macroeconomic stability.
Remittances to Georgia, as compared to 
Eastern European and some other post-Soviet 
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countries are more oriented on consumption 
than on savings and investment. The impact of 
remittances upon the national economy, therefore, 
is limited to the multiplier effect which, in its turn, 
is quite restricted due to a clear-cut orientation of 
consumption of imports. The remittances of labour 
migrants signify a vital source for a large part of 
Georgian households; although the distribution of 
the remittance ﬂows reveal a certain inequality.
The majority of recipients are inhabitants of the 
capital city and larger urban centres for whom 
remittances often represent an additional source 
of income and serve as a means of improving their 
social standing.
3.3 Georgia’s Labour Market
Hence, as our analysis has shown there are no 
remarkable changes in the economic position 
of households in Georgia during the last period. 
Poverty and unemployment remain to be the major 
problems for a signiﬁcant part of the population
despite of economic reforms, humanitarian 
aid and extensive social policy measures. The 
ofﬁcial unemployment rate of those registered
as unemployed has continued to rise, reaching a 
decade’s peak from 11.5% in 2003, to 13.8% in 
2005, and was on pace to become stable in 2006. 
The details paint an even starker picture: about 
75% of the unemployed have not had a job for at 
least one year, and the 20 to 30 years age group 
has the highest overall unemployment rate of 
28.8% (rates are lowest for those aged between 
46 and 65). In addition, annual inﬂation had crept
up to 8.8% by December 2006, and the creation 
of new jobs remained slow. Another reason for 
persistent poverty, and a problem in itself, is the 
continuing high level of unemployment. Ofﬁcial
statistics give the increase of unemployment 
as 11.5% in 2004, to 13.3% in 2007. However, 
the number of people who classify themselves 
as ‘unemployed’ is usually closer to 30%. The 
reason for this discrepancy is that ofﬁcial statistics
(and international standards) deﬁne subsistence
agriculture as ‘employment’, while many of the 
people who work in such positions do not.
Unemployment varies throughout the country. 
As the above discrepancy suggests, it may not 
be a good idea to use ofﬁcial unemployment
ﬁgures as the basis for targeting assistance to the
unemployed, since ofﬁcial ﬁgures routinely show
unemployment as higher in the cities. Clearly the 
most widespread unproductive ‘employment’ 
remains in the countryside.
Agriculture remains the mainstay of the 
Georgian economy, even as its contribution to the 
GDP has fallen from 30% in 1990, to 14.8% in 
2005. Trade and industry continue to be important, 
but ﬁnancial intermediation, the booming
construction and transportation industries and 
communications have been driving much of the 
growth; jobs in these sectors tend to be in urban 
areas. 
The labour market in Georgia is also gender 
segmented. Women are mainly employed in the 
public sector with the proportion of 117 women 
per 100 men, whereas the proportion in the non-
public sector is 57 women with hired employment 
per 100 men. Moreover, there are 161 highly 
qualiﬁed women professionals per 100 men out of
the total number of employees of the same lot, 150 
medium qualiﬁed women specialists per 100 men
and only 5 women per 100 men in the unqualiﬁed
labour force. 
It is obvious that the qualiﬁcation of women
in the labour market does not fall short of that 
of men. Nevertheless, if in the early 1990s an 
average monthly salary of a woman employed in 
the economy comprised 75% of a man’s average 
salary, during the late 1990s it dropped to 52% 
and currently does not exceed 48.6%. All of these 
facts, along with an increase of unpaid female 
labour in the household economy, indicate wide-
spread gender discrimination in Georgia’s labour 
market. 
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Current return and reintegration programmes are 
relatively new, few and operate on a limited scale. 
Unfortunately, this means that relatively few 
returnees have been through the full programmes. 
By contrast, IOM Georgia reports having helped 
4,100 Georgians to return through its Assisted 
Voluntary Return Programme up through mid-
2005. 
The IOM has the longest history of implementing 
return and reintegration programmes in Georgia. 
However, for the most part, current efforts are 
targeted towards rejected asylum seekers, who 
represent only a small proportion of all returnees. 
Limited awareness and a small number of 
countries with programmes also limit the scale of 
the initiative.
Most programmes follow a similar model. They 
are centred on assisting returnees to ﬁnd some
means of income, be it through job placement and 
training or support in opening one’s own business. 
The programmes provide funding and access 
to resources such as training on how to write a 
business plan. Additional services include housing 
assistance, counselling, adaptation training, and 
health care.
Table 14 brieﬂy presents the programmes on
returnees that exist in Georgia so far: 
Table 13:
 Gender Structure of Employment (Women per 100 Men) in Georgia, 2006
Total population 107
Total employees 91
of which:
Entrepreneur / businessman employer 23
Hired employee 91
Public sector hired employee 117
Non-public sector hired employee 57
Out of total employees:
Heads of management bodies 36
High level qualiﬁed professionals 161
Medium level qualiﬁed professionals 159
Employees engaged in preparing information, registering documents,  
record-keeping and rendering service
254
Employees engaged in trade, service or related activity 107
Qualiﬁed workers of agriculture, hunting, forestry, ﬁshery sectors 103
Qualiﬁed workers of production, construction, transport, communications sectors 16
Operators, mechanics, assemlers and drivers 2
Unqualiﬁed employees 5
Source: Department for Statistics, Ministry of Economic Development
4: Current Return and Reintegration Programmes 
International Migration. Local Conditions and Effects 103
str. 103
At the request of the Government of Georgia 
and with support of the Czech and German 
governments IOM carried out an assessment of 
the country’s migration management system from 
October 1-5, 2007 and within the scope of the 
European Commission (EC) funded programme 
‘Informed Migration – An Integrated Approach 
to Promoting Legal Migration through National 
Capacity Building and Inter-regional Dialogue 
between the South Caucasus and the EU’. The 
information presented below is based on the 
results of this assessment report and mentioned in 
the list of references. 
The assessment team noted that the 
Government of Georgia faces several challenges 
in the management of the ﬂows of foreigners
across its international borders and their ensuing 
stay in the country, be it temporary or for longer 
periods. It is also important to consider Georgia’s 
geopolitical situation with lasting instability 
in the region as well as Georgia’s proximity to 
the new EU borders of Romania and Bulgaria, 
which might produce an increase in the arrival 
of migrants aiming to enter the EU, particularly 
following these countries’ up-coming entry into 
the Schengen zone. The overriding factor is that 
legal migration into Georgia is accessible to such 
an extent that undocumented migration becomes 
almost a ‘non-issue’. Some of the more important 
contributing factors are:
• Georgia’s extremely liberal and open policy on 
migration following its free market policies;
• A very liberal visa regime both in terms of visa 
categories as well as in relation to visa issuance 
at the borders – available for practically every 
citizenship;
• Neither proper inter-agency administrative 
structure nor a clear-cut inter-agency 
cooperation between the various ministries 
and agencies, allocated with competences 
in different areas of migration management. 
Ultimately this undermines the objective of 
dealing with the different immigration issues 
in a coherent manner;
Table 14: 
Existing Return Programme Partners
Country Georgia Partner(s) Managing Agency Years of operation Number of returnees 
served
Belgium Caritas FEDASIL April 26, 2006 to April 
2008
One case (plus one 
exception – person  
from Austria)
Czech Republic People in need (PIN) Czech and German 
Government
2005 to 2008 44 families (total)
Czech Republic IOM NA NA Case-by-case
Great Britain IOM The Home Ofﬁce of the UK 
and the European Refugee 
Fund.
2003 to present 88 individuals
Ireland IOM NA NA Case-by-case
Netherlands Caritas CORDAID 2006 to 2007 Two cases
Poland IOM NA NA Case-by-case
Switzerland World Vision/IOM Federal Ofﬁce for Migration 
(FOM)/Swiss Agency 
for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC)
February 2006 to 
March 2008
51 individuals
Switzerland IOM Swiss Government Since January 15, 
2006
48 individuals
5: The International Framework of Out-Migration and Legal Frameworks  
     of Migration in Georgia
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• The lack of systematic requirements for issuing 
residence permits and their categories as well 
as the length of validity – particularly crucial 
for the residence permits issued on the basis 
of employment, with regards also to Georgia’s 
own unemployed populati on;
• There is no speciﬁc work permit regime for
foreigners in place, meaning that there are 
no limits to the employment of foreigners 
who obtain their residence permits simply on 
presentation of employment contracts. There 
are no partic management administration, 
as well as efﬁcient practices. The experts’
assessment of Georgia’s migration management 
capacity identiﬁed weaknesses which, unless
quickly addressed, are expected to fuel the 
ﬂow of undocumented migrants, transnational
crime and other abuses directly and indirectly 
linked to migration - potentially jeopardising 
the country’s security and interests. These 
weaknesses in the ﬁeld of migration include:
• A lack of overall direction and limited policy 
development and implementation capability; 
• An insufﬁcient legal framework and a lack of
clear criteria for entry and residence; 
• The fact that there is neither a government 
agency coordinating migration management 
nor, alternatively, clear terms of reference 
for the division of tasks between the existing 
agencies dealing with the migration process; 
• A lack of a coherent system for migration data 
collection and analysis and an insufﬁciently
elaborated data exchange mechanism between 
migration related institutions.
Relations to the European Union
The European Union–Georgia European 
Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan (ENP AP) was 
endorsed by the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council 
on 14 November 2006. The main priorities for the 
EU’s support in the Action Plan’s implementation 
in the period between 2007 and 2013 are given as 
democratic development, the rule of law and good 
governance; economic development and the ENP 
AP implementation; poverty reduction, social 
reforms and the peaceful settlement of Georgia’s 
internal conﬂicts.
Priority area number 4 of the ENP AP calls 
for enhanced cooperation in the ﬁeld of justice,
freedom and security, including the ﬁeld of border
management. In the area of migration issues, the 
AP foresees, among others, the elaboration of a 
coherent, comprehensive and balanced ‘National 
Action Plan on Migration and Asylum Issues’. 
Furthermore it calls for the establishment of 
an electronic database for the monitoring of 
migration ﬂows, improved coordination between
relevant national agencies dealing with migration, 
cooperation on the reintegration of returned 
asylum applicants and irregular migrants, and the 
strengthening of the dialogue and cooperation 
in preventing and ﬁghting against irregular
migration. The latter could, according to the 
document, possibly lead to a future EC-Georgia 
agreement on readmissions. 
The European Council is currently holding 
discussions with the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) on the issue of visa 
facilitation for Georgia. At the same time the EC 
Sub-Committee on Justice, Liberty and Security 
is discussing a ‘mobility partnership’ and met in 
January 2008, to discuss the progress. It is clear 
to the Georgian government (State Minister 
for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in particular) that readmission 
is linked to visa facilitation. Furthermore the 
European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom 
and Security, Franco Frattini called in his letter 
on the issue of visa facilitation on Georgia to 
introduce biometric passports by 2009. The issue 
of the EU Migration Acquis alignment for the 
Caucasus Countries remains a high priority for 
the European Commission (Directorate-General 
for Justice, Freedom and Security), which now 
considers the Acquis not necessarily as a pre-
requisite for accession, but rather a vehicle for 
closer cooperation on migration matters.
The Georgian government very positively 
accepted the idea of mobility partnerships between 
EU Members and ENP countries, put forward by 
the European Council Conclusions of June 18, 
2007 ‘On Extending and Enhancing the Global 
Approach to Migration’. In fact, Georgia was 
hoping to become one of the pilot countries for 
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the implementation of this new concept. However, 
following a decision of the European Council of 
December 2007, Georgia has not been included as 
a pilot country for the implementation of mobility 
partnerships. But it can be expected that the 
Georgian government will pursue the inclusion in 
the second round of pilot partnerships. 
Apart from the recently initiated negotiations 
between the European Commission and Georgia on 
a readmission agreement with the EC representing 
all EU member states, Georgia has also been 
conducting readmission agreement negotiations 
with individual EU member states. In some cases 
(Bulgaria, Italy, Germany) readmission agreements 
have been concluded and either ratiﬁed or awaiting
ratiﬁcation, whereas negotiations are ongoing
with Austria, the Benelux countries, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovenia, and Sweden. Georgia has 
also entered into readmission agreements with 
the non-EU member states Switzerland and the 
Ukraine, whereas negotiations are ongoing with 
Norway, Russia and Turkey.
Current Migration Policy of Georgia
Currently there is no explicit emigration policy 
in Georgia, even though policy-makers are well 
aware of the economic and demographic effects 
of the large-scale out-migration of nationals of 
productive working age, as well as the possibly 
positive effects of remittances and diaspora 
involvement.
The existing legislation of Georgia governing 
migration issues consists of a number of laws, 
regulations and instructions stipulating the rights 
of nationals, foreign nationals and stateless 
persons and regulating the issues of entry, sojourn 
(residence), return, and irregular migration. 
The national migration law also relies on the 
norms of legal acts of other branches of law, for 
instance administrative or penal law, to ensure the 
prevention and prosecution of offences and crimes 
in the area of migration.
Although the general legal provisions that 
regulate the entry into Georgia do comply with 
European standards, there remain a number of 
signiﬁcant gaps in the Georgian legislation that
are related to the non-detailed list of categories of 
entry visas. While reviewing the entry regulations, 
it was already mentioned that the ‘ordinary’ 
Georgian visa has a universal character and covers 
almost all legal purposes, except study. The same 
happens with the residence permit, though study 
purposes are included in the list of other criteria 
determining the residence permit eligibility.
Georgian immigration legislation does not fully 
cover the issue of foreigners being employed or do-
ing business in Georgia. There is no limitation to 
employment or economic activities, once a person 
enters Georgia with an ordinary visa. A speciﬁc
labour migration legislation does not exist either. 
The law also fails to limit business activities of 
foreigners in Georgia. In contradiction to this 
absence of regulations, several sub-regulations 
refer to and sometimes are even based on such 
limitations, which could not be found in the law. 
The norms that grant residence permits based 
on labour contracts also need critical reviewing. 
As already mentioned the Law on Foreigners 
stipulates that a temporary residence permit may 
be granted to a foreigner, who has been engaged in 
labour activities in Georgia, including freelancers. 
This implies that no work permit is necessary to 
obtain a residence permit based on employment 
grounds.
For employed persons there are no legal 
provisions or institutions in charge of the EU Acquis 
required ‘labour market test’ to verify whether the 
employment of a foreigner is justiﬁable vis-à-vis
the availability of the local work-force. Similarly, 
for self-employed persons there is no institution 
and no legal provisions in place to carry out the 
Acquis required ‘economic beneﬁts test’ to verify
the economic viability and interest of Georgia in 
any particular small or medium enterprise venture. 
Basically even the preliminary differentiation 
between these two categories (employed and 
self-employed) which is a cornerstone of the EU 
Acquis on the employment of foreigners is not 
made by Georgian legislation. 
Just as the current system for entry into 
Georgia is characterized by a very limited 
categorization and by its overly universal 
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character, the criteria determining eligibility for 
obtaining residence permits are equally general. 
Therefore, the establishment of a clear and 
diversiﬁed categorization of residence permits
issued to foreigners is of vital importance for the 
improvement of Georgia’s immigration policy 
and practice.
In the current migration law, all foreigners 
who do not require a visa to enter Georgia have 
the right to stay in the country for three months 
without visas, at which time they are obliged 
to apply for a temporary residence permit. In a 
similar fashion, foreigners who do need to have a 
visa for entering Georgia are obliged to apply for 
a residence permit before the validity of their visa 
expires. When receiving the permit the foreigners 
are automatically registered according to the 
place of residence that they have indicated in their 
application. With the exception of humanitarian 
reasons, it should not be possible for persons under 
the visa free regime to obtain a residence permit 
(i.e. change of status) if the above suggested visa 
categories were applied and their original entry 
was in the above categories.
However, there is no control mechanism in 
place to monitor whether foreigners do indeed 
apply for a residence permit upon the expiration 
of their visa or their visa-free stay, and whether 
they apply for a renewal of their residence permit 
once the current permit expires. As a result, 
no information is available on the number of 
foreigners, who exceed their right to stay and 
hence no action is taken by the government to 
promote either regularization of foreigners staying 
in Georgia on an irregular basis or to facilitate 
their departure from the country.
Emigration Policy and Protection of Labour Migrants Abroad
According to current regulations, nationals from 
Georgia who decide to leave the country on a 
permanent basis need to register this at the Ministry 
of Justice. However, for various reasons this does 
not happen to a large extent, which means that the 
numbers of emigrants registered by the Ministry 
of Justice by no means reﬂect the real outward
out-migration movements.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommends 
Georgian nationals, who live abroad to register 
with the Georgian embassies in the countries 
of their destination. According to information 
presented to the assessment team, the consular 
sections of Georgian embassies register both 
Georgian nationals residing abroad on a 
permanent and temporary basis. However until 
more precise beneﬁts for registration (e.g. vote
abroad or ﬁscal facilitation at home as a foreign
resident) are legally put in place it will be difﬁcult
to convince Georgian nationals abroad of the uses 
of registration. As labour migration is still one 
of the important aspects of out-migration from 
Georgia, it would be recommended to establish 
a legal framework for managing the aspects of 
employment of Georgian nationals abroad, i.e. 
possible bilateral agreements. 
Regulation of the activities of recruitment 
agencies sending Georgian nationals for 
employment abroad should be one priority in this 
regard, for example through a system of licensing 
or any other system that is in compliance with best 
international practices. Equally important is the 
support and protection of nationals from Georgia 
during their employment abroad, e.g. through the 
conclusion of bilateral labour migration agreements 
with countries of destination that contain speciﬁc
agreements on the protection of migrant workers, 
the deployment of labour attachés at embassies of 
Georgia abroad, engaging in mobility partnerships 
with EU Member States, etc.
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NOTES
133 The ofﬁcial statistics on migration for 1990-1991 is not
published in statistical books, but was obtained from the 
Georgian Statistical Ofﬁce and is cited in Tsuladze et al. 
1999.
134 Cf. web site: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b08_11/
IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/05-09.htm
135 Editorial note: Situated 25 km southeast of the capital 
Tbilisi, Rustavi used to be a major centre of heavy (steal) 
industries, but suffered dramatically from the dissolution of 
the USSR. Most of its industrial plants were shut down, while 
65% of the city‘s population became unemployed, with the 
attendant social problems of high crime and acute poverty. 
The population shrank from 160,000 in the mid-1990s to 
116,000 (census of 2002) as residents moved elsewhere in 
search of work. 
136 Editorial note: Situated in Western Central Georgia 
(Imereti), Tkibuli was a centre of coal mining during Soviet 
times. Now only one of previously nine mines is in operation. 
The tea production that was the second major industry in that 
area also collapsed after 1991, for lack of quality.
137 Editorial note: Akhalkalaki (population 60,975) is the 
main administrative centre of the Samtskhe-Javakheti 
province with a predominantly non-Georgian population (ca. 
90% ethnic Armenians). While the area was relatively well 
off during Soviet times, it became one of the poorest areas in 
post-Soviet Georgia. According to ofﬁcial data, the poverty
rate in 2008 was as high as 66% (of which 51.1% are living 
below the ofﬁcial subsistence level). The modest industry of
Soviet times collapsed after 1991, and with the withdrawal of 
the Russian military base – so far unreplaced by the Georgian 
army – the last major employer in the area left (1,000 working 
places for the local population). The average monthly income 
in the province is as low as 83.4 GEL (45.40 EUR) and would 
be even lower without seasonal labour migration to Russia.
138 The aggregated results of this survey are published by 
Mansoor & Quillin (Eds.) 2007.
139 Editorial note: The Georgian Civil War consisted of 
interethnic strife as well as of intra-national conﬂict. The
latter emerged after a military coup d’état (December 21, 
1991 - January 6, 1992) against the ﬁrst democratically
elected President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and continued 
with Gamsakhurdia’s rebellion in a vain attempt to regain 
power. Clashes between ‘Zviadist’ armed militia and pro-
governmental forces continued throughout 1992 and 1993, 
leading, among others, to the decision by Aslan Abashidze, 
head of the Autonomous Republic of Adzharia, to close the 
administrative border against the entries of militiamen from 
the two conﬂicting parties, thus establishing an authoritarian
semi-separatist regime in Adzharia and causing frictions in 
the relations between the regional government and the central 
government of Georgia.
140 Editorial note: The reasons for low or high expenditure on 
foods are manifold and not easy to explain. For comparison, 
the average per capita expenditure on food in Germany was 
12.9% of all consumer expenses in 2005 (2007: 9.7% of the 
consumer expenditure per private household; 2008: 14% of 
the monthly average per capita income), which is among the 
lowest of all EU countries (Luxemburg: 11%; Great Britain: 
12.3%; Sweden: 12.4%). Nearly 40 years ago, the share was 
25% in Germany. Among the higher spending EU countries 
are currently France (2005: 15.7%), Spain and Italy (20%), 
Lithuania (37%) and Rumania (50%). However, experts do 
not see the low amount as indicative for the wealth of the 
German or other low spending populations, but explain it 
either as an indicator for increasing poverty, when people start 
to save on their food expenditure instead of other consumer 
goods, or as a lack of eating culture in comparison with other 
European countries (priority choice). A third explanation 
relates to the relative stability of food prizes in Germany (the 
price of bread has increased by nine times since 1950) as 
compared to the higher increase of other consumer goods 
(since 1995: 22.5%) and of wages (since 1950: more than 
20 times). In Russia, only 6% of the respondents of polls 
by the private Russian polling institution VCIOM (web site: 
http://wciom.ru/) spend less than a quarter of their household 
budget on food (May 2008); 30% of the respondents spend 
25-49% and the relative majority (41%) even 50-74%; 16% 
of the population spend more than 75% of their household 
budget on food. Over a period of the last three years (2005-
08) the polling results remained nearly unchanged in Russia. 
Residents of the megacities of Moscow and St. Petersburg 
spend relatively less on food than the rest of the Russian 
Federation. Compare for Germany,
 web site: http://www.raiffeisen.com/news/artikel/30210128; 
and for Russia, web site: http://www.gusnews.net/2008/06/
25/russland-ausgaben-fur-lebensmittel/.
141 Before 2007, this function was performed by the 
Department for Statistics.
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The analysis of statistical data demonstrates that 
the growth of population in Moscow after 1990 
remained positive (except during the years 1992 
and 1993) and only ﬂuctuated in its scale. The
negative population growth observed during the 
years 1992 and 1993 is explained mainly by the 
fact that during these years the government of 
the capital city adopted harsh measures aimed 
at preventing inﬂux of migrants to Moscow. At
present the index of migration-generated growth 
in Moscow is one of the highest among all 
Russian regions. Since 2005, however, a slight 
decrease of migration turnover can be observed 
(see Table 1). It should be noted that the ﬁgures
in Table 1 reﬂect only permanent migration and
do not take into account temporary migrations 
that, as demographers argue, exceed the scale of 
permanent migration by a factor of 3 to 6.142
MIGRATION FROM ARMENIA AND GEORGIA TO MOSCOW
Galina I. Osadchaya and Tatiana N. Yudina
1: Statistics
1.1 Migration-Generated Population Growth of Moscow’s Population
Table 1:
 Migration-generated population growth of Moscow’s population 1992 to 2006,  
in thousands143
Year Migration-generated growth or decrease
1992 -17,1
1993 -16,5
1994 10,8
1995 24,5
1996 35,6
1997 47,8
1998 59,5
1999 61,1
2000 65,5
2001 52,0
2002 48,2
2003 54,1
2004 54,5
2005 52,3
2006 50,6
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Moscow remains to be attractive for migrants 
from Armenia and Georgia arriving for permanent 
residence in the city. However the migration-
generated growth index with regards to Georgia 
and Armenia is gradually decreasing: from 2,200 
persons in 2000, to 900 persons in 2006 from 
Armenia; and from 2,600 persons in 2000, to 500 
persons in 2006 from Georgia. Until 2005, Georgia 
provided a greater share of migration growth than 
Armenia. In 2005, however, migration-generated 
growth due to Armenian migrants in Moscow 
started to comprise 9.9% of the total migration-
generated growth rate from the New Independent 
States (NIS) of Moscow’s population while the 
same index for migrants from Georgia comprised 
mere 6.8%. This trend prevailed in the subsequent 
year 2006 (see Table 3).
Despite a decrease of migration-generated 
growth the efﬁciency of migration in absolute
terms remains to be high: the migration-generated 
growth coefﬁcient in Moscow is four times as
high as the same coefﬁcient in Russia as a whole
(see Table 2). 
Table 2:
 Migration-generated population growth coefﬁcients  
(Migration-generated population growth per 10,000 persons per year)144
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Entire 
Russian 
Federation 
9 18 35 66 44 35 35 29 18 25 19 16 6 7 9 11
Central 
Federal 
circuit
30 53 75 1006 111 95 96 88 74 82 68 64 36 34 35 39
Moscow 
City
93 57 92 117 260 242 263 245 214 239 211 166 52 52 53 48
1.2 Migration-Generated Population Growth of Moscow’s Population due 
to Migrants from Armenia and Georgia Arriving in Moscow for Permanent 
Residence
Table 3:
 Migration-generated growth of Moscow’s population due to migrants from Armenia 
and Georgia who arrived for permanent residence145
2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006
Thou. 
Persons
% Thou. 
Persons
% Thou. 
Persons
% Thou. 
Persons
% Thou. 
Persons
% Thou. 
Persons
%
Migration-
generated 
growth 
(from NIS), 
including:
16.6 100 6.8 100 6.1 100 3.3 100 7.6 100 9/1 100
Armenia 2.2 13.1 0.7 9.7 0.5 8.5 0.1 4.1 0.8 9.9 0.9 8.0
Georgia 2.6 15.8 0.8 12.2 0.7 11.6 0.5 15.4 0.5 6.8 0.5 5.9
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Until 2003, the ﬂow of migrants from Georgia
arriving for permanent residence exceeded the ﬂow
from Armenia in the total volume of all immigrants 
to Moscow: every tenth of all immigrants were 
Georgian while Armenians resulted in 8% of 
all immigrants. From 2005, the ratio changed 
and more Armenians arrived in Moscow 
(see Table 4).
Table 4: 
Structure of migrant ﬂow, number of persons arrived in Moscow from Armenia  
and Georgia for permanent residence between 2000 and 2006146
2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006
Thou. 
Persons
% Thou. 
Persons
% Thou. 
Persons
% Thou. 
persons
% Thou. 
Persons
% Thou. 
Persons
%
Total # of 
migrants
20.7 100 11.1 100 9.6 100 6.4 100 10.7 100 11.9 100
From 
Armenia 
2.6 12.4 1.2 10.8 0.9 0.5 8.2 8.2 0.86 8.1 1.02 8.6
From 
Georgia 
3.0 14.6 1.3 11.8 1.0 10.2 0.7 10.9 0.67 6.2 0.71 5.9
The absolute scale of reverse migration 
ﬂows to Georgia and Armenia from Moscow
is inconsiderable. During the recent ﬁve years
the average number of those who left Moscow 
for Armenia comprises 100 to 105 persons, the 
average number of people who left Moscow for 
Georgia comprises 150 to 160 persons. These 
ﬁgures reﬂect the general trend of return migration
from Moscow. 
1.3 Gender, Matrimonial and Educational Structure of Migration Flows from 
Armenia and Georgia to Moscow
Gender 
Males ﬁt to work represent the absolute majority
(70 to 85%) of migrants from Armenia and 
Georgia. When in 1989, of every 100 Moscow 
residents of Armenian origin 58 were male and 42 
were female (for Moscow residents of Georgian 
origin this proportion was 60 to 40) then in 2002, 
this gender disparity increased: The proportion of 
sexes among Armenians comprised 62 to 38, and 
among Georgians it comprised 65 to 35.
Matrimonial structure
Statistical data on the matrimonial and educational 
structure of migration ﬂows from Armenia and
Georgia are currently unavailable. Therefore the 
description of these structures in the following 
subsection will be based on results of earlier 
studies.147 According to these studies, 32% of 
the immigrants from Armenia and 23% of those 
from Georgia arrive with no family members. 
Among Georgians arriving unaccompanied the 
percentage of unmarried men is higher than among 
single Armenians. Resettlements of families are 
more characteristic to Georgian migrants. Three 
quarters (75%) of Georgian migrants polled came 
to Moscow together with their families; of those, 
36% with their parents, 8.0% with a spouse, 28% 
with a spouse and children, 3% with children and 
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parents. 64% of Armenians followed this pattern. 
Studies of migrants from Armenia demonstrate 
also that the family status of Georgians and 
Armenians is different. 
Educational structure
In general, Armenians are one of the best educated 
ethnic groups among the ethnic minorities of 
Moscow (Galkina 2006, 188). Nevertheless there 
are relevant differences in the educational level 
and cultural education of new-coming and ‘old’ 
Armenian residents. According to Arutyunian’s 
studies (2001) and further elaborated by Galkina 
(2006, 188), predominantly Armenophone 
Armenians coming to Moscow have a lower 
level of education, if compared to Russophone 
Armenians, who reside in Moscow at least for 20 
years, or are born in Moscow. Among the second 
group, about 75% have completed a higher 
education level, while among Russian Muscovites 
about 30 to 60% have completed higher education, 
depending on their age groups (Vendina 2005). 
As Table 5 illustrates, 39% of the ‘new’ 
immigrants from Armenia since 1989 until 2002 
and 37.3% of those from Georgia have higher 
education certiﬁcates. Similar data were obtained
by Lebedev (2006). According to his survey 36% 
of Armenian immigrants and 32% of Georgian 
immigrants hold higher education degrees. These 
data conﬁrm calculations brought by Drobiževa et
al. (2007).
Table 5: 
Number of persons of Armenian and Georgian origin with higher education,  
incomplete higher education, and specialized secondary education  
(per 1,000 persons of 15 years old and above)
Country of 
origin
Education
Higher education Secondary education
1989 1994 2002 1989 1994 2002
Armenia 551 567 399 144 166 208
Georgia No data 514 373 No data 173 227
Source: Arutyunian 2001; Drobiževa et al. 2007
1.4 Armenian and Georgian Communities in Moscow
Migration ﬂows contribute increasingly to the
ethnic re-composition of Moscow’s population 
(see Table 6).
Table 6:
 The percentage of ethnic Armenians and Georgians among the population of Moscow
Ethnic origin
Percentage of the total population Increases between 1989 and 2002,  
in percentage1970 1979 1989 2002
Armenians 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.7
Georgians 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3
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According to the 2002 census, the Armenian 
community in Moscow numbers 124,000 people. 
The number of Armenians residing in Moscow 
increased threefold between the censuses of 1989 
and 2002. The share of Moscow born ethnic 
Armenians is 24% while 76% of the Armenian 
residents have moved in at one time or another; 
of these, 26% arrived after 1990. According to 
Arutyunian’s study (2001), the new generation 
of the Armenian population of Moscow is 
fundamentally distinct from the Armenians who 
settled in the city earlier. Peculiarities of the new 
generation emerge in social orientations and 
in cultural attitudes. Newcomers are oriented 
toward the Armenian culture. All Armenians 
interviewed are migrants of the 1990s who regard 
the Armenian language as their mother tongue 
and speak it ﬂuently. Only one third of them
speak Russian. All in all, according to the census 
2002, 36.1% of Armenians residing in Moscow 
speak Russian ﬂuently and regard Russian as their
second language.
As several researchers (cf. Vendina 2005; 
Rybakovski 2006; Drobiževa et al. 2007) note, 
Armenians tend to agglomerate in certain areas of 
Moscow. The largest concentration of Armenian 
newcomers can be found in the suburban 
Vostryakovo district, in the far south of Central 
Moscow. 
The Georgian community of Moscow is 
smaller than the Armenian one, comprising 
about 54,000 to 55,000 people (cf. Rybakovski 
2006; Drobiževa et al. 2007; Osadchaya 2008). 
The greatest rates of the Georgian community 
growth occurred between 1992 and 1995. More 
Georgians came to Moscow during these four 
years than in the precedent 36 years (Kutelia et al. 
2006). Currently Georgians comprise 22% of the 
metropolis’ population. According to Drobiževa et 
al. (2007), the majority of Moscow’s Georgians are 
speaking Russian ﬂuently, while two thirds retain
a good command of the Georgian language. These 
ﬁndings correlate with data of the 2002 census:
the share of Georgians who have a complete 
command of the Russian language comprised 
44.2% (according to the census of 1989, 58% 
of Georgians regarded Russian as their mother 
tongue, while 95.0% of Georgians had complete 
command of Russian as their second language).
The Georgian settlement in Moscow is 
more disperse than the settlement of Armenians 
and it is not distinguishable for any increased 
concentrations. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
identify the north-west and south west sectors of 
the city as sectors that are inhabited by Georgians 
more often.
The census of 2002 reﬂected for the ﬁrst time
citizenship among other social characteristics. 
Besides residents with Russian citizenship 
those with Armenian and Georgian citizenships 
are relatively visible (see Table 7). Due to the 
introduction of dual citizenship in Armenia in 
spring 2007, it is possible to assume that the 
number of Armenians with dual citizenship will 
rise.
Table 7: 
Moscow’s population by citizenship (Data of 2002 All-Russian census)
Foreign citizens Thousand people Percentage
Total # 338 100
Citizens of Armenia 29 0.3
Citizens of Georgia 20 0.2
1.5 Employment of Armenians and Georgians and Their Work in Moscow
On Moscow’s labour market there is a huge 
demand for cheap labour force. Nowadays legal 
mechanisms for the attraction of temporary 
migrant labour are rather well adjusted. According 
to Federal Migration Service (FMS) data between 
1995 and 2004 a permanent and stable increase in 
the number of people attracted to work from FSU 
countries can be observed. For example, in 2003 
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work permits were issued to 106,000 persons. In 
2004, about 220,000 persons from 111 countries 
received work permits in the metropolis. A trend 
to attracting workers from Armenia and a similar 
trend for workers from Georgia is being recorded, 
while at the same time trends for ﬂuctuations
diminish (see Table 8).
Table 8:
 Number of foreign workers attracted to work in Moscow from Armenia and Georgia 
(Data provided by the Federal Migration Service of the RF Ministry of Interior)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total number 57.2 69.2 54.7 72.1 73.2 64.4 82.7 72.1 106.7 145.4
New foreign countries including 
nationals of
29.3 36.1 19.2 32.0 27.1 26.9 28.3 21.3 32.1 --
Armenia 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.3 2.3 --
Georgia 4.2 4.7 3.5 4.0 3.4 3.4 2.9 0.9 1.3 --
According to data of the labour resources 
balance in the average, for instance in 2003, 
457,200 foreign migrants worked in Moscow. 
Of these, 2,300 persons were from Armenia and 
1,300 persons were from Georgia. This comprises 
2.1% and 1.2% of the total number of foreign 
citizens attracted to Moscow; respectively 7.2% 
and 4.0% of the total number of newcomers from 
new foreign countries. By mid-2008, 65,591 
migrants were employed in Moscow. Of these, 
2,014 persons are citizens of Armenia.
In July 2008, an understanding on organized 
recruitment of workers from Armenia for Moscow 
has been achieved on the basis of negotiations 
between the Government of Moscow and the 
Employment Service of the Republic of Armenia. 
Respective agencies of Moscow’s government 
request lists of vacancies from enterprises, these 
lists are then presented to employment services in 
Armenia. Mandatory requirement for enterprises 
are that in their requests they have to guarantee that 
would-be workers will be provided with housing, 
health service and that standards of labour laws 
will be abided.
The Federal Migration Service (FMS) alleges 
that the majority of Georgian labour migrants are 
staying in Moscow undocumented, and that only 
1% of all incoming Georgian migrants work with 
permission.148
According to the information provided by the 
Moscow Employment Service Agency, Armenian 
citizens work, ﬁrst of all, in construction,
commerce, public catering, industry, communal 
utilities and transportation. Arutyunian (2001) 
corroborates this information of the employment 
service, even though priorities of the spheres are 
somewhat different. According to the author, 
Armenian migrants are employed ﬁrst of all in
trade and the service sector, then in industry, 
construction, transportation, and, to a lesser 
extent, in education, science, health and culture. 
A relatively large percentage of Armenian 
newcomers is represented by employees of private 
companies or are engaged in individual labour 
activities.
Drobiževa et al. (2007) argue that Armenians, 
when compared to Georgians, get employment 
in Moscow more easily. This is connected to the 
social and occupational composition of people 
who arrive from Armenia and Georgia, and to 
their social ambitions and possibilities provided 
by the respective ethnic communities in Moscow. 
Armenians arriving in Moscow have a higher 
educational level and higher vocational claims, 
and fellow nationals, who have already achieved 
certain positions in Moscow, help them to ﬁnd
better jobs. Georgians are more represented by 
intelligentsia. Within the Georgian community 
there is a higher percentage of unemployed 
persons.
According to expert estimates made by 
Tyuryukanova (2003), a citizen of Armenia 
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who works undocumented in Moscow transfers 
64 USD/month to his home country; a citizen 
of Georgia transfers 61 USD/month. But there 
are higher estimates alleging that an Armenian 
migrant may transfer up to 126 USD/month. 
1.6 Violations of Passport Regulations
According to the Moscow City Main Directorate 
for Internal Affairs, the numbers of migrants 
detained for violation of passport regulations and 
registration regulations tend to decrease from 
2,000 persons in 2000, to 998 persons in 2004.
2: International Structure of Migration from Georgia and Armenia to Moscow 
The international structure of migration from 
Georgia and Armenia to Moscow is determined by 
bilateral treaties, agreements between receiving 
and sending parties as well as by multipartite 
agreements and treaties concluded within the CIS 
framework.
2.1 The Relationship between the Russian Federation  
      and Georgia in Terms of Migration
Three documents adopted prior to 1995, legislate 
the relationship between the RF and Georgia in 
terms of migration:
• The Treaty between the Russian Federation 
Government and the Government of the 
Republic of Georgia on the Cooperation in 
the Sphere of Culture, Science and Education 
(Tbilisi, February 3, 1994);
• The Treaty between the Russian Federation 
and the Republic of Georgia on Friendship, 
Good Neighborliness and Cooperation (Tbilisi, 
February 3, 1994);
• Declaration on the Development and Deepening 
of the Comprehensive Cooperation between 
the Russian Federation and the Republic of 
Georgia (Signed by Eduard Shevardnadze, the 
former Head of Republic of the Georgia state, 
September 15, 1995).
In accordance with the understanding of the 
presidents of the two countries Vladimir Putin and 
Eduard Shevardnadze the work on a new framework 
treaty on friendship and cooperation between the 
RF and Georgia has been developed. According 
to the foreign ministries of the two countries this 
work was virtually completed by 2006. However 
in 2007 the work on this document was put on 
hold.149 Events of August 2008 brought about 
the break of diplomatic relations between Russia 
and Georgia. This development complicated the 
movement of Georgians to Russia (Moscow) and 
their return to Georgia.150 According to specialists 
tracing migration ﬂows, Georgians have to leave
their country via third countries. Ofﬁcial data
characterizing the mobility of Georgians in 2008 
does not yet exist. According to data provided by 
the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS) 
one more problem emerged. As of September 
2008, about 500 natives of Georgia arrived in 
Moscow and applied for refugee status.151 Back in 
2006, a week-long confrontation between Russia 
and Georgia had ended with the deportation of 
undocumented Georgian migrants. 
According to data gathered by the All-Russian 
Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VCIOM) 
as a result of the conﬂict in South Ossetia in
August 2008, the attitude of Russians towards 
Georgians has changed. Half of the polled Russian 
population (51% of people) changed their attitude 
to Georgians for worse. But 41% of respondents 
retain their usual attitude to the Georgian people; 
while 2% of respondents even improved their 
attitude to Georgians. It should be noted that if 
there are 54% young people, aged between 18 
and 24, whose attitudes to Georgians deteriorated 
then there are 48% of those who share these ill 
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feelings in the age cohort of 25 to 43 years old. 
Approximately 52% of people belonging to the age 
cohort of 35 to 44 years and the same percentage 
of older respondents (60 years and more) changed 
their attitude towards Georgians for worse.152 
Respondents with elementary education and 
incomplete secondary education (53%) noted 
that their attitude to the Georgian people changed 
for worse more frequently than, for example, 
interviewed people with higher and incomplete 
education (49%). People with higher education 
level are rather stable in their attitudes to Georgians 
(among people polled who have higher education 
45% did not change their attitude; while among 
respondents with lower level of education this 
share comprises 38 to 42%).
Residents of Siberia and southern parts of 
Russia proved to be the most continual in their 
attitudes to Georgians (52% of residents of Siberia 
and 46% of southern residents did not change 
their attitudes to Georgians). However residents 
of the Urals (67%) and the North-West (56%) 
changed their perception of the Georgian people 
for worse.
Half of the polled Russians (50%) do believe 
that there are more things in Russian-Georgian 
relations that separate those nations. Yet 28% 
still think that there are more unifying elements 
than disuniting elements in these relations. The 
smallest group consists of those who think that 
there are more commonalities in Georgian-Russian 
relations: in the 18 to 24 year old cohort such 
people comprise 21%, and the greatest percentage 
of such people is in the 25 to 34 year old cohort 
(32%) and in the 45 to 59 year old cohort (31%).
As polls performed by the Levada-Centre 
demonstrate153, Russian public opinion was 
always very sensitive in its reactions to events in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. When a situation 
around unrecognized republics escalated, and 
Russian TV channels began to cover it intensively, 
public opinion changed considerably. However, 
it should be noted that though Russian society 
was gravely concerned with ‘the situation in and 
around Abkhazia and South Ossetia’ (73% of 
people polled in September 2007 expressed such 
concern) even then about a half of the people 
polled said that they had ‘no sympathy for neither 
party of the conﬂict’ (however numbers of people
sympathizing with Ossetians tended to increase 
and comprised 36%, while the number of persons 
sympathizing with Georgians was 12 times less 
and comprised 3%). Over the whole period of 
polls greater parts of respondents could not deﬁne
their attitude towards processes that took place in 
Georgia.
In June 2008, the Levada-Centre executed 
a poll of 2,000 Russians on ‘Russian’s Attitude 
toward Georgia, the US, the Ukraine and Citizens 
of these Countries’. The poll was representative 
for the adult population. According to the poll’s 
results 57% of Russians think that Georgia poses 
a threat to Russia’s interests (the ﬁgure is a sum of
answers to ‘certainly yes’ plus ‘more likely yes’). 
50% of Russians think that Georgia interferes 
in domestic affairs of Russia while 37% hold to 
the opposite opinion. The attitude of the majority 
(53%) remains neutral, a quarter regards Georgia 
in ‘rather’ or ‘absolutely negative terms’. One 
ﬁfth of Russians polled regards Georgia ‘rather’
or ‘absolutely positively’. The majority of people 
polled advocate a restriction or prohibition of 
Georgians’ entry to the RF (35% favour restrictions 
and 20% favoured prohibition).
2.2 Migration Relation between the Russian Federation and Armenia
The structure of migration relations between the 
RF and the Republic of Armenia is governed 
by The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Aid between the Russian Federation and 
the Republic of Armenia (1997).
Ofﬁcial persons give a high appraisal of the
development of relations between the RF and 
Armenia, the cooperation of the two countries 
within the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) frameworks and within 
international organizations.154 No special study 
of the attitude within the Russian population 
towards Armenia is performed. However, results 
of a study named ‘Natives of Trans-Caucasus in 
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List of Documents on Migration Issues (adopted within the CIS Framework)
Designation of document and date 
of its adoption
Signed or joined Entry into effect
1. Treaty on the establishment of 
a Consultative Board on labour, 
migration and social protection of 
CIS members’ population protection 
(Council of government heads, 
November 13, 1992, Moscow) 
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Took effect upon signature
2. Treaty on non-visa movement of 
CIS citizens (Council of government 
heads, October 9, 1992, Bishkek)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Georgia
Took effect upon signature
3. Agreement on aid for refugees 
and forced migrants (Council of 
government heads, September 24, 
1993, Moscow).
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Took effect upon signature
4. Agreement on the cooperation in 
the sphere of labour migration and 
migrant workers rights protection 
(Council of government heads, 
September 24, 1993, Moscow)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Georgia
Took effect on November 
21, 1994; in the Republic of 
Armenia and on September 1, 
1995, in the RF
5. Treaty on mutual recognition 
of rights to indemniﬁcation of
harm caused to workers by injury, 
professional disease or any other 
damage to health connected with their 
performance of labour duties (Council 
of government heads, September 9, 
1994, Moscow)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Georgia
Took effect on August 11, 1995
6. Agreement on cooperation in the 
sphere of labour protection (Council 
of government heads, December 9, 
1994, Moscow)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Georgia
Took effect on October 6, 
1995, in the RF; on October 
27, 1995, in the Republic of 
Armenia, and on January 29, 
2004, in Georgia
7. Agreement on the investigation 
procedure of employment injuries of 
workers staying abroad from their 
permanent residence states (Council 
of government heads, December 12, 
1994, Moscow)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Georgia
Took effect on March 10, 1995, 
in the RF and the Republic of 
Armenia
Moscow’ conducted by Drobiževa et al. (2006) 
give indirect evidence of the fact that Armenians 
“positively appraise a lack of inter-ethnic tension 
in Moscow”.
The protection of Georgian and Armenian 
migrants’ interests and needs issues are reﬂected
in international treaties, special documents on 
migration issues signed by the RF and Armenia 
within the CIS framework.155
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8. Protocol attached to the Agreement 
on aid to refugees and forced migrants 
of September 24, 1993 (Council of 
government heads, February 10, 1995, 
Almaty city)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Took effect on March 10, 1995, 
in the RF and the Republic of 
Armenia
9. Agreement on the procedure of 
development and compliance with 
agreed norms and requirements on 
labour protection and mutually delivered 
products (Council of government heads, 
March 12, 1996, Moscow)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Georgia
Took effect on January 17, 1997, 
in the Republic of Armenia from 
May 17, 1999
10. Agreement on procedure of CIS 
citizens’ exit to non-CIS states and 
departure from these states (Council of 
government heads, January 17, 1997, 
Moscow)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Georgia
Took effect on August 3, 2004
11. Treaty on the regulation of social 
and labour relations in transnational 
corporations operating in the territory 
of CIS member-states (Council of 
government heads, October 9, 1997, 
Bishkek)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Took effect upon signature in 
the RF on July 10, 2003, and 
in the Republic of Armenia on 
November 9, 2000
12. Agreement on CIS member-states’ 
cooperation in struggle against illegal 
migration (Council of government 
heads, March 6, 1998, Moscow)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Took effect upon signature
13. Agreement on the cooperation on the 
application of single rate manuals for the 
occupation and trades of workers and 
qualiﬁcation manuals of employee’s jobs
(Council of government heads, January 
1, 1999, Saratov)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Georgia
Took effect on June 16, 1999. 
Took effect in the RF on April 
27, 2000. 
On July 10, 2003, the RF notiﬁed
its intention not to join the treaty.
14. Resolution on the regulation of 
general data bases on illegal migrants 
and persons whose entry to CIS 
members is prohibited pursuant to 
effective national laws and due to the 
procedure of information exchange 
on illegal migration (Agreement on 
cooperation in the combat of illegal 
migration) (Council of government 
heads, January 25, 2000, Moscow)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Took effect upon signature
15. Concept of time-phased formation 
of a common labour market and labour 
force migration regulation in CIS 
member-states
Signed by the Presiding person
16. Resolution on a joint commission of 
CIS member states for CIS countries’ 
cooperation in the struggle against 
illegal migration of March 5, 1998 
(Council of government heads, April 16, 
2004, Cholpan-Ata city)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Took effect upon signature
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17. Resolution on the concept of 
CIS member states’ cooperation on 
combating illegal migration (Council of 
government heads, September 10, 2004, 
Astana)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Took effect upon signature
18. Resolution on a program of 
CIS member states’ cooperation on 
combating illegal migration for the years 
2006 to 2008 (Council of government 
heads, August 26, 2005, Moscow)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Took effect upon signature
19. Protocol on the introduction of 
modiﬁcations and addenda to the
agreement on cooperation in the 
sphere of labour migration and migrant 
workers rights protection of April 15, 
1994 (Council of government heads, 
November 25, 2005, Moscow)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Took effect from December 15, 
2006
20. Statement of CIS member 
states’ heads on an intensiﬁcation of
cooperation in struggle against illegal 
migration (Council of heads of CIS 
member states, November 28, 2006, 
Minsk city)
Republic of Armenia
The Russian Federation
Took effect upon signature
As we can see, from 2000 onwards, Georgia did 
not take part in negotiations on migration issues. 
Therefore the legal status of Georgian migrants in 
Russia is regulated by documents that Georgia has 
adopted and ratiﬁed during the 1990s as well as
by general norms of the RF Federal laws # 115-
ФЗ ‘On the legal status of foreign citizens’ of July 
25, 2002, and # 110-ФЗ ‘On migration registration 
of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation’ and 
amendments to this law.
An analysis of the statutory base of the CIS 
in the sphere of migration also shows that at the 
present time co-operations (including interaction 
of the RF and the Republic of Armenia) are carried 
on primarily along two principal directions: in the 
sphere of labour migration and in the sphere of 
combating illegal migration. These directions do 
not sufﬁciently meet contemporary requirements.
The need to broaden the range of cooperation 
along other aspects of migration is a long-felt 
one. On October 5, 2007, the Council of Heads of 
States adopted the decision on agreed Migration 
policy of CIS member-states.
Commitment to generally accepted principles 
and standards of international law and provisions 
of national laws of CIS member states, adherence 
to principles stated in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States Convention on Human Rights 
and Basic Freedoms of May 26, 1995, as well as 
adherence to other interstate and intergovernmental 
agreements concluded in this sphere within the 
framework of the Commonwealth are expressed 
in the Declaration of the Agreed Migration Policy 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
Members. The heads of states proclaimed their 
willingness to:
• Pursue the agreed migration policy;
• Promote securing the CIS member states’ 
citizens rights to freedom of movement, choice 
of place of residence, staying and labour 
activity performance;
• Debar any discrimination based on gender, 
race, language, religion and beliefs, political or 
other opinions, ethnic or social origin, property 
or family status;
• Provide support to ethnic, language, cultural 
and religious uniqueness of the CIS member 
states’ citizens;
• Contribute to shaping respect for laws, language 
and culture of a country of stay among the CIS 
member states’ citizens;
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• Promote cooperation of state and non-state 
structures in the sphere of migration;
• Extend cooperation on issues of labour 
migration processes normalization and 
regulation;
• Develop informational interaction in the sphere 
of migration;
• Seek to provision beneﬁcial conditions for
mutual travels of the CIS member states’ 
citizens;
• Carry on measures aimed at the prevention 
and suppression of illegal migration, provide 
mutual help in prevention, identiﬁcation and
suppression of illegal migration channels;
• Seek to co-operate on migration laws’ 
harmonization issues, and in the development of 
migration programs and their implementation.
In the new version of the convention On 
the legal status of labour migrant workers and 
members of their families156 of the CIS member 
states all rights that citizens of the receiving party 
enjoy pursuant to the national law are granted 
to migrants.157 Migrant workers and members 
of their families enjoy fully guaranteed the 
following rights: right to life; right to freedom and 
security of person; right to marry; right to equality 
before law and justice; right to protection against 
illegal interference in private or family life; 
right to protection against illegal infringement 
in inviolability of dwelling; right to protection 
of personal correspondence and other types of 
communication secrecy; right to the protection of 
honour, dignity and business reputation; right to 
the protection of legally owned private property; 
right of access to cultural life and participation 
in it; right to social security (social insurance) in 
accordance with laws of receiving party (except 
retirement insurance); right to get emergency 
medical aid.
Also, freedoms of speech; worship; expression 
of opinion; establishment of associations; public 
voluntary organizations and joining trade unions 
in accordance with laws of the receiving party; 
reuniﬁcation of migrant workers’ families are
guaranteed to migrant workers. In addition, 
migrant workers enjoy rights to school training, 
vocational training and re-training; to free 
reception of information from competent bodies 
of all parties as well as the right to learn their 
mother tongues.
The convention emphasizes that migrant 
workers and members of their families cannot be 
expelled from the receiving party otherwise than 
on grounds stipulated in international treaties and 
laws of the particular receiving party.
At the same time a possibility of introducing 
restrictions for migrant workers in respect to: 
categories of jobs migrants may occupy; business 
occupations or activities in the receiving party’s 
interests; access to paid labour activity for the 
purpose of national labour market protection 
and provision for priority right of the receiving 
party’s own citizens to occupation of vacant jobs; 
vocational training on the same conditions as 
citizens of the receiving party enjoy.
It is emphasized that rights of migrant workers 
and members of their families may be subject to 
restrictions envisaged in laws of all parties, for the 
purpose of national security, public order, health 
and morals of population, or for the protection of 
other persons’ rights and freedoms.
Additionally, for the purpose of migrants’ 
interests and needs protection the Moscow City 
Government takes measures for migration ﬂows
regulation. The government has developed 
calculation rules of activities aimed at an organized 
recruitment of foreign labour force including:158
• Submission of request on the need of workers 
of particular vocations to the Moscow City 
Committee for Interregional Relations and 
National Policy. Requests are to be submitted 
by employers who have to indicate in these 
requests wage, terms of work and warrant 
accommodation in dormitories and medical 
service provision.
• Concurrence of employers requests by the 
Committee with the Moscow City Ofﬁce for
Population Employment and requests send 
to agencies for labour and employment of 
respective republics where requested workers 
are selected for limited times speciﬁed with a
particular employer.
• Mandatory health examination in republican 
medical institutions for migrant workers;
• Notiﬁcation of employers on the availability
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of workers in sending countries; employer’s 
visit to the respective republic for a check 
of conformity of the selected workers with 
the requirements set forth in request to the 
employer’s submission;
• Transfer of workers to Moscow to be 
accompanied by representatives of employer’s 
and republican agency for labour and 
employment; accommodation of newcomers 
in employer’s dormitory or in administrative 
municipality of The Moscow Single Migration 
Window (MSMW). Ofﬁcers of MSMW execute 
registration of migrants and then process work 
permits for them.159
3: Legal Framework of Migration to Russia/Moscow: Laws and Resolutions on 
    Migration
The structure of relations in terms of migration 
between the RF and Georgia, and the RF and 
the Republic of Armenia are governed by the 
RF Federal law # 115-FZ ‘On the legal status of 
foreign citizens’ of July 25, 2002. This law deﬁnes
the legal status of foreign citizens in the RF and 
regulates relations between both, foreign citizens 
and bodies of state power, local authorities that 
arise due to the stay (residence) of foreign citizens 
in the RF and with the performance of labour, 
business or other activities by foreign citizens on 
the territory of the RF.
In January 2007, a new federal law # 110-ФЗ 
‘On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens 
and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation’ 
(issued on July 18, 2006) took effect. This law 
included all issues related to the registration 
of foreign citizens that previously had been 
governed by provisions of the ‘Federal Law on 
the Legal Status’. In addition, from January 15, 
2007, amendments to the law ‘On the Legal 
Status of Foreign Citizens in the RF’ took effect. 
These amendments are aimed at the simpliﬁcation
of rules regulating foreigners’ stay and work in 
Russia. Thus one may assert that from January 
15, 2007, the new migration laws are effective in 
Russia. Modiﬁcations in the new migration laws
lie in the fact that for all foreign citizens arriving to 
Russia registration only by place of stay – which 
may be accommodation or other premises, like 
institutions or organizations – has been introduced 
instead of a registration by place of stay only in 
accommodations. Besides that, registration which 
previously had been permitted only by authorities 
became possible through a notiﬁcation procedure.
For citizens who had arrived without visa, work 
permits were issued with no quota limitations 
under the previous laws. Pursuant to the new laws 
any work permit is to be issued within the quota 
limit. Pursuant to the previous law work permits 
were executed by employers. Pursuant to the 
new law an employee applies for his or her work 
permit. Also, according to new laws employers 
must not obtain a permit to employ foreigners. 
Pursuant to the old law, persons who arrived for 
a temporary stay or temporary residence in the 
RF territory were allowed to work only in the 
respective part of the RF for which the work or 
residence permits were issued. The new law takes 
peculiarities of regional economic relations into 
account and provides for the possibility of these 
rules to be modiﬁed. If before persons temporarily
residing in the RF were not required to have work 
permits then now this requirement is mandatory.
The procedure of foreign labour quota 
deﬁnition has also changed. If previously the need
for migrant labour was determined and established 
for a year in advance, and changes in the quota in 
the course of the year were not envisaged, then 
the new laws allow a more ﬂexible solution. If an
employer feels the necessity to attract additional 
labour and beyond the quota previously declared, 
or new employers demand migrant labour the 
quotas might increase.
In 2007, measures taken against employers 
for violations of migration laws, i.e. for attracting 
undocumented migrants became more vigorous. 
If earlier employers were ﬁned for the recruiting
of migrant labour force and penalties comprised 
2,000 to 3,000 RUB (ca. 43.74 to 65.58 EUR), 
irrespective of the number of migrant workers 
hired; then today responsibility is envisaged, 
ﬁrstly, not for recruiting, but for employing
undocumented workers and, secondly, the 
maximum ﬁne for hiring undocumented workers
rose up to 800,000 RUB (ca. 17,495 EUR).
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One more novelty introduced in 2007-2008 was 
the adoption of resolutions of the RF government 
# 683 ‘On deﬁning the Allowable Percentage of
Foreign Workers Employed by Economic Entities 
Performing Activity in the Retail Trade Sphere 
on the Territory of the Russian Federation’ on 
November 15, 2006, and # 1003 ‘On Deﬁning
the Allowable Percentage of Foreign Workers 
Employed by Economic Entities Performing 
Activity in the Sphere of Retail Trade in the Field 
of Sports in the Russian Federation Territory’ of 
December 29, 2007. These resolutions limited 
the possibility for trade activity only for those 
who have temporary or permanent residency. 
These resolutions do not cover persons who 
occupy senior management positions in economic 
entities.
On August 21, 2007, the Moscow City 
Government considered and adopted a new urban 
migration program for 2008-2010 (Moscow 
City Government Resolution # 711-ПП ‘On 
Moscow City Migration Program for 2008-
2010’). This program became an extension and 
correction of the migration policy previously 
regulated by the ‘Moscow City Migration Policy 
for 2005-2007’. New provisions of the program 
were induced by the fact that the introduction 
of registrations by notiﬁcation minimizes the
rights of the RF constituent parts to regulate 
migration processes to Moscow and deprive them 
of the capability to control numbers of labour 
migrants, to obtain timely information on sectors 
of migrant employment, their accommodation 
conditions, and their health status. According to 
the conception of its developers the new program 
aims at the creation of a comprehensive system of 
providing the city with skilled labour resources, 
the maintenance of market balance, and the 
optimization of migration processes. The program 
contains some fundamentally new positions for 
the resolution of a number of migration problems. 
For instance, the metropolis proposes to create so-
called migration terminals, a Moscow exchange 
centre which will include representative ofﬁces of
the Federal structures and will be Moscow City 
Government’s authorized organization for foreign 
citizen employment in Moscow. For the issuance 
of documents foreign citizens need to get work 
permits. A foreign worker who needs to register 
as a migrant may apply for such registration in 
the migration terminal and, provided his or her 
application is duly accepted, use the terminal’s 
address for registration. After that the migration 
terminal commences to bear responsibility for the 
invited foreign worker that it accepted.
The Moscow City Department of Education has 
approved and implements a program of foreign 
migrant children’s integration into Moscow’s 
educational environment and its cultural, 
linguistic, social and psychological conditions 
of the metropolis.160 The framework entails a 
Russian language program for migrant children, 
who do not or poorly speak Russian in order to 
improve their level of socio-cultural adaptation to 
the Russian and the Moscow society.
At the same time the issue of social beneﬁts
for foreigners who work in Moscow is not 
resolved. Mechanisms of deﬁning foreign labour
force quota are not completely adjusted. So far 
it is being discussed how to trace migrants with 
serious diseases and what funds will provide their 
recovering and health. An analysis of the sanitary 
and epidemiological situation or health condition 
of the migrant labour force staying in Moscow 
indicates that up to 14% of these workers arrive 
in Moscow with virulent diseases: tuberculosis, 
syphilis, leprosy, hepatitis, HIV-AIDS. Pursuant 
the effective laws people infected with HIV-
AIDS are subject to expulsion from Russia but 
no clear mechanisms for such a procedure are in 
place. The Moscow City Government prepared 
respective suggestions and submitted them for 
consideration.
4: Migration policies of Moscow City
As noted earlier in this paper, since 2005 migration 
policies for Moscow City were developed within 
the framework of the Moscow City Migration 
Program for 2005-2007, approved by the ‘Moscow 
City Government Resolution # 491-ПП’ of June 
2005.
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As a result of the implementation of this 
program a system of interaction among Moscow 
City state power bodies is responsible for the 
regulation of foreign labour migration processes. 
This contributed to an increase of the percentage 
of legally recruited foreign workers employed in 
communal services in 2006 by 62%, in comparison 
to 2005.
However problems related to migration 
and migrants are far from being resolved and 
settled (cf. Yudina 2007). From January 15, 
2007 the introduction of migrant’s registration 
by notiﬁcation procedures and more severe
penalties for the violation of rules regulating the 
recruitment and employment of foreign labour 
force.161 In 2007, 578,390 persons from countries 
enjoying the right of entry without visa received 
work permits in Moscow. However, according to 
data provided by the Federal Migration Service 
Directorate for Moscow City, employers sent only 
207,108 notiﬁcations on employment of foreign
workers. Data on the employment of 371,282 
foreign workers from countries enjoying the 
right of entry without visa are absent. This can be 
interpreted as the existence of a shadow labour 
market and the decrease of social protection. 
The Moscow City Migration Program for 
2008-2010, as approved on August 21, 2007 under 
# 711-ПП, has taken previous ﬂaws and new
conditions of migration processes into account. It 
is based on acts of laws and other statutory acts of 
the RF on migration issues. The program sets aims, 
tasks and principal directions of urban policy in 
the sphere of migrant labour, social protection and 
social insurance, education and their integration 
into the metropolis’ social environment.
Thus, in order to promote employment of 
foreign citizens and the provision of civilized 
conditions for their stay in the capital, the 
creation of the Moscow Single Migration 
Window (MSMW) has been approved and a pilot 
MSMW project is tested in territories owned by 
‘Likhachev’s automotive plant public joint-stock 
company’. Measures for the establishment of 
a ‘Foreign guest’s map automatic information 
system’ (hereinafter referred to as FGM AIS) are 
being taken in order to supply information to the 
Moscow City executive power bodies’ work.
Powers of the Moscow City Moscow Centre 
of Labour Exchange State Enterprise (hereinafter 
referred to as MCLE SE) and the Moscow City 
Ofﬁce of Population Employment State Service 
are being speciﬁed. MCLE SE is charged with the
execution of accepting and distributing foreign 
citizens over MSMW ofﬁces, the issuance of
documents for the registration by place of stay 
and the obtainment of work permits, organization 
of health examinations, and the dispatch of 
foreign citizens arrived within the framework 
of organized enrolment to jobs. The Ofﬁce of
Population Employment Service is charged 
with the assistance provided for foreign citizens 
arriving beyond organized recruitment conﬁnes
and looking for employment. Measures aimed 
at organized recruitment of migrant workers are 
being taken. To achieve agreed efforts directed at 
the formation of organized recruitment systems 
and the dispatch of highly skilled foreign workers 
to jobs, a special inter-agency commission is 
being established, and interaction with sending 
countries is being performed.
An agreement with the Russian Federal 
Migration Service Directorate for Moscow City 
on the execution of inspecting documents issued 
by MCLE SE and required of foreign citizens to 
register the place of temporary stay and obtain 
work permits, including health examination, has 
been achieved.
The Moscow City Government policy in the 
sphere of labour may be characterized by its 
proposals on improving the RF migration laws. In 
the essence, the improvement consists of the fact 
that the determination of quota for foreign labour 
force has to be the matter of social partnership and 
be performed by regional trilateral commissions 
and on federal level by the Russian trilateral 
commission for social and labour relations 
regulation. According to the position of Moscow 
City this approach will enable to take into account 
interests of all participants of the market. Trade 
unions will control observance of the Russian 
workers’ interests, while the Russian Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs will control the 
interests of employers in migrant labour force, 
and executive authorities will control abidance 
by agreements and observance of the region’s 
economic interests. Thus the RF government 
will approve annual quotas for the issuance 
of work permits to foreign citizens, including 
the distribution of quota by the RF regions in 
accordance with understandings included in 
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the general agreement with the All-Russian 
Trade Union Associations and the All-Russian 
Associations of Employers. 
Yet it should be noted that experts in Russia 
are increasingly inclined to the abolition of 
quotas. Some have proposed to establish uniform 
procedures of recruitment and employment of 
foreign citizens who have arrived to the RF with or 
without visas from employers. These procedures 
require that employers attain permission to recruit 
and employ foreign workers. Further it has 
been proposed to issue documents that foreign 
workers need to get work permits. The Moscow 
City Government contemplates simultaneous 
submissions of medical certiﬁcates of the health
status of foreign citizens with the applications 
for work permits; to introduce requirements of 
vocational training in order to control foreign 
worker’s hiring private persons within limits of 
labour and civil agreements; to modify labour 
migrant registration procedures; to introduce 
effective law amendments that control the change 
of places of stay as a ground for the removal of 
registration.
Alongside with that it is proposed to:
• Make residential and non residential premises 
owners responsible for the improper use of 
these premises connected to foreign citizens’ 
accommodation;
• Introduce administrative responsibility for:
• A violation of labour, labour protection and 
population employment laws in the process of 
worker recruitment and illegal employment;
• Illegal activity aimed at foreign worker 
employment in the RF territory;
• A violation of rules of maintenance and 
operation of residential premises not accepted 
for operation or recognized as unsuitable 
for residence as well as failure to make 
efforts aimed at an elimination of causes and 
conditions conducive to these premises’ use 
for undocumented residence including foreign 
citizens’ residence.
These measures counteract undocumented 
migration and resist undocumented employment 
of labour migrants.
The most important steps towards the 
enhancement of social protection are measures 
envisaged in the program for medical aid to 
arriving migrants (Moscow City Department for 
Public Health Service) and in the Provisional 
administrative and residential town for repeated 
use Project.162 These measures are aimed at the 
provision of ﬁre and sanitary epidemiological
safety and of conditions propitious for foreigners 
and migrants from other parts of Russia staying 
in Moscow.
One of the program’s tasks is the discovery 
of efﬁcient methods of migrant adaptation
and integration into Moscow’s socio-cultural 
environment. Already existent programs of migrant 
children’s adaptation are being advanced.163 That 
includes educational, social psychological and 
cultural-linguistic programs, the development 
of educational books for the instruction and 
socio-cultural adaptation of migrants who speak 
Russian poorly. Furthermore the inter-regional 
competition ‘Dialogue as a path to understanding’ 
and other projects will be continued. The quality 
of education in educational institutions with 
ethnic-cultural components implementing general 
educational programs and having a great share 
of migrant students will be monitored. Extension 
of programs developed by the ‘Ethno-sphere for 
social and cultural adaptation’ within the Centre for 
Migrants Working in Moscow, the developments of 
new concepts, methods, programs in the sphere of 
migrants’ socio-cultural and language adaptation 
are scheduled. Within the program’s framework 
social assistance targeted to distressed migrants 
and to members of their families is envisaged. 
Volunteers are involved in the work with migrant 
families.
Duties of the program’s principal customer-
coordinator are vested with the Moscow City 
Committee for Inter-regional Relations and 
National Policy. The Moscow Centre of Labour 
Exchange has appointed the organization 
authorized by the Moscow City Government which 
provides for migrants’ employment in Moscow 
the issuance of documents that migrants need to 
get work permits, as well as for the organization 
and technical support of the implementation 
of the program’s measures in respect of labour 
migrants.
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Within the framework of the Moscow City 
Government’s resolution all urban departments, 
committees, and directorates that take part in the 
implementation of the program have developed 
plans of their own. Results of these plans’ 
implementations have not been analyzed so far 
and will be summarized in 2009.
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The following is a list of citations on general 
issues on international migration, migration from 
Armenia and Georgia and immigration to Russia, 
focussing on Moscow. The list contains periodical 
literature (both print and online editions, if 
available), monographs, results of representative 
and non-representative surveys and empirical 
ﬁeld studies.
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